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 This dissertation examines the permanent and transitory effects of aggregate 
wealth changes on aggregate consumption and the distribution of taxable income, while 
controlling for other important macroeconomic factors.  In the three essays presented, the 
first investigates the relationship between consumption, wealth, and disposable income.  
In addition, the relationship between the disaggregated components of consumption (non-
durable, durable, and services consumption), wealth, and disposable income is explored.  
Through the use of cointegration techniques and Vector Error-Correction Models, the 
permanent and transitory responses of all series are investigated.  The findings suggest 
that aggregate consumption, wealth, and disposable income are endogenous in the long 
run.  Therefore, all three series permanently adjust to changes in any one of these series.  
Once consumption is disaggregated, non-durable consumption and durable consumption 
are endogenous.  Structural breaks are found in the long run relationships, but results are 
robust with the inclusion of these breaks. 
 The second essay disaggregates wealth into assets and liabilities.  The permanent 
and transitory impacts of asset and liabilities changes on consumption are examined.  
Results demonstrate that disaggregating wealth has no impact on the long run 
endogeneity of aggregate consumption.  Further, assets are endogenous, responding to 
changes in consumption, disposable income, and assets in the long run. 
 The final essay examines the role of wealth in determining the distribution of 
taxable income.  In particular, changes in the share of Adjusted Gross Income reported by 
the top 0.5 percent of households (AGI Share) are investigated.  Wealth is a significant 
contributor to permanent changes in the AGI share, with increases in wealth having a 
 iv
positive effect on the share of income held by households in the top 0.5 percent of the 
AGI distribution.  Further, the capital gains tax and the top marginal income tax rate have 
a permanent negative effect on the AGI share.  Further, ninety-five the ninety-seven 
percent of these permanent changes occur within two years.  In addition, wealth and the 
capital gains tax rate create transitory changes in the AGI share. 
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This dissertation looks at the role of wealth in the macroeconomy, and how 
households in the aggregate respond to wealth changes.  Total nominal aggregate 
household wealth at the end of 2001 equaled 41 trillion dollars, which is just over four 
times the size of nominal GDP for that year.  In terms of household income, household 
wealth was five-and-one-half times larger that same year.  This amassed wealth 
represents a possibly important resource for households.  Given this, a change in 
aggregate household wealth has the potential to have substantial impacts on the macro 
economy.  Two potential areas where wealth can have important consequences are the 
purchases of goods and services by households and the distribution of taxable income.  
The first two essays study the effect of wealth changes on total consumption and the 
disaggregated components of aggregate consumption in the U.S.  The third essay 
examines wealth’s role in affecting the division of Adjusted Gross Income between the 
wealthy and all remaining households. 
 The first essay addresses the recent debate concerning the effect of wealth 
changes on consumption.  Recent research supports the classic notion that changes in 
aggregate wealth create permanent changes in consumption.  In this research, it is 
estimated that a one dollar increase in wealth permanently creates four cents in new 
consumption in the long run.  The direction of causality is unidirectional; a change in 
consumption has no impact on wealth in the short run or long run.  Contrary to these 
findings, some current researchers fail to find a permanent change in consumption from 
changes in wealth.  Aggregate wealth changes have only a transitory effect on 
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consumption.  In fact, aggregate consumption permanently impacts wealth.  This 
inconsistency of results warrants further investigation into the relationship between 
wealth and consumption.   
The first essay contributes to the literature by studying the long run and short run 
relationships between consumption and wealth.  This relationship is considered for 
aggregate consumption and also for the disaggregated components of consumption from 
the National Income and Product Accounts.  These components include non-durable 
consumption, durable consumption, and services consumption.  This essay estimates the 
permanent and transitory effects of wealth on aggregate household spending using these 
measures of aggregate consumption. 
The second essay investigates the importance of assets and liabilities for the 
relationships found in the first essay.  In balance sheet accounting, an equal change in 
assets and liabilities has the same impact on real wealth, in absolute value.  Yet, the 
second essay recognizes that an equal change in assets and liabilities may not have 
equivalent impacts on consumption in absolute value.   Changes in assets and liabilities 
may have different permanent and transitory effects on household consumption.  In 
addition, if consumption changes create permanent adjustments in wealth, the second 
essay identifies whether both assets and liabilities are permanently affected, and how 
these effects differ. 
 The first two essays examine the aggregate behavior of consumption from 
changes in wealth and the components of wealth, i.e. assets and liabilities.  Therefore, 
these two essays offer evidence concerning the recent debate on the effects of wealth 
changes on consumption.  It also illustrates the relative importance of assets versus 
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liabilities.  The third essay moves away from the behavior of aggregate consumption, and 
turns to the influence of wealth on the reporting of taxable income. 
This final essay analyzes the role of wealth in determining the permanent and 
transitory movements in the share of total Adjusted Gross Income reported by ‘ultra-rich’ 
households.  ‘Ultra-Rich’ households are defined as those that are in the upper 0.5 
percent of the AGI distribution (the AGI share).  Wealth represents an important income-
generating resource for this small group of tax filers, and changes in wealth can have 
important impacts on the AGI and tax payments distributions.  In addition to wealth, the 
role of the top marginal income tax rate and top capital gains tax rate in influencing the 
AGI share is also estimated.  In addition, this essay analyzes the issue of permanent 
versus transitory responses of this AGI share from changes in the top capital gains and 
top marginal income tax rates. 
 The three essays contained in this dissertation employ time-series econometric 
methods.   As is common in macroeconomic research, the methods use a non-structural 
modeling approach.  The focus here is to identify the key relationships among the 
variables over time, rather than impose and test a specific structural model.  Further, 
these techniques permit the endogenous response of all variables.  More importantly, they 
enable the examination of permanent and transitory responses of all variables in the 
empirical specification.  Use of these methods enables the attainment of this 
dissertation’s objective – contributing to the current literature by examining the 
permanent and transitory responses of household consumption and the distribution of 
taxable income to aggregate wealth changes. 
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Essay One 





 The large growth in equities and housing prices in the late 1990s accounted for 
the large growth in total wealth.  At the same time, domestic output experienced 
substantial growth, eclipsing recent historical rates of growth in GDP.  Expanding 
consumption fueled a significant portion of this. A long tradition of research posits a link 
between wealth and consumption - the “wealth effect.”  The empirical research dates 
back to Ando and Modigliani (1963), and posits that increases in wealth may create 
changes in consumption beyond the effect of disposable income.  The most recent 
estimates of the relationship between wealth and consumption, the wealth effect, is that a 
one-dollar increase in household wealth permanently creates approximately four cents of 
new consumption spending (Davis and Palumbo, 2001 or Mehra, 2001).  Conversely, 
recent research by Ludvigson and Steindel (1999) discover a wealth effect on 
consumption that is, at best, temporary.   
This raises the timely question – to what extent was the robust increase in 
consumption experienced in the 1990’s attributable to the large growth of household 
wealth over this same period?  The average change in real wealth between 1995:1 and 
1999:4 was 5.8 times higher than between 1952:2 and 1994:4.  Over this same period, 
real consumption grew at an average rate that was 2.3 times higher than between 1952:2 
and 1994:4.  Since consumption constitutes, on average, two-thirds of total output, large 
increases in wealth that lead to increases in consumption can produce large changes in 
total output.  For example, Poterba (2000) notes that as much as two to three percent of 
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GDP growth in 1999 could be due to the rise in household wealth during the previous 
four years.   
Beginning in late 2000, some worried about a “reverse” wealth effect, and the 
possible drag it may create on total output.  Equity prices started falling during the second 
quarter of 2000.  Housing prices continue to increase, but the declines in equity values 
were significant enough to decrease aggregate wealth.    Indeed, from the second quarter 
through the fourth quarter of 2001, aggregate output decreased, supporting the notion that 
declines in total wealth may have a negative impact on total output. 
This essay focuses on the some of the more recent empirical investigations of the 
wealth effect.  For purposes of exposition in this essay, the two competing lines of 
thought are termed as “Endogenous Consumption” and “Endogenous Wealth” papers.  
Both groups start with the basic Life-Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis (LCPIH), but 
the conclusions of these two lines of research are juxtaposed to one another.  The 
Endogenous Consumption research empirically estimates a long run wealth effect in 
consumption, or that consumption is endogenous.  This endogeneity of consumption 
leads to the conclusion that a one dollar change in wealth permanently increases 
consumption by almost four cents in the long run.  Conversely, Endogenous Wealth 
papers empirically find no long run wealth effect on consumption; it is wealth that 
permanently responds to changes in consumption.  Therefore they find that it is wealth 
that is endogenous in the long run.  In this view, increases in wealth induce only short-
run, or temporary, increases in aggregate consumption.  The conclusions of these two 
bodies of research, concerning the long run evolution of consumption, contradict each 
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other.  This research assesses the impact that wealth has on consumption, paying 
particular attention to this ongoing debate. 
 
Literature Review 
 Some of the earliest empirical findings of a wealth effect date back to the seminal 
research of Ando and Modigliani (1963). Their work develops the Life-Cycle model 
where disposable income and wealth are important determinants of consumption.  They 
empirically estimate a marginal propensity to consume from wealth between 0.036 and 
0.089, while controlling for the effects of household income.  Their findings have proven 
robust, being observed in multiple studies across various time frames.  For example, 
Davis and Palumbo (2001) provide more recent estimates of the wealth effect, using 
current time series techniques.  Their estimated marginal propensity to consume from 
wealth is 3.9 cents per dollar of wealth created.  Empirical evidence regarding wealth 
effects on consumption is robust across international borders.  In a study by Brodin and 
Nymoen (1992), the authors find significant wealth effects in Norwegian consumption, 
with a wealth elasticity estimate of 0.27 for overall consumption.1  Further, an analysis by 
Horioka (1996) and another by Ogawa, Kitasaka, Yamaoka, and Iwata (1996) look at the 
consumption behavior of Japanese households.  Both find similar wealth effects.  Horioka 
estimates a marginal propensity to consume (MPC) from wealth between 0.016 and 
0.041.  Ogawa, Kitasaka, and Yamaoka find a MPC from changes in liquid wealth of 
0.048. 
                                                 
1 Their income elasticity estimate ranges between 0.54 and 0.55.  Also, this wealth elasticity measure is 
relatively robust to those found using U.S. data.  Ludvigson and Steindel (1999) estimate an elasticity of 
0.29 and Lettau and Ludvigson (2003) estimate an elasticity of 0.30.  Ludvigson and Steindel (1999) 
estimate a MPC out of wealth of 0.046. 
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Moving beyond the effects of total wealth on aggregate consumption, recent 
research has hinted at differences in wealth effects across different components of 
consumption. Ruiter and Smant (1999) estimate the elasticity of durable consumption 
with respect to wealth of 0.36 to 0.46 in the Netherlands, which is substantially larger 
than the wealth effect on total consumption.  Patterson (1985), adjusting for household 
durables, uncovers significant wealth effects in consumption less durables.  Further, using 
a Vector Autoregression (VAR) and a Vector Error Correction Model (VECM), 
Ludvigson and Steindel (1999) note the timing of wealth effects.  They find that wealth 
effects on durables consumption and non-durable plus services consumption occur within 
a few quarters of an exogenous shock to wealth. 
Davis and Palumbo (2001) and Mehra (2001) are the two most recent papers that 
fall under the Endogenous Consumption category.  They estimate that changes in wealth 
permanently induce more consumption in the long run, and the full effect of changes in 
wealth on consumption is felt after several quarters, or even years.  These two papers 
demonstrate that a one dollar increase in wealth creates approximately almost four cents 
in new consumption, and two-thirds to nine-tenths of this effect occurs after two years.  
They also estimate an elasticity of consumption with respect to wealth of 0.19.  The 
conclusion of their research supports the traditional notion of the wealth effect - that 
changes in wealth lead to substantial permanent changes in aggregate consumption. 
The Endogenous Wealth literature includes the work of Ludvigson and Steindel 
(1999), Lettau and Ludvigson (2003), and Lettau, Ludvgison, and Barczi (2001).  They 
estimate parameter values in the long run relationship between wealth and consumption 
that are similar to those of the Endogenous Consumption research.  The conclusion of the 
 8
Endogenous Wealth literature contradicts that of the Endogenous Consumption literature, 
however.  Their findings suggest that consumption and disposable income are exogenous 
in the long run.  Therefore, the traditional wealth effect does not exist.  In contrast to 
Davis and Palumbo, it is wealth that adjusts in the long run to changes in consumption, 
disposable income, and wealth, not consumption.  Therefore, any changes in wealth have 
only temporary, short run effects on consumption.2 
Given this recent evidence, the current literature has found inconclusive results 
concerning the speed and pattern of long run adjustment of consumption to changes in 
wealth.  One possible reason for these differing results may be that Davis and Palumbo 
(2001) and Mehra (2001) use aggregate consumption in their paper, while Ludvigson and 
Steindel and Lettau and Ludvigson use non-durables plus services.  Therefore, the 
different results may be caused by the measure of consumption utilized.  Consequently, 
investigation of the effects of wealth on all forms of consumption is warranted. 
Another possible reason for the different conclusions, as noted by the Endogenous 
Wealth research, is the use of single-equation error-correction techniques by Davis and 
Palumbo.  The single-equation method implicitly assumes that consumption only 
responds to changes in wealth or disposable income in the long run.  The possibility does 
exist that wealth (as is shown by the Endogenous Wealth literature) and personal income 
also respond to changes in any of the three variables in the system too.  Therefore, 
Endogenous Wealth authors suggest a multivariate approach is warranted when 
investigating the relationship between consumption, wealth, and disposable income.   
                                                 




 The Endogenous Consumption and Endogenous Wealth literatures use the Life-
Cycle/Permanent Income Hypothesis (LCPIH) as the foundation for their empirical 
investigations of aggregate consumption behavior.  These two lines of research employ 
non-structural approaches to their empirical investigations.  However, as Ludvigson, 
Steindel, and Lettau (2002) note, empirically imposing structure in aggregate 
econometric models creates numerous problems, the most notable of which are those of 
Lucas (1976).  Their empirical methods are non-structural and avoid the Lucas Critique, 
but the LCPIH serves to guide their analysis. 
  The LCPIH is based upon utility-maximizing behavior of households, who seek 
to smooth consumption over their respective lifetimes.  In the utility-maximizing 
framework of the LCPIH, households seek to maximize lifetime welfare (W).  
Households increase lifetime welfare through consumption, given by ct; future 
consumption is discounted for the rate of time preference, θ, which is assumed constant.  
The estimated remaining lifespan of the household is T time periods.  In Equation (1.1), 
consumption is separable between periods, therefore, utility and the marginal utility from 












 Households face a lifetime budget constraint, which represents the total resources 
available over the remaining T periods in their lifespan.   The total present value of 
                                                 
3 This is a common assumption in the LCPIH.  See Fisher (1930), Branson (1989), Hall (1978), or Romer 
(1996) for more details.  Later theoretical investigations relax this assumption, which are addressed 
following the LCPIH discussion. 
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consumption must equal total discounted lifetime income and the current value of assets 
or wealth.  Income earned at time t is denoted by yt, and the current value of total wealth 
or assets is given by w0.  Future income and consumption are discounted by some 






















 Maximization of (1.1) with respect to (1.2) solves the basic household problem.  
In the LCPIH, households smooth consumption over their respective lifetimes, adjusting 
consumption to permanent shocks in their resources.  Specifically, consumption depends 
on the present value of future income, current assets or wealth, rate of time preference, 
and the discount rate.  Current consumption is positively related to beginning of period 
wealth, disposable income, and the rate of time preference, and negatively related to the 
discount rate.  In general notation, current household consumption is given by Equation 
(1.3). 
tttc νΩ=  (1.3) 
Here, ct is consumption in time period t, νt is the present value of future resources, 















ν  (1.3a) 
Household resources can be further developed, since current income, y0, is 
known.  A common assumption is that households expect future income to grow 
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proportionately to current income by a factor β over the future T-1 time periods, so the 
total proportionate future growth is denoted by β(Τ−1).  Using this, Equation (1.3a) 
becomes: 
00000 )]1(1[)1( yTwyTywt −++=−++= ββν  (1.3b) 
Substituting Equation (1.3b) into Equation (1.3), produces a restatement of the 
consumption function, Equation (1.4).  It is important to note that Equation (1.4) 
represents the long run relationship between consumption, disposable income, and 
wealth. In Equation (1.4), current period consumption depends positively on current 
period personal income and beginning of period wealth, with marginal propensities to 
consume out of income and wealth of α0 and α1, respectively.4 
00)]1(1[ wyTc ttt Ω+−+Ω= β , or 
110 −+= ttt wyc αα  
(1.4) 
 Households in the LCPIH plan consumption based upon Equation (1.4).  
However, actual current consumption ( ) may differ from planned consumption.  
Changes in current income or wealth induce changes in consumption, but households 
may not fully, or immediately, respond.  The difference between current consumption 
and planned consumption is the amount of disequilibrium that exists, given by Equation 
(1.5).  This framework lends itself nicely to current time-series econometric techniques.  
Equation (1.5) can be empirically estimated using cointegration techniques.  Also, the 
short run, immediate impacts from changes in consumption, disposable income, wealth, 
or any disequilibrium that exists can be estimated using error-correction models. 
tĉ
                                                 
4 This is due to the stock nature of wealth.  Beginning of period wealth at time t is the same as end of period 
wealth at time t-1. 
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ttt cc ε=−ˆ  (1.5) 
 Carroll (2001) notes that, following the establishment of the LCPIH model, 
empirical researchers using micro-level data failed to confirm some of its conclusions.  
He notes that these empirical investigations find that “households simply spent all of their 
current income.”  These investigations assumed certainty equivalence.  In his empirical 
work, he includes income uncertainty into the LCPIH to better describe the behavior of 
moderately impatient consumers. 
Carroll’s empirical evidence provides one possible reason for endogenous wealth 
findings.  He suggests households engage in buffer-stock, or precautionary savings, due 
to income uncertainty.  Therefore wealth and consumption are positively related.  The 
higher the income uncertainty, the greater the buffer-stock savings needed to insure 
against this uncertainty.  Therefore, a change in income itself creates a permanent change 
in wealth through this buffer-stock savings. 
Further, he suggests that there should be a long run tradeoff between wealth and 
consumption.  Households hold an amount of wealth, or targeted wealth, that is 
proportional to permanent income.  If a shock to savings occurs, increasing the ratio of 
wealth-to-permanent-income, households consume more using this extra wealth.  
Therefore, wealth and consumption should, at the very least share some short run 
relationship. 
Another area of recent research eases the time-separability assumption under the 
LCPIH.  When households consume goods, their total consumption this period may have 
important impacts in later periods.  In the theoretical literature, if the utility from 
consumption in any one period is dependent upon a stock of consumption in any previous 
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period, the household is said to exhibit “habits” in consumption.  With the inclusion of 
habits, households derive their utility from the excess of current consumption minus the 
previous stock of habits, eliminating the separability assumption. 
There are several theoretical investigations in recent years into the behavior of 
households when habits exist.  This essay focuses on the theoretical investigations that 
use habits to explain the behavior of consumption only.5  The Alessie and Lusardi (1997) 
investigation into habits finds that consumption depends on lifetime resources of the 
household, as with the LCPIH.  Not surprisingly, once habits are introduced in the 
household’s utility, consumption also depends on previous consumption.  In addition, 
when habits are non-existent, household savings is determined by future expected income 
only. With the inclusion of habits, the household’s savings decisions are conditional on 
previous savings and current income changes as well. 
In the same paper, Alessie and Lusardi introduce income uncertainty into the 
household’s consumption decision.  The household’s consumption decision with habits 
and income uncertainty is similar to the decision excluding income uncertainty.  This 
general form of consumption is given in Equation (1.6).  Household consumption, Ct, is a 
function of previous consumption, permanent income, Ypt, and some risk premium, Γj-1.  
In Equation (1.6), r is the real interest rate, ψ*wj is the discounted present value of 
expected future income innovations, and γ is the degree of habit persistence.  If γ = 0, 
there is no habit formation, and if γ = 1 there is permanent habit persistence.  Note that 
the risk premium is increasing in income uncertainty and decreasing in habit persistence.  
                                                 
5 Deaton (1992) discusses several theoretical models of consumption including habit formation.   
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Thus, more income uncertainty reduces current consumption, but an increase in the 

























The influence of habits and income uncertainty on savings is similar.  The risk 
premium has a positive influence on household savings.  This greater future income 
uncertainty creates an increase in current savings, since current savings may be needed to 
fund greater amounts of future consumption, if future income falls.  Naturally household 
consumption and savings move in opposite directions, so an increase in habit persistence 
affects savings negatively through the risk premium. 
Although Alessie and Lusardi provide great insights into the behavior of 
consumption under income uncertainty with habit formation, household income is 
exogenous.  Secklin (2001) introduces the household’s labor decision with habit 
formation, and the consumption decision is made under the condition of wage 
uncertainty.  Secklin’s findings suggest that wage uncertainty and habit formation limit 
the size of current period substitution between consumption and leisure.  When the 
persistence of habits increases, the intra-period marginal rate of substitution between 
consumption and leisure increases.  In addition, households are less likely to substitute 
between current and future leisure than in a world without consumption habits.   
Lupton (2001) also looks at the role of habits in the household’s savings decision 
in the Life-Cycle consumption model.  In particular, how do habits affect the choice 
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between risky assets and assets with less risk?  Households with greater habits will 
choose to purchase less risky assets, and larger habits also reduce the MPC out of wealth.  
Previous consumption creates a “habit liability” that reduces net wealth into effective 
wealth.  Once we reduce net wealth to effective wealth, the behavior of habit-forming and 
non-habit forming households are nearly equal. 
Finally, Smith (2002) examines the impact of durability and habits on 
consumption.  The nature of durability mitigates the impact of habits on household 
consumption.  As with Alessie and Lusardi, consumption is increasing in household 
wealth and income and decreasing in the income risk premium.  The addition of 
durability has a negative impact on current consumption.   
One theme is apparent in the theoretical investigations into household 
consumption.  Household consumption depends upon current income, future income, and 
wealth.  Adding income uncertainty does not change this result, but alters it by adding a 
risk premium to current consumption.  In addition, the inclusion of habits reduces the 
impact of changes in income and wealth on consumption.  However, the basic tenets of 
the LCPIH hold – household consumption is positively related to changes in income and 
wealth over long periods of time. 
 
Contribution 
This essay contributes to the current literature by spanning the gap between the 
Endogenous Consumption and Endogenous Wealth research.  The methods employed in 
this essay address the criticisms of the Endogenous Wealth research directed at the 
Endogenous Consumption papers.  The results of this study provide greater insights into 
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the long run and short run evolution of consumption, wealth, and disposable income.  To 
properly address the difference between the measures of consumption used between the 
Endogenous Consumption and Endogenous Wealth research, wealth effects on aggregate 
consumption and also on disaggregated consumption are evaluated.  Further, this essay 
extends the literature by examining whether substitution effects exist in the long run 
relationship.  Finally, this essay also evaluates potential structural breaks in the long run 
relationship. 
Specifically, this essay investigates the behavior of aggregate consumption and 
each of the disaggregated components of consumption (or “consumption categories”).  
These disaggregated components include non-durable consumption, services 
consumption, and durable consumption.  The Endogenous Wealth literature criticizes the 
use of aggregate consumption, due to the inclusion of durable consumption in that 
measure.  They contend that durable consumption is adequately controlled for by its 
inclusion in wealth, and instead use a measure of consumption that is non-durable 
consumption plus services consumption.  This essay investigates the long run and short 
run behavior of all consumption categories, and therefore is the least restrictive method.  
This study demonstrates that the inclusion of durable consumption in wealth is not a 
sufficient control for its behavior.  In addition, the use of the non-durable plus services 
consumption measure places unsound restrictions on the cointegration, or long run, 
relationship.  Procedures here allow for possible long run substitution effects across 
components of consumption.  Findings establish that important substitution effects indeed 
do exist, and that the exclusion of these effects creates a large omitted variables bias in 
the disposable income and wealth parameters.   
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The Endogenous Wealth research routinely criticizes the Endogenous 
Consumption literature for using an empirical method that restricts the long run 
adjustment of wealth and disposable income to zero (as they demonstrate in their 
research).  Therefore, this essay uses the same empirical methodology of the Endogenous 
Wealth literature.  This methodology allows for the long run endogenous response of all 
variables in the long run, and this essay examines the long run and short run dynamics of 
all consumption categories.  Thus, the methodology employed in this essay is the least 
restrictive.   In fact, the methods are even less restrictive then the Endogenous Wealth 
literature.  Procedures here allow for the long run adjustment of all consumption 
categories, wealth, and income in the long run relationship.  As is typical with time-series 
econometrics (and these two competing lines of research), procedures here do not impose 
a particular structural model.  By using the least restrictive methodology, these methods 
are less susceptible to a Lucas Critique argument (Lucas, 1976).6   
Another contribution of this research is the inclusion of structural break tests in 
the cointegration, or long run relationships.  Lettau and Ludvigson conduct such tests, but 
conclude that structural breaks do not exist.  This essay employs a different procedure 
that simultaneously tests for cointegration and structural breaks.  Results indicate possible 
structural breaks in the long run. 
                                                 
6 Lucas (1976) notes that parameters from structural macroeconomic models may vary based upon policy 





The procedures here use the same methodology as the Endogenous Wealth 
literature.  Instead of using single-equation error-correction methods (which assumes 
consumption only responds to wealth or income shocks), a multivariate method is used. 
Yet, the empirical methods here are even less restrictive then the Endogenous Wealth 
literature by allowing for important substitution effects between consumption 
components.  The findings demonstrate that the specification employed removes these 
inappropriate restrictions imposed by the Endogenous Wealth literature. 
The overall goals of this essay are: 
1. Determine if a long run relationship exists between measures of consumption, 
wealth, and disposable income, and for disaggregated consumption categories, 
wealth, and income. 
2. Identify the long run differences in effects of wealth and disposable income for 
each consumption subcomponent. 
3. Examine the timing and pattern of the aggregate response of each consumption 
measure to changes in wealth (i.e., determine if consumption is influenced by 
wealth in the short run only, or both the short run and long run). 
Cointegration techniques provide the means to evaluate the long run response of each 
form of consumption to changes in wealth, and provide evidence for the first point.  The 
results from cointegration estimations for all forms of consumption provide evidence on 
the second point.  Finally, Vector Error-Correction Model (VECM) methodology 
provides evidence on the timing and short run/long run issues in point three. 
 19
As with any research that employs time-series data, care must be taken.  Granger and 
Newbold (1974) identified the dangers of using such data, and noted that Ordinary Least 
Squares Regression (OLS) can create misleading results.  Granger and Newbold 
introduce the concept of spurious regression by demonstrating that use of OLS with non-
stationary time-series data can lead to the identification of relationships that do not exist.  
Thus, if any series contains a unit root (i.e. is non-stationary), the possibility of spurious 
regression exists.  Therefore, the first step in the assessment is to identify the properties 
of each variable, and determine if any variable is non-stationary. 
 Next, the possible existence of a long run relationship must be evaluated.  
Variables integrated of the same order are cointegrated if their linear combination 
produces a variable of a lower order of integration.  If the variables move together 
through time (are cointegrated), the possibility of a spurious result, as identified by 
Granger and Newbold, is eliminated.  However, other problems arise, such as biased and 
inefficient results.  The cointegration techniques developed recently, such as Johansen’s 
test (Johansen, 1991) for cointegration and Dynamic OLS (DOLS) (Stock and Watson, 
1993), correct for these problems.7 
Data for the study span fifty years.  Thus, there is a possibility of structural 
change over the sample period.  To examine this possibility of structural breaks and test 
for cointegration at the same time, Gregory and Hansen’s test (1996a, 1996b) is used.  
The Gregory-Hansen test recursively checks for structural breaks and for cointegration 
based upon the existence of said break.  The least restrictive form of the test permits the 
                                                 
7 The DOLS method is discussed further under the Structural Break Test section. 
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inclusion of a structural break in the constant and parameters.  The long run relationship 
estimated using DOLS is then re-estimated with any possible breaks. 
 After the long run relationships are estimated, the empirical procedures then shift 
to focus on short run relationships and the long run endogeneity of all variables.  Multi-
equation Vector Error-Correction Models (VECM) are used to estimate the pattern of 
dynamic short run responses to changes in a measure of consumption, wealth, or 
disposable income.  These VECM estimates provide evidence concerning the timing of 
wealth effects – whether consumption adjusts in the short run (within a few quarters) 
and/or over the long run to changes in a given variable. Further, the VECM methodology 
examines the duration of any consumption response to changes in wealth.  If 
consumption responds in the short run only (i.e., is exogenous), the duration of any 
possible wealth effects are temporary.  If consumption responds to changes in wealth in 
the long run (as in the Endogenous Consumption research), then changes in wealth have 
permanent effects on consumption.  A statistically significant adjustment parameter 
signals the endogeneity of consumption, and the existence of long-term effects of wealth 
on consumption (the wealth effect).  As in the Endogenous Wealth literature, the long run 
adjustment of consumption, wealth, and income are all possible in the VECM.  A 
statistically significant adjustment parameter on a variable indicates a permanent effect 
on that variable from a change in any variable in the VECM.  Attention turns next to data 
used in this empirical investigation of wealth effects. 
Data Used 
 To empirically study wealth effects, data are needed for several key variables.  
They can be subcategorized into four groups: consumption variables, wealth, income, and 
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deflators.  These series are collected for the fifty-year period, beginning in the first 
quarter of 1952 and extending through the second quarter of 2002.8  All series are 
quarterly, and come from two sources.  The income, consumption, and deflator series 
come from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s FRED, and wealth is available from 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve.9 
 The consumption series include aggregate consumption, non-durable 
consumption, services consumption, and durables consumption.  The income series used 
here is real disposable personal income.  All consumption and income variables are 
provided (in FRED) in real terms using 1996 dollars.  In addition, the GDP deflator and 
civilian population were obtained from the St. Louis Federal Reserve.  Civilian 
population is used to adjust consumption, income and wealth variables for population 
changes. 
 The wealth measure is obtained from The Balance Sheet of the United States.10  
Assets are broken into tangible assets and financial assets.  Tangible assets include 
housing, such as owner-occupied, unoccupied secondary homes, homes for sale, and 
vacant property.  Housing assets are included at market value.  Other tangible assets, such 
as equipment and durable goods, are valued at replacement cost.  Financial assets include 
equities, mutual funds, demand deposits and currency, bonds, and other securities.11  
These are also listed at current market value.  Also under wealth, liabilities include 
                                                 
8 This was the last available observation when this research began. 
9 FRED data sources are the Bureau of Economic Analysis and the Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
10 The Balance Sheet of the United States includes the balance sheet for households and nonprofit 
organizations, non-financial corporate business, and non-farm non-corporate businesses.  The balance sheet 
for households and nonprofit organizations is used by the Endogenous Wealth and Endogenous 
Consumption research and in this essay. 
11 Bonds include domestic corporate securities, corporate securities, and foreign securities.   
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mortgages and home equity loans, consumer credit, and bank loans, and other 
miscellaneous entries.  Wealth is deflated by the GDP deflator into 1996 dollars and also 
adjusted for population changes.  Further, following previous studies, these balance sheet 
variables are lagged one period, so that wealth, assets, or liabilities in any quarter 
represents the beginning of quarter values.12  Given these data, attention turns to testing 
the stationarity of each series.  The unit root tests, addressed in the next section, provide 
this necessary information. 
Unit Root Tests 
 To test if any series are stationary in their respective levels, three unit root tests 
are utilized: the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1981), the 
Phillips-Perron (PP) test (Phillips-Perron, 1988), and the KPSS test (Kwiatkowski, et. al., 
1992).13  Under the ADF and PP tests, the null hypothesis is the existence of a unit root, 
or non-stationary series.  The null hypothesis in the KPSS test is one of stationarity.  As 
Kwiatkowski, et. al. (1992) point out, the ADF and PP tests suffer from low power.  In 
addition, using tests with differing null hypotheses provides better information about the 
properties of each series. 
 The basic structure of the ADF test is given by Equation (1.7), where the property 
of each series is considered separately.  The ADF test adjusts the original Dickey-Fuller 
test by adding k lags of first differences of the series in question to control for serial 
correlation, since the underlying data generating process may be more complicated than 
an AR(1) process (Harris, 1995).  The number of lagged first differences is determined by 
                                                 
12 Descriptive Statistics are provided in Table A1.1, and the Correlation Matrix is in Table A 1.2.  An 
example from the Balance Sheet of the United States is given in the Table A 1.3. 
13 Specifically, each series is tested using its non-log, dollar levels. 
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the Schwarz Information Criteria for each series.  The null hypothesis under the ADF and 
PP tests is a unit root process, where the parameter estimate δ equals zero, and the test 
statistic is the associated t-statistic.  Since yt may be ~I(1), the normal critical values of 






1 εδγµ  (1.7) 
 The PP test estimates Equation (1.7), omitting the lagged first difference terms.  A 
nonparametric correction is used to account for higher-order serial correlation instead of 
adding lags of first differences, as in the ADF test.  Specifically, the Newey-West (1988) 
procedure is used here to obtain a consistent long run variance estimate, which is used to 
adjust the t-statistic.  As with the ADF test, MacKinnon critical values are used to test the 
null of a unit root. 
 The KPSS test differs from the previous two tests in that the null hypothesis is 
that the series is trend stationary.  Under the KPSS test, each series can be decomposed 
into a deterministic trend and a random walk, by assumption: 
ttt rty εγ ++=  (1.8) 
where rt is a random walk, 
ttt urr += −1  (1.9) 
In Equation (1.8), t is a deterministic trend, εt is assumed to be stationary, and ut in 
Equation (1.9) is iid ( .  Under the null hypothesis , and y),0 2uσ 0
2 =uσ t is a stationary 
series.  The critical values are provided by KPSS (Table 1, pg. 166).  As with the ADF 
 24
and PP test, the KPSS test statistic depends on the lag truncation chosen.  As 
Kwiatkowski, et. al. note, a lag truncation of four may result in large size distortions, 
while 12 may result in low power, making a lag truncation parameter of eight a 
“compromise” (1992, pg. 175).  Therefore, the KPSS test employed here uses a lag 
truncation parameter of eight. 
 The results of all unit root tests are given in Tables 1.1a and 1.1b.  In Table 1.1a, 
all variables are tested in levels.  In all three tests, test results indicate each variable 
contains a unit root.  From Table 1.1b, where each variable is measured in first 
differences, each series appears stationary.  Thus, as is common with time-series data, all 
variables are integrated of order one, or contain a unit root.  Therefore, estimating any 
equation with variables containing a unit root using OLS may produce spurious results.  
However, if the variables are cointegrated, as found in previous studies, the problem of 
spurious estimates is mitigated.  The next section examines the long run, or cointegration 
relationship of the variables. 
Cointegration Tests 
 As Granger and Newbold (1974) noted, estimation via OLS of relationships 
between cointegrated variables does not produce spurious results, since they are bound 
together through time.  However, results can be biased and inefficient.  The Johansen test 
for cointegration (Johansen, 1991) provides a correction for these problems.  The 
Johansen test serves as the primary test for cointegration.  As a secondary test, Gregory 
and Hansen’s (1996a, 1996b) test for cointegration in the presence of a structural break, 
is utilized.  Gregory and Hansen (1996a, 1996b) support this strategy of pre-testing for 
cointegration.   
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Table 1.1a 
Unit Root Tests 
Variables in Levels 
(8 Lags in the ADF and KPSS Tests) 
Variable Constant Only Constant and Time Trend 
 ADF Test 
Statistic 




















(5% CV = 
0.15) 
Aggregate 
Consumption 1.59 1.91 2.27 -0.57 -0.50 0.32 
Non-Durable 
Consumption 1.39 1.57 2.17 -0.08 -0.24 0.29 
Services 
Consumption 0.95 -2.88 2.31 -1.96 -1.29 0.32 
Durable 




1.13 1.25 2.31 -1.17 -1.62 0.15 
Wealth 0.65 1.04 1.99 -1.25 -1.08 0.42 
ADF and PP tests the null of a unit root, while KPSS tests the null of a stationary series. 
 
Table 1.1b 
Unit Root Tests 
Variables in First Differences 
(8 Lags in the ADF and KPSS Tests) 
Variable Constant Only Constant and Time Trend 
 ADF Test 
Statistic 




















(5% CV = 
0.15) 
∆ Aggregate 
Consumption -4.04 -11.17 0.39 -4.42 -11.26 0.09 
∆ Non-Durable 
Consumption -4.11 -11.54 0.35 -4.38 -11.62 0.14 
∆ Services 
Consumption -3.40 -11.82 0.31 -3.60 -11.90 0.06 
∆ Durable 




-4.11 -15.77 0.22 -4.27 -10.25 0.08 
∆ Wealth -3.67 -14.52 0.30 -3.86 -15.87 0.08 
ADF and PP tests the null of a unit root, while KPSS tests the null of a stationary series. 
∆ Represents the first difference operator. 
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 The Johansen test uses an adjusted Vector Autoregression (VAR) model to test 
for cointegration.  Under the Johansen test, an unrestricted VAR model, given by 
Equation (1.10), is transformed into Equation (1.11).  In Equation (1.10), the Yt is a (k x 
1) matrix of variables, the Ai matrices are (k x k) matrices containing autoregressive 
coefficients, j is the number of lags, and εt is ~ iid (0,Ω).  In Equation (1.11), ∆ indicates 
the first difference operator, the Γi are the transformed matrices of coefficients, σt is ~ iid 
(0,Ω), and Π is the “constant dynamic adjustment of first differences of variables… to 
levels regardless of the time difference” (Charemza and Deadman, 1997, pg. 171-172).  
The matrix Π is the product of two separate matrices, or Π=αβ’.  It is the Π matrix that 
identifies the pattern of long run adjustment of all variables (α) and the long run 
relationship, or cointegration relationship (β), between all variables.  The rank of matrix 
Π determines the number of long run relationships between the variables, or number of 


















tititt YYAY σ  (1.11) 
Cointegration is tested between consumption, disposable income, and wealth, and 
is also tested between disaggregated consumption components, disposable income, and 
wealth.  The cointegration test for disaggregated components includes all consumption 
categories. In this case, only one cointegration test needs to be performed when using 
disaggregated consumption, since the Johansen test estimates the number of relationships 
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that create stationary variables.  Therefore the result from the Johansen test is the same, 
regardless of variable ordering. 
 Prior to the Johansen test, it is important to determine the appropriate number of 
lags (j) to include in Equation (1.11).  An appropriate number of lags must be added to 
ensure that the residual matrix, εt, is ~ iid (0,Ω).  One common method is to estimate 
VARs with various lag lengths and use either the Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) 
(Akaike, 1974) or the Schwarz Criterion (SC) (Schwarz, 1978) as a starting point to 
determine the appropriate number of lags.14  It’s important to note that the SC and AIC 
provide a starting point only.  The number of lags indicated might still be insufficient to 
remove residual serial correlation, which invalidates the results of the Johansen test.  
Table 1.2 provides the number of lags indicated by each criterion.  The results indicate 
that in every case, one or two lags are appropriate to start with when testing for 
cointegration.  This essay starts with two lags in all specifications. 
It is important to note that the interpretation of the parameter values depends upon 
the response of consumption in the long run.  If consumption is the only variable that 
adjusts to changes in wealth or disposable income in the long run, then these 
cointegration equations represent the long run response of aggregate consumption to 
changes in wealth or disposable income only.  If, as Lettau and Ludvigson (2003) find, 
wealth is the only variable that adjusts to changes in the long run, then it is incorrect to 
conclude that the parameter values represent the long run marginal propensity to consume 
out of disposable income and wealth.  So, adjustment of all variables to the cointegration 
                                                 
14 Generally the AIC and SC give different results.  In particular, due to the nature of these criteria, the AIC 




Akaike Information and Schwarz Criterion 
Number of lags indicated by: VAR AIC SC 
Total Consumption 2 1 
Disaggregated Consumption 2 1 
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relationships must be further investigated before any conclusions about the MPC out of 
wealth or income can be reached.  In this essay, the parameters in the cointegration 
equations will continue to be addressed as MPCs, but only to compare the estimates to 
results in previous literature. 
Panel A of Table 1.3 gives the results of the Johansen test for total consumption, using 
two lags in the test VAR.  At a 95% level of confidence, there are zero stable long run 
relationships between the variables.  The ten percent critical values are 18.60 (Eigen test) 
and 26.79 (Trace test), so the result marginally rejects cointegration at a ninety percent 
level of confidence.  Other authors test for cointegration using the Engle-Granger method 
(see Mehra 2001), and find a stable long run relationship.15  An insufficient number of 
lags may be one possible reason for the conclusion of no cointegration.  The Johansen 
test, as mentioned, relies on residuals that are “white noise”.  It is possible that using two 
lags leaves a significant amount of autocorrelation in the residuals, which invalidates the 
results.  Given this, the Johansen test is estimated extending the lag length in the test 
VAR.  Panel B of Table 1.3 gives the results from the Johansen test that uses three lags in 
the test VAR.16 The estimated cointegration relationship indicates parameters on income 
and wealth of 0.723 and 0.039, respectively.  Parameter results are consistent using two 
or three lags.  This result is then used to construct the Error-Correction Term (ECT) for 
consumption, disposable income, and wealth in the absence of structural breaks. 
How do cointegration results in Table 1.3 compare to previous results?    Mehra 
(2001), using aggregate consumption in the cointegrating equation, estimates parameters 
                                                 
15 Ludvigson and Steindel find cointegration using non-durable plus services consumption. 





Johansen Cointegration Test Results 
Panel A: Two Lags in the Johansen Test  
Number of Cointegration 









r = 0 18.46 20.97 26.03 29.68 
r ≤ 1 4.57 14.07 7.57 15.41 
r ≤ 2 3.00 3.76 3.00 3.76 
Cointegration Relationship: 





Panel B: Three Lags in the Johansen Test 
Number of Cointegration 









r = 0  23.14* 20.97 28.54 29.68 
r ≤ 1 3.51 14.07 5.40 15.41 
r ≤ 2 1.89 3.76 1.89 3.76 
Cointegration Relationship: 





* indicates rejection of the null at a 95% level of confidence. 
Standard error in parenthesis. 
Critical values provided by Osterwald-Lenum (1992), Table 1. 
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on disposable income and wealth of 0.57 to 0.62 and 0.03 to 0.04, respectively.  In the 
research here, the estimated wealth parameter (0.039) in the aggregate consumption 
equation lies inside these bounds.  However, the parameter on disposable income (0.723) 
is substantially larger.  Davis and Palumbo (2001) exclude income from transfer 
payments and estimate a disposable income parameter of 0.68, which is closer to that 
found here.  Further, their estimated wealth parameter is 0.039, which matches across 
studies.  Therefore, the aggregate consumption results here are generally consistent with 
recent research. 
Table 1.4 contains the results from the Johansen test, using two lags, for 
cointegration between the disaggregated components of consumption, disposable income, 
and wealth.  Compared with total consumption, the test strongly rejects a long run 
relationship at the ninety-five percent level of confidence.  Therefore, disaggregation of 
consumption into its three subcategories eliminates the finding of cointegration.  Further, 
adding additional lags to remove any remaining autocorrelation does not significantly 
change the results.  Structural breaks in the series potentially are producing the finding of 
no cointegration.  The next section of this study examines cointegration results when 
procedures allow for structural breaks in the long run relationship. 
Structural Break Tests 
The previous tests represent initial evidence about wealth effects on the 
components of consumption.  They presume a constant relationship between the variables 
over the sample period.  It is possible that some structural breaks have occurred over the 





Johansen Cointegration Test Results 
Number of Cointegration 









r = 0 24.46 33.46 48.07 68.52 
r ≤ 1 12.90 27.07 23.61 47.21 
r ≤ 2 6.85 20.97 10.70 29.68 
r ≤ 3 3.67 14.07 3.86 15.41 
r ≤ 4 0.19 3.76 0.19 3.76 
Critical values provided by Osterwald-Lenum (1992), Table 1. 
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Hansen’s (1996a, 1996b) test (GH) for cointegration in the presence of possible structural 
breaks is used. 
Equation (1.12) gives the general form of the test.  In Equation (1.12), Ct is the 
measure of consumption (aggregate or consumption component) being investigated, 
RDPIt is real personal disposable income, RWt is real wealth, and OC is (2 X 1) matrix of 
the remaining consumption measures.  The matrix OC is included only when testing for 
structural breaks in the disaggregated consumption components.  Also, in Equation 
(1.12), ϕt is a dummy variable, n is the number of observations, and τ indicates the period 
being investigated.  The variable τ lies in the interval [0.15, 0.85], as suggested by 
Gregory and Hansen, and denotes the dependence of the parameter on the break point.  
Finally, δ is a (2 X 1) matrix of parameters, and i indicates that each parameter and break 
point is dependent on the measure of consumption investigated. Two versions of 
Equation (1.12) are estimated for the four cointegration relationships.  The first version 
used here tests for cointegration in the presence of a structural break in the constant only 





























 One version of the GH test statistic uses the bias-corrected first-order serial 
correlation coefficient from Equation (1.12) to test for cointegration in the presence of a 
structural break.  The recursive test statistic, which is Phillips’s (1987) test statistic, is 
given by: 
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)1ˆ()( * −= τα ρτ nZ  (1.13) 
In Equation (1.13),  is the bias corrected first-order serial correlation coefficient, and n 
is the number of observations.  The other version uses the Augmented-Dickey Fuller test 
statistic (ADF* test).  However, the critical values for cointegration are different, since 
the model being tested has more parameters.  Under the GH test, the null hypothesis is 
one of no cointegration.  Cointegration exists in the presence of a possible structural 
break if the test statistic is less than the 95 % critical value.   
*ˆτρ
These test statistics rely on time-series techniques that correct for parameter bias 
and serial correlation.  Gregory and Hansen use Phillips’s (1987) bias-correction to 
derive the corrected first-order serial correlation coefficient.  In this dissertation, Stock 
and Watson’s (1993) Dynamic OLS (DOLS) technique is utilized.  There are many 
advantages to using DOLS over other correction methods.  First, it provides a correction 
for regressor endogeneity, as do other methods.  Second, it provides efficient estimation 
even when regressors are integrated of higher order.  Also, it is computationally more 
convenient than other methods.  Finally, DOLS is routinely used in empirical research, 
and is widely accepted.17 
DOLS corrects for parameter and standard error bias through the addition of leads 
and lags of the first difference of all right-hand side variables.  The specific functional 
form is contained in Equation (1.14).  In Equation (1.14), Ct, RDPIt, RWt are as 
previously defined, ∆ indicates the first difference operator, k is the lag length chosen 
based upon residual normality tests and Information Criteria (such as AIC or SC), and i 
                                                 
17 This technique is used by Ludvigson and Steindel (1999), Davis and Palumbo (2001), and Lettau and 
Ludvigson (2003). 
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indicates each parameter’s dependence on the measure of consumption used on the left-
hand side.  In addition, OC is a (2 X 1) matrix of the remaining consumption measures, 
∆OC is a [2 X (2k+1)] matrix of leads, lags, and current value of the first difference of 






















−  (1.14) 
When estimating the GH test, Equation (1.12) is incorporated into Equation (1.14) 
through the inclusion of dummies and interaction terms.  The test is estimated for a break 
in the constant only and a break in all parameters.  The GH test results for aggregate 
consumption are contained in Table 1.5.  The remaining tests for non-durable 
consumption, services consumption, and durable consumption are presented in Panels A, 
B, and C of Table 1.6. 
As the Table 1.5 results for the GH test on consumption indicate, there is no real 
consensus as to when structural breaks occur.  Two possible breaks appear in the  
cointegration relationship between aggregate consumption, disposable income, and 
wealth.  The results from the Zα test suggest a possible break around the 1991 recession, 
preceding the large increases in wealth that occurred in the 1990’s.18   
 Recall that the Johansen method with three lags (or more) indicated 
cointegration exists for aggregate consumption.  Rejection of the null hypothesis under 
the GH test indicates cointegration in the presence of a possible break.  Therefore, there 
is only a possibility of a structural break existing.  When cointegration is found, both 
                                                 
18 In contrast, the ADF* test narrowly fails to identify cointegration at the ninety percent level in the 
constant only, but, as Gregory and Hansen note, the ADF* test suffers from low power compared to the 




Gregory and Hansen Tests for Aggregate Consumption 
Break in: ADF* Statistic Zα Statistic 
Constant -4.64 (1994:2) 
  -78.41** 
(1993:3) 
All Parameters -4.77 (1992:4) 
  -89.80** 
(1990:4) 
** signifies significance at the 95% level. 
The 95% (90%) level of confidence critical values are –4.92 (-4.69) for the ADF* test and –46.98 (-
42.49) for the Zα test for breaks in the constant.  The 95% (90%) level of confidence critical values 
are –5.50 (-5.23) for the ADF* test and –58.33 (-52.85) for the Zα test when testing for a break in 




Gregory and Hansen Tests for Disaggregated Consumption 
Panel A: Non-Durable Consumption 
Break in: ADF* Statistic Zα Statistic 
Constant   -6.70** (1984:1) 
  -76.84** 
(1993:1) 
All Parameters -5.65 (1993:4) 
-67.36 
(1993:3) 
Panel B: Services Consumption 
Break in: ADF* Statistic Zα Statistic 
Constant -3.59 (1980:1) 
-25.14 
(1964:2) 
All Parameters -3.68 (1980:1) 
-24.43 
(1964:2) 
Panel C: Durable Consumption 
Break in: ADF* Statistic Zα Statistic 
Constant -2.98 (1964:3) 
-42.40 
(1964:4) 
All Parameters -4.13 (1974:1) 
-37.26 
(1990:4) 
** signifies significance at the 95% level. 
The 95% (90%) level of confidence critical values are –5.56 (-5.31) for the ADF* test and –59.40 (-
54.38) for the Zα test for breaks in the constant.  The 95% (90%) level of confidence critical values 
are –6.41 (-6.17) for the ADF* test and -78.52 (-72.56) for the Zα test when testing for a break in 
disposable income, wealth, and other consumption measures. Critical values are provided by 
Gregory and Hansen (1996) Table 1, pg. 109. 
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excluding and including structural breaks, Gregory and Hansen note that it is 
“inappropriate” to disregard the cointegration results excluding structural breaks (1996a, 
pg. 114).  Also, as GH note, one should obviously examine the results of the post break 
period for economically viable results, given the nature of the GH test.  Therefore, the 
behavior of aggregate consumption including and excluding structural breaks in the 
cointegration relationship is analyzed. 
 Turning to non-durable consumption, results indicate that cointegration does exist 
when a structural break is included.  The ADF* test suggests a break in the constant after 
1983, while the Zα test suggests a later break in the constant, after 1992.  Interestingly, 
both breaks occur at the end of aggregate sector recessions.  Gregory and Hansen’s 
results provide some guidance in choosing between the alternatives.  From their Monte 
Carlo experiments, the power of the tests increases as the break falls later in the period.  
Therefore, the results from the Zα test may be more reliable. 
Turning to services consumption and durable consumption, the GH test fails to 
reject the null of no cointegration in the presence of possible structural breaks.  Panels B 
and C of Table 1.6 provide results from these tests.  Indeed, cointegration is strongly 
rejected for services consumption.  The same is true for durable consumption.  Therefore, 
the null hypothesis of no cointegration, both with and without structural breaks, is 
supported for services consumption and durable consumption.   
The next section examines the parameters of the cointegration relationships in the 
presence of structural breaks.  These parameter estimates are compared to findings in the 
previous section and current literature.  The Long Run Adjustments and Short Run 
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Dynamics section examines the long run endogeneity of all variables and addresses the 
Endogenous Wealth and Endogenous Consumption debate. 
Cointegration Results in the Presence of Structural Breaks 
Aggregate Consumption 
The cointegration results in the presence of structural breaks are presented in this 
section.  Recall that the GH test for aggregate consumption suggested two possible 
structural breaks: 1990:3 (in all parameters) and 1993:2 (constant only).  A break after 
1990:3 in all parameters is added to the DOLS specification, and the results are in Table 
1.7.  In Table 1.7 Panel A, the first three rows of results are the pre-break parameters.  
The next three rows present post-break changes in the parameter values.  Panel B details 
the post-break parameter values and parameter significance.  Once this break is included 
in the specification, the wealth parameter estimated in the Johansen test in the previous 
section is reduced by over one-third in the period before the break (from 0.038 to 0.024).   
Also, the estimated parameter on disposable income in the period preceding 1990:4 
(0.769) is robust to the earlier Johansen test estimate (0.724). 
Results, however, are much different after the break.  Following the break, the 
size of the wealth parameter is statistically zero.  In addition, the parameter on disposable 
income after the break may initially seem economically implausible, being 1.375.  
However, this interpretation as the marginal propensity to consume out of disposable 
income critically depends on the adjustment of consumption and non-adjustment of 
wealth and disposable income in the long run.   
The GH test also suggests a single break in the constant (in 1993).  Given these 





(Break in all parameters in 1990) 
Panel A: Pre-break Cointegration Parameters and Dummy Parameters 
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Real Disposable Personal Income    0.769** 0.031 
Real Wealth    0.024** 0.008 
Constant 26.21 33.89 
ϕt * Real Disp. Personal Income (1990:4)     0.606** 0.131 
ϕt * Wealth (1990:4)    -0.040** 0.010 
ϕt * Constant (1990:4) -2204.43** 495.45 
** indicates significance at a 95% level of confidence 
Panel B: Post-break Cointegration Parameters 
Joint Parameter Values and Significance 
Variable Marginal Effect p-value 
Real Disposable Personal Income 1.375 0.000 
Real Wealth -0.016 0.169 
Constant -2178.22 0.000 




 occurring after 1993:3.  The results are given in Table 1.8.  The results are more 
reasonable, given that the long run marginal propensity to consume out of disposable 
income is 0.775.  As opposed to the previous results, the wealth parameter is 0.023 over 
the whole sample period, and is close to the pre-break wealth parameter in Table 1.7. 
Non-Durable Consumption 
 Recall that previous results indicate cointegration exists for non-durable 
consumption, with a possible break in the constant (Panel A of Table 1.6).  Given this, 
DOLS is used to estimate the long run relationship between non-durable consumption, 
disposable income, and wealth.  The specifications allow for substitution effects between 
components of consumption, by adding services and durable consumption to the 
cointegration relationship.  From the GH test, two possible breaks appear in the constant  
only: one after 1983 (Table 1.9,Panel A) and the other after 1992 (Table 1.9, Panel B).  In 
either case, all parameters are statistically significant at a ninety-five percent level of 
confidence.  The size of the marginal propensity to consume out of income is smaller for 
non-durable consumption when using the post 1992 break.  In addition, the wealth effect 
is similar to that of aggregate consumption.  Given the lack of cointegration in services 
and durable consumption, this result should not be surprising, since the long run 
relationship between non-durable and wealth should be manifested in aggregate 
consumption.  Interestingly, this estimate of the wealth effect is robust when compared to 
previous literature with the inclusion of services and durable consumption into the long 
run relationship. 
The results to this point give some interesting insight into the behavior of 






(Break in constant in 1993) 
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Real Disposable Personal Income 0.775** 0.011 
Real Wealth 0.023** 0.003 
Constant 31.61** 14.62 
ϕt * Constant (1993:3) 111.94** 14.39 





Panel A: Break in Constant After 1983:4 
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Real Disposable Personal Income 0.365** 0.048 
Real Wealth 0.028** 0.002 
Services Consumption -0.403** 0.085 
Durable Consumption -0.520** 0.103 
Constant 237.94** 39.74 
ϕ1t * Constant (1984:1) -43.27** 7.78 
Panel B: Break in Constant After 1992:4 
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Real Disposable Personal Income 0.508** 0.045 
Real Wealth 0.022** 0.004 
Services Consumption -0.621** 0.085 
Durable Consumption -0.543** 0.136 
Constant 220.71** 52.93 
ϕ1t * Constant (1993:1) 52.56** 17.11 
** indicates significance at a 95% level of confidence 
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between  aggregate consumption, disposable income, and wealth.  The GH tests suggest a 
structural break around the 1991 recession.  This test also rejects the null of no 
cointegration in the presence of structural breaks.  The long run parameter on disposable 
income, assuming long run adjustment of consumption to disequilibrium, is estimated to 
be 0.723 to 0.775, which is larger than previous estimates.  The estimated long run wealth 
effect on aggregate consumption is between 0.022 and 0.039, which is consistent with 
previous estimates. 
When disaggregating consumption into non-durable, services, and durable 
consumption, cointegration is not evident under basic tests (no structural breaks).  
However, allowing for the possibility of structural breaks provides support for 
cointegration in non-durable consumption.  GH tests suggest a break after 1992.   
Cointegration estimates provide a wealth parameter of 0.022, and a parameter on 
disposable income of 0.508.  These parameter results are significantly smaller than 
previous literature.  Two factors may account for this.  First, the measures of 
consumption differ.  The Endogenous Wealth literature uses non-durable plus services 
consumption.  This restricts the long run relationship between services consumption, 
income, and wealth to be the same as that between non-durable consumption, income, 
and wealth.  Another way of interpreting this is that it imposes a parameter value of 
negative one on services consumption.  As can be seen from Table 1.9, this imposes an 
apparent improper restriction.  The parameter on services consumption (-0.621) is 
statistically greater than negative one (p-value of 0.000).  Second, the analysis here 
addresses all subcomponents of consumption.  This framework allows for potential 
substitution effects between non-durable consumption and services or durable 
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consumption.  Results here indicate significant substitution effects exist across 
components of consumption.  Results indicate that possibly large omitted variables bias 
potentially exists in specifications that do not incorporate these significant substitution 
effects.  The wealth parameter here is approximately forty to fifty percent smaller than 
those in the Endogenous Wealth research.  Also, the income parameter in Table 1.9 is 
sixteen percent smaller than that found in Ludvigson and Steindel (1999, see Table 3).  
The negative relationship between non-durable consumption, services consumption, and 
durable consumption bias the income and wealth parameters upward in the Endogenous 
Wealth literature. 
In the remaining sections, the results are condensed.  The endogenous responses 
of aggregate consumption and non-durable consumption are examined.  Subsequent 
analyses in the next section build upon key specifications identified so far.  More 
comprehensive estimation has been conducted using alternate break specifications, and 
results are generally robust.  To preserve space and a focused discussion, these results for 
alternative specifications are presented in Appendix B.19 
Long Run Adjustment and Short Run Dynamics 
 The existence of a long run relationship gives no information concerning the 
adjustment process, or long run versus short run behavior of the variables contained in 
the system.  The classic notion of the wealth effect denotes the long run response of 
consumption to changes in household wealth. The adjustment of consumption and wealth 
is the center of the Endogenous Wealth and Endogenous Consumption debate.  The next 
                                                 
19 Specifically, results for aggregate consumption excluding any breaks and a break in 1993 in the long run 
relationship, and for non-durable consumption incorporating a break after 1992 are relegated to Appendix 
B. 
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step in this empirical section is to determine the adjustment of all variables in the 
cointegration relationships.  These adjustment parameters provide evidence concerning 
the endogeneity of consumption. 
A statistically significant adjustment parameter denotes permanent changes in that 
variable from changes in any variable in the cointegration relationship (i.e. it is 
endogenous).  If a variable does not adjust (or has a statistically insignificant adjustment 
parameter), then changes in any of the variables create transitory responses only (i.e. is 
weakly exogenous).  For example, household consumption may be exogenous and evolve 
as a random walk.  In this case, wealth and/or disposable income may adjust to 
accommodate consumption.  Ludvigson and Steindel (1999) find their measure of 
consumption (non-durable plus services consumption) does not respond to changes in 
wealth or disposable income in the long run.  In fact, as in Hall (1978), they find that a 
random walk model predicts their measure of consumption better than their restricted 
VAR model.  If consumption evolves as random walk and cointegration exists between 
the variables, then disposable income and/or wealth must adjust to changes in 
consumption in the long run.  If this is true, then wealth can only influence consumption 
in the short run, in a temporary manner, or not at all.  If consumption adjusts to changes 
in the cointegration relationship, then wealth and income changes have a permanent 
impact on consumption. 
 The next step in this investigation is to estimate the dynamic adjustment of all 
components in the long run.  To accomplish this goal, three Vector-Error Correction 
Models (VECM) are estimated: 
A. Aggregate consumption, disposable income, and wealth, excluding any breaks. 
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B. Aggregate consumption, disposable income, and wealth, including the 1993 
break. 
C. Non-durable consumption, disposable income, wealth, services consumption, and 
durable consumption, including the1993 break. 
Results in this section are grouped into two sets – two VECMs for aggregate 
consumption and one for non-durable consumption.  Specification A serves as a 
benchmark, both for specification B and for comparison to existing literature.20   
The empirical method used here matches that of the Endogenous Wealth 
literature.  In the Endogenous Wealth literature, the removal of the zero restriction on the 
adjustment of wealth and income resulted in the exogeneity of consumption.  These 
VECMs provide results concerning the simultaneous adjustment of all variables in the 
cointegration relationship.  Therefore, the restrictions of zero adjustment on income and 
wealth imposed in the Endogenous Consumption literature are removed. 
The VECM, which estimates adjustment to long run equilibrium, is given in 
Equation (1.16).  In Equation (1.16), Yt is a (k x 1) matrix of variables, and j is the 
number of lags.  Each model uses j = 4 lags, which is the general specification.  The 
number of variables, k, is three in VECM A and B.  In VECM C, k is equal to five.  In 
Equation (1.16), ∆ indicates the first difference operator, Γi is the transformed matrix of 
coefficients, and σt is ~ iid (0,Ω).  The matrix Π is the product of two separate matrices, 
or Π=αβ’.  It is the Π matrix that identifies the adjustment of all variables (α).  The long 
                                                 
20 To speed exposition, the results for aggregate consumption including a break in 1990 and those for non-
durable consumption including a break in 1984 are provided in Appendix B.  Overall, results for these two 
VECMs are robust to those of VECM A-C. 
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run relationship, or cointegration relationship (β) between all variables was estimated in 
the previous sections (for each specification).  Therefore, each variable is allowed to 


















 The main interest here is the statistical significance of the elements in the matrix 
of adjustment parameters (α).  Specifically, if the adjustment parameter for any 
consumption series is statistically significant, then this indicates the particular series 
adjusts to changes in either disposable income or wealth in the long run.  In other words, 
that measure of consumption exhibits a wealth effect, or changes in income and wealth 
have a permanent effect on that measure of consumption. 
 Beginning with a general model, the VECMs in specifications A through C are 
reduced to a parsimonious model.  Insignificant lags (with t-statistics less than one in 
absolute value) that follow significant lags are eliminated.  In each table of VECM 
results, the joint parameter value and significance of the included j lags are given for each 
variable in each equation.  Thus, the joint significance of the included lags determines 
Granger-Causality in the short-run sense.  The parameter on the ECT (Error-Correction 
Term) gives the long run adjustment (α) to changes in the equilibrium relationship 
between the variables.  As a cross check on model reduction methods, the joint 
significance of the parameters restricted to zero (through reduction to a parsimonious 
model) is reported near the bottom of each table. 
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 The VECMs are estimated using Full Information Maximum Likelihood (FIML). 
This accounts for endogeneity, and allows for system reduction to a parsimonious model.  
In a just identified model, FIML, two-stage least squares (2SLS), and instrumental 
variables (IV) estimation produce the same parameter estimates.  However, FIML is 
superior to 2SLS and IV in over-identified systems, since it produces the most efficient 
estimates.21  Therefore, FIML is the best approach when a restriction of parameters 
produces an over-identified system, which is the case here. 
Aggregate Consumption 
 As a benchmark, the specification that excludes a structural break is examined.  
The dynamic responses of aggregate consumption, disposable income, and wealth are 
reported in Table 1.10 (for the most parsimonious model).  The long run relationship used 
to derive the Error-Correction Term (ECT) comes from the Johansen Test using three 
lags (results given in Panel B of Table 1.3).  Recall in this long run relationship, the long 
run MPCs out of income and wealth are 0.723 and 0.039 respectively. 
In this specification without structural breaks, the long run dynamic response of 
aggregate consumption (given by the estimated parameter on the ECT) to changes in 
disposable income, wealth, and its own past changes is statistically significant (and the 
parameter value is -0.071).  Therefore, consumption is endogenous in this VECM.  This 
“no break” result may be compared to other recent studies.  Davis and Palumbo (2001), 
using a sample from 1960:1 through 2000:1, estimate the dynamic response of aggregate 
consumption in a single-equation format.  They find that aggregate consumption responds 
to changes in disposable income and wealth, with speeds of adjustment to changes in the  
                                                 





 (No Structural Breaks) 

















i=1 to j (0.000) 3 (0.000) 4 (0.037) 1 
Σ∆RDPIt-i 
i=1 to j (0.041) 4 (0.000) 4 — 0 
Σ∆RWt-i 
i=1 to j — 0 (0.004) 2 (0.059) 3 




   -0.341** 
(0.000) — 
    2.735** 
(0.000) — 
Joint Significance of Restrictions (p-value): 0.987 
* and ** indicates significance at a 90% and 95% level of confidence respectively 
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cointegration relationship between –0.13 to –0.21.  Mehra (2001) estimates an adjustment 
parameter of –0.15, with an almost identical sample as Davis and Palumbo.  These 
papers, by using an Error Correction Model (ECM), restrict wealth and disposable 
income to be weakly exogenous.  In other words, they restrict the long run adjustment 
parameter of these variables to be zero and not adjusting to changes in the long run 
relationship.  This restriction has a substantial impact on the results.   
The technique used here is less restrictive than Davis and Palumbo’s and Mehra’s.  
Procedures here allow for the endogenous long run response of disposable income and 
wealth.  Once the specification allows the endogenous response of disposable income and 
wealth, consumption still is found to respond in the long run.  However, the speed of 
adjustment is smaller than values found in these recent papers.  The predicted adjustment 
parameter on consumption is approximately one-third to two-thirds less than that in found 
in the Davis and Palumbo and the Mehra papers (-0.071 here versus –0.13 to –0.21 in 
Davis and Palumbo).  Further, the evidence indicates that wealth and disposable income 
are in fact endogenous, adjusting to changes in the long run equilibrium.  Therefore, 
results here indicate restricting these to zero (as in the Endogenous Consumption 
literature) is not appropriate. 
The pattern of Granger-Causality in VECM A is as complex as the long run 
relationship between the variables.  Consumption is the only variable that Granger-
Causes (⇒) all series in the short run.  The direction of causality between consumption 
and wealth is unidirectional, running from consumption to wealth.  Also, wealth ⇒ 
disposable income in the short run, but disposable income does not Granger-Cause 
wealth.  Finally, wealth Granger-Causes itself. 
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In VECM B in Table 1.11, results are consistent with VECM A.  The pattern of 
results, in terms of endogeneity and short-run Granger-Causality, match those of VECM 
A.  Therefore, the inclusion of a break in the constant in the long run relationship has no 
effect on the dynamics of the systems, as should be expected.  Thus in this specification, 
as with VECM A, evidence indicates that long run wealth effects in consumption exist.  
However, wealth and income are endogenous too, through the statistically and 
economically significant adjustment of the two series to changes in the long run 
equilibrium. 
These two VECMs provide some interesting results that support some previous 
conclusions in the literature.  First, as in the Endogenous Consumption literature, there 
appears to be a long run response in aggregate consumption to changes in wealth and 
disposable income.  Yet, the estimated MPC out of wealth is not as large as that in Davis 
and Palumbo or Mehra, the Endogenous Consumption literature.  The estimated MPC out 
of wealth here is between 0.023 to 0.039 cents per dollar increase in wealth.  Also, 
allowance for endogenous adjustment of wealth and income reduces the value of the 
adjustment parameter, intimating a slower response of consumption in the long run.  
Thus, findings here are an important contribution to the current empirical wealth effect 
literature.  Results here are consistent with previous research, but are established here 
with less restrictive empirical techniques. 
Therefore, even after providing for structural breaks, the results still point to a 
long-term wealth effect in aggregate consumption.  The methods used here are the least 
restrictive, but they still result in finding a long run response in consumption, i.e. 





(Break in 1993) 

















i=1 to j (0.000) 3 (0.000) 4 (0.013) 1 
Σ∆RDPIt-i 
i=1 to j (0.038) 4 (0.000) 4 (0.278) 2 
Σ∆RWt-i 
i=1 to j — — (0.006) 2 (0.063) 3 








   -0.468** 
(0.000) — 
    1.883** 
(0.037) — 
Joint Significance of Restrictions (p-value): 0.996 
* and ** indicates significance at a 90% and 95% level of confidence respectively 
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literature (which finds an endogenous response in wealth only) results here show that 
consumption also is endogenous.  Further, the results demonstrate that this is a complex 
relationship, with disposable income and wealth responding to changes in the equilibrium 
relationship too.  
Non-Durable Consumption 
 Recall that cointegration for non-durable consumption relied on allowance for a 
structural break in the long run relationship.  Since the Zα test is the more powerful of the 
GH tests (and the break after 1992 matches that in aggregate consumption), the Error-
Correction Term (ECT) incorporating a break after 1992 is used.22  The VECM for non-
durable consumption models the effects of non-durable consumption, disposable income, 
and wealth on each other.  This VECM also allows for the short run effects of changes in 
services and durables consumption on these variables.  Also, by including services and 
durable consumption, these two measures of consumption are allowed to adjust to 
changes in the long run relationship between non-durable consumption, disposable 
income, and wealth.  Previous tests in this essay indicate durable and services 
consumption are not cointegrated with wealth, disposable income, and other 
consumption.  However, they may still respond to changes in the long run relationship.  
By doing this, the VECM here is the least restrictive by allowing the endogenous 
response of services and durable consumption. 
Table 1.12 gives results from estimating the short run dynamics of non-durable 
consumption, disposable income, wealth, services consumption, and durable   
                                                 





(Break in 1993) 
∆NDC Equation ∆RDPI Equation ∆RW Equation ∆RSC Equation ∆RDC Equation 
Variable Joint Sig. 
(p-value) # of Lags 
Joint Sig. 
(p-value) # of Lags 
Joint Sig. 
(p-value) # of Lags 
Joint Sig. 
(p-value) # of Lags 
Joint Sig. 
(p-value) # of Lags 
Σ∆NDCt-I 
I=1 to j (0.360)      4 (0.056) 4 — — — — (0.268) 2
Σ∆RDPIt-I  
I=1 to j — — (0.000)    4 — — — — (0.034) 2
Σ∆RWt-I 
I=1 to j (0.010)          1 (0.001) 2 (0.094) 3 (0.071) 2 (0.070) 3
Σ∆SCt-I 
I=1 to j (0.000)          2 (0.000) 4 (0.203) 1 (0.105) 3 (0.010) 4
Σ∆DCt-I 
I=1 to j (0.000)          3 (0.000) 2 (0.340) 1 (0.000) 3 (0.081) 3










    0.041** 
(0.050) — 
  -0.610** 
(0.000) — 
    4.727** 
(0.001) — — — 
 -0.066* 
(0.066) — 
Joint Significance of Restrictions (p-value):  0.990 
* and ** indicates significance at a 90% and 95% level of confidence respectively. 
NDC, SC, and DC denote Non-Durable Consumption, Services Consumption, and Durable Consumption. 
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consumption.  The specification allows for a break in the long run relationship after 1992.  
As with aggregate consumption, the results are those for a parsimonious specification 
Using the methodology of the Endogenous Wealth literature results in the finding 
of endogeneity in non-durable and durable consumption.  The Endogenous Wealth 
literature claims that consumption does not respond to wealth in the long run; rather 
wealth responds to changes in consumption.  Contrary to findings in the Endogenous 
Wealth literature, non-durable consumption does respond to changes in wealth in the long 
run.  Therefore, a permanent wealth effect exists for non-durable and durable 
consumption.  In addition, the Endogenous Wealth literature contends that durable 
consumption is adequately controlled for through its inclusion in real wealth, and do not 
enter it directly in their empirical specification.  Results here indicate that this restriction 
ignores important economic effects from the VECM and the evolution of consumption.  
In fact, based on the Error-Correction Term (ECT), the adjustment of durable 
consumption is larger, in absolute value, then the adjustment of non-durable 
consumption, suggesting that the response in durables to changes in the long run 
relationship are larger than that of non-durable consumption. 
The pattern of Granger-Causality between the variables also contradicts the 
Endogenous Wealth results.  The Endogenous Wealth literature finds that lagged 
consumption and wealth are statistically significant in the consumption equation.  Non-
durable consumption in VECM C does not Granger-Cause itself.  Rather, non-durable 
consumption is Granger-Caused by wealth, services consumption, and durable 
consumption.  Also in VECM C, every variable Granger-Causes disposable income.  In 
the Endogenous Wealth literature, income is Granger-Caused by consumption only.  In 
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fact, disposable income is the only variable Granger-Caused by non-durable consumption 
here.  
The one variable that exhibits long run exogeneity in VECM C (in Table 1.12) is 
services consumption.  Services consumption does not adjust to changes in any of the 
variables in the long run, including itself.  Yet, services consumption does not appear to 
evolve as a simple random walk, since other variables (wealth and durable consumption) 
Granger-Cause services in the short run.  In VECM C, wealth Granger-Causes all 
variables; wealth contains important information concerning the short run and long run 
evolution of all variables, except services consumption.  On the other hand, no other 
variable is the Granger-Cause of wealth.  This emphasizes the important role of wealth in 
the evolution of all forms of consumption. 
Results here for disaggregated consumption differ noticeably from those of 
Ludvigson and Steindel (LS) (1999), and Lettau and Ludvigson (LL) (2003).  First, in 
their cointegration relationship, they restrict the influence of income and wealth on 
services and non-durable consumption to be equal.  However, it has been demonstrated 
here that the effects of wealth and disposable income on these consumption components 
are not equal.  Also, the long run substitution between services and non-durable 
consumption does not have a value of negative one, as imposed by the Endogenous 
Wealth literature.  Further, their procedures exclude long run substitution effects between 
non-durable and durable consumption.  These past studies restrict to zero effects that are 
statistically and economically important here, and suffer from an omitted variables 
problem in the cointegration relationship.  Results here show substitution effects are 
significant and should be incorporated to avoid omitted variables bias.  Once the 
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substitution effects are included, the wealth effect is 0.022, which is considerably smaller 
that the LS estimate of 0.046. 
Recall that LS and LL find that wealth is the only variable that adjusts in the long 
run to changes in disposable income and their measure of consumption.  It should not be 
surprising that the Ludvigson and Steindel results differ, given that some important 
substitution effects are omitted.  Using a VECM, they find that the adjustment parameter 
on wealth is 0.476.  Procedures here (VECM C) find an adjustment parameter that is as 
much as ten times larger.  Finally, LS’s VECM excludes the short run and long run 
response of durable consumption by failing to include it in their specification.  The LL 
study also finds a long run adjustment in wealth only in their VECM, with an estimated 
adjustment parameter of 0.358, and an estimated long run wealth elasticity of 
consumption of 0.30.23  As with the LS study, they also exclude any substitution effects 
between non-durable, services, and durable consumption, which were found to be 
significant here. 
Lettau and Ludvigson (2003) also test for structural breaks in their specification 
using Hansen’s (1992) test, but they fail to find any significant parameter changes over 
their sample (1953:1 – 2001:4).  However, provision for structural breaks is critical for 
the finding of cointegration for non-durable consumption in this study.  Recall that 
excluding structural breaks from the cointegration test led to a conclusion of no 
cointegration between the variables.  The next section examines the sensitivity of the no 
cointegration result to the empirical specification through a series of robustness checks. 
                                                 
23 This is close to Ludvigson and Steindel’s elasticity estimate of 0.29.   
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Assessing the overall evidence, results here indicate there is a complex 
relationship between each subcomponent of consumption, disposable income, and wealth.  
Aggregate consumption, from the findings, is cointegrated with income and wealth, and 
reacts to changes in either variable over the long run.  Therefore, the classic inference of 
a long run wealth effect is supported by these results, with a current estimate between 
0.028 and 0.039.  Contrary to earlier research results, wealth and disposable income also 
respond to changes in consumption in the long run. 
Non-durable consumption, like aggregate consumption, reacts to changes in 
disposable income and wealth in the long run.  Further, results indicate that non-durable 
consumption also responds to changes in services and durable consumption.  As with 
VECM A and B, income and wealth are found to be endogenous.  Further, durables 
consumption is found to respond to changes in the long run as well.  Yet, this long run 
response in non-durable consumption and durable consumption is dependent upon the 
structural break being modeled into the long run relationship. 
Final Robustness Checks 
 The finding of a long run response in non-durable consumption runs counter to 
the findings of Luvigson and Steindel and Lettau and Ludvigson.  There are two possible 
reasons for this result.  First, the measure of consumption used by these two Endogenous 
Wealth papers is non-durable plus services consumption.  Second, they omit durable 
consumption from the cointegration relationship.  The final robustness checks here 
analyze whether these differences can account for the dissimilar results. 
 The long run relationship is re-estimated using DOLS, as in the Endogenous 
Wealth literature, but now using non-durable plus services consumption as the dependent 
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variable.  Further, relevant substitution effects between the two and durable consumption 
are excluded (consistent with the literature).  Panel A in Table 1.13 reports the results 
from this cointegration equation, and the results of the cointegration test.  Results suggest 
that cointegration exists, but at the ninety percent level of confidence.  The estimated 
wealth parameter, however, is substantially smaller than that found in both Endogenous 
Wealth papers (0.024 here, compared to 0.046 in the previous research).  It is consistent 
with those reported here.  In addition, the income parameter is biased by the exclusion of 
durable consumption, but values differ only slightly.  Thus the differences in findings do 
not appear to be driven by differences in the consumption measure. 
Recall that previous results indicated that the use of non-durable plus services 
consumption by the Endogenous Wealth literature improperly restricts the long run 
parameter on services consumption to negative one.  It is possible that the inclusion of 
durable consumption creates this result.  The next check moves services consumption to 
the right-hand side of the DOLS equation, while excluding durable consumption.  The 
results are reported in Table 1.14, Panel A.  Restricting the parameter on services 
consumption can be rejected at a ninety-nine percent level of confidence.  Also, the null 
hypothesis of no cointegration is rejected at a ninety-five percent level of confidence.  
Therefore, the Endogenous Wealth result of cointegration depends upon the improper 
restriction being imposed on services consumption.  Cointegration is found in Panel B of 
Table 1.13 when the restriction on services consumption is imposed, but once the 
restriction is removed cointegration is not found (Panel B of Table 1.14). 
 Do these restrictions in the long run relationship result in the Endogenous Wealth 
finding of exogenous consumption and endogenous wealth?  To answer this question, two  
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Table 1.13 
Robustness Checks A 
Non-Durable Plus Services Consumption 
Panel A: Cointegration Parameters 
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Real Disposable Personal 
Income 0.652** 0.015 
Real Wealth 0.024** 0.004 
Constant 188.66** 19.78 
** indicates significance at a 95% level of confidence 
Panel B: Cointegration Test Results (ADF test using one lag) 
Test Without Constant Test With Constant 
Cointegration Test for the 











Error Correction Term -3.20 -3.27 -3.70 -3.80 
Critical Values are from Phillips and Ouliaris (1990).  The 10% critical value is –2.99 for the test 





Robustness Checks B 
Non-Durable Consumption 
Panel A: Cointegration Parameters 
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Real Disposable Personal 
Income 0.358** 0.056 
Real Wealth 0.019** 0.002 
Services Consumption -0.461** 0.103 
Constant 389.63** 35.07 
** indicates significance at a 95% level of confidence 
Panel B: Cointegration Test Results (ADF test using one lag) 
Test Without Constant Test With Constant 
Cointegration Test for the 











Error Correction Term -3.28 -3.74 -3.85 -4.16 
Critical Values are from Phillips and Ouliaris (1990).  The 10% critical value is –3.44 for the test 
excluding a constant, and –3.84 when the constant is included. 
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VECMs are estimated, VECM EW1 and VECM EW2.  The first, VECM EW1, restricts 
the parameter on services in the cointegration relationship to take the value of –1, which 
is the Endogenous Wealth restriction.  This VECM contains the dynamic behavior of 
non-durable plus services consumption, disposable income, and wealth.  The second, 
VECM EW2, is the least restrictive.  It models the dynamic behavior of non-durable 
consumption, disposable income, and wealth, and adds the Error-Correction Term 
derived from the results in Table 1.13.  The results from these two VECMs are presented 
in Table 1.15.  For exposition purposes, only the adjustment terms are presented, since 
this is the crux of the debate. 
 Indeed, these restrictions have a substantial impact on the pattern of endogeneity.  
In VECM EW1, which incorporates the Endogenous Wealth restriction (using non-
durable plus service consumption), the adjustment of non-durable plus services 
consumption is statistically zero.  Once this restriction is removed in VECM EW2, non-
durable consumption is endogenous.  In fact, the results for the included variables are 
relatively robust to the estimates of VECM C.  Therefore, it appears that the improper 
long run restriction on services consumption suppresses the adjustment of non-durable 
consumption, resulting in the exogeneity of consumption. 
 
Conclusion 
 Results here indicate that changes in aggregate household wealth can have 
substantial impacts on aggregate demand, through the consumption channel.  Further, 
changes in wealth also influence work effort or disposable income, given the endogenous 




Results from VECM EW1 and VECM EW2 
∆ (NDC + SC) 












-0.005 0.857 -0.411 0.000 3.213 0.002 
EW2 ECTt-1 0.053 0.065 -0.403 0.001 5.373 0.001 
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here suggest that a one-dollar increase in wealth creates 2.3 to 3.9 cents of new 
consumption.  Further, wealth and disposable income also are permanently affected from 
changes in either of these two or consumption. 
 There appears to be significant long run substitution between non-durable 
consumption, services consumption, and durable consumption.  With the inclusion of 
these substitution effects, the effects of wealth and disposable income differ significantly 
from earlier research.  Changes in wealth not only permanently affect aggregate 
consumption, but also the division of consumption between its three components. 
This essay bridges the gap between two competing lines of research regarding the 
timing and duration of wealth effects.  The current debate centers on the long run 
endogeneity of consumption to changes in wealth, disposable income, and itself.  The 
Endogenous Wealth literature purports that wealth, and only wealth, adjusts to changes in 
the cointegration relationship between the three variables, or is endogenous.  In this 
essay, despite the use of methodology from the Endogenous Wealth literature, results still 
reveal the endogenous response of consumption.  This differs from the Endogenous 
Wealth results, and supports the conclusion of the Endogenous Consumption literature.  
Yet, results also point to the endogeneity of wealth and disposable income.   
This research also examines the long run dynamics of disaggregated consumption.  
Cointegration exists for non-durable consumption, but only if structural breaks are 
addressed.  Services and durable consumption do not show cointegration.  However, non-
durable consumption and durable consumption are endogenous, adjusting to changes in 
the equilibrium relationship between the variables.  These findings contradict previous 
research that finds a long run response in wealth only.  Further, the results here indicate 
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that previous research omits relevant variables in the long run relationship.  In particular, 
significant substitution between the disaggregated components of consumption is ignored 
in previous studies. 
Also adding to the complexity is the possibility of structural breaks in the long run 
relationship between aggregate consumption, disposable income, and wealth.  The 
finding of structural breaks in the long run relationships counters the findings in Lettau 
and Ludvigson.  In fact, the finding of cointegration between non-durable consumption, 
disaggregated consumption, income, and wealth relies on the provision for structural 
breaks.  The general results for aggregate consumption, however, are not dependent on 
structural breaks in the cointegrating vector.   
The findings here reinforce the idea that aggregate wealth plays an important role 
in determining consumption in the long run.  The size of the wealth parameter in the long 
run aggregate consumption relationship is slightly smaller than previously estimated.  
Therefore the rise in equity and housing prices as experienced in the late 1990s can add 
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Appendix A 
Table A 1.1 
Descriptive Statistics 
(Billions of 1996 Dollars) 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
∆Aggregate Consumption 
(∆RC) 19.872 27.147 
∆Non-Durable Consumption 
(∆RNDC) 4.289 9.250 
∆Services Consumption 
(∆RSC) 11.932 9.589 
∆Durable Consumption 
(∆RDC) 3.897 12.869 
∆Disposable Personal Income 
(∆RDPI) 21.008 42.032 
∆Wealth 
(∆RW) 118.035 506.364 
∆ denotes the first-difference operator 
 
Table A 1.2 
Correlation of Variables 
 ∆RC ∆RNDC ∆RSC ∆RDC ∆RDPI ∆RW 
∆RC 1 0.759 0.632 0.809 0.423 0.268 
∆RNDC 0.759 1 0.446 0.378 0.483 0.270 
∆RSC 0.632 0.446 1 0.234 0.374 0.276 
∆RDC 0.809 0.378 0.234 1 0.136 0.077 
∆RDPI 0.423 0.483 0.374 0.136 1 0.330 
∆RW 0.268 0.270 0.276 0.077 0.330 1 




Table A 1.3 
Balance Sheet of the United States1 
For the Year Ended December 31, 2001 
(Billions of U.S. Dollars) 
      
Assets     
      Households2,3 12,576.70    
 Nonprofit Organizations 1,204.00    
Real Estate  13,780.70   
Equipment and Software Owned by Nonprofit 
Organizations4 
 120.10   
Consumer Durable Goods4  2,829.70   
     
Tangible Assets   16,730.60  
      
 Foreign Deposits 53.50    
 Checkable Deposits and Currency 349.10    
 Time and Savings Deposits 3,250.60    
 Money Market Fund Shares 1,174.30    
Deposits  4,827.60   
      
 Open Market Paper 53.30    
 U.S. Government Securities 844.00    
 Municipal Securities 596.70    
 Corporate and Foreign Bonds 763.80    
 Mortgages 112.20    
Credit Market Instruments  2,370.00   
Corporate Equities2  6,076.60   
Mutual Funds Shares2  2,955.20   
Security Credit  454.30   
Life Insurance Reserves  880.00   
Pension Fund Reserves  8694.00   
Investment in Bank Personal Trusts  912.00   
Equity in Non-corporate Business6  4,877.10   
Miscellaneous Assets  354.90   
     
Financial Assets4   32,402.00  
      




Table A 1.3, Continued 
      
Liabilities     
 Home Mortgages7  5,379.40   
 Consumer Credit  1,703.30   
 Municipal Securities8 154.30  
 Bank Loans n.e.c.  55.50   
 Other Loans and Advances  263.20   
 Commercial Mortgages8  124.70   
Credit Market Instruments   7,680.40  
      
Security Credit   196.40  
Trade Payables8   144.70  
Deferred and Unpaid Life Insurance Premiums   19.10  
      
Total Liabilities (less)    8,040.6 
      
Total Net Wealth    41,091.80 
     
1.  Includes households, farm households, and nonprofit organizations.  2.  At market value.   3.  Includes 
owner-occupied homes, farmhouses, mobile homes, second homes not rented, vacant homes for sale, and 
vacant land.  4.  At replacement (current) cost.  5.  Value based on market value of equities held and the 
book value of other assets held by mutual funds.  6.  Net worth on noncorporate businesses and owner’s 
equity in farm business and unincorporated security brokers and dealers.  7.  Includes loans made under 










(No Breaks, ECT Derived from Johansen Test using 3 lags) 











∆C  t-1 0.207** 0.077 0.710** 0.097 3.127** 1.505 






t-3 0.383** 0.092 0.173 0.116 0.910 1.812 
∆Ct-4 0.050 0.093 0.208* 0.117 0.954 1.824 
∆RDPIt-1 -0.075 0.055 -0.435** 0.069 -0.985 1.081 
∆RDPIt-2 -0.142** 0.062 -0.100 0.078 -1.320 1.213 
∆RDPIt-3 -0.091 0.061 -0.136* 0.076 -0.466 1.191 
∆RDPIt-4 -0.081 0.051 -0.079 0.064 -0.421 0.998 
∆RWt-1 0.003 0.004 0.003 0.005 -0.047 0.078 
∆RWt-2 -0.000 0.004 -0.153** 0.005 0.098 0.077 
∆RWt-3 -0.003 0.004 -0.002 0.005 0.159* 0.082 
∆RWt-4 -0.003 0.004 -0.002 0.005 0.052 0.082 
Constant 11.42* 2.77 4.16 3.49 64.84 54.37 
ECTt-1 -0.080* 0.044 -0.350** 0.056 2.540** 0.872 
* and ** indicates significance at a 90% and 95% level of confidence respectively 
 




(No Breaks, ECT Derived from Johansen Test using 3 lags) 













∆Ct-1 0.220** 0.070 0.708** 0.095 2.988** 1.420 
∆Ct-2 0.217** 0.076 0.600** 0.102 — — 
∆Ct-3 0.346** 0.083 0.153 0.109 — — 
∆Ct-4 — — 0.193* 0.112 — — 
∆RDPIt-1 -0.067 0.051 -0.431** 0.068 — — 
∆RDPIt-2 -0.122** 0.056 -0.095 0.076 — — 
∆RDPIt-3 -0.084* 0.048 -0.135* 0.076 — — 
∆RDPIt-4 -0.071 0.046 -0.076 0.062 — — 
∆RWt-1 — — 0.003 0.005 -0.047 0.072 
∆RWt-2 — — -0.015** 0.005 0.085 0.069 
∆RWt-3 — — — — 0.166** 0.072 
Constant 11.38** 2.70 4.28 3.43 37.68 43.54 
ECTt-1 -0.071* 0.039 -0.341** 0.053 2.735** 0.770 
Joint Significance of Restrictions (p-value): 0.987 








(Break in 1993) 













∆Ct-1 0.213** 0.078 0.766** 0.094 3.440** 1.548 
∆Ct-2 0.212** 0.084 0.660** 0.102 -0.110 1.680 
∆Ct-3 0.387** 0.094 0.242** 0.113 1.605 1.865 
∆Ct-4 0.055 0.094 0.272** 0.114 1.542 1.874 
∆RDPIt-1 -0.078 0.056 -0.469** 0.067 -1.243 1.109 
∆RDPIt-2 -0.139** 0.062 -0.120 0.075 -1.866 1.231 
∆RDPIt-3 -0.091 0.061 -0.159** 0.074 -0.838 1.214 
∆RDPIt-4 -0.076 0.051 -0.063 0.061 -0.680 1.010 
∆RWt-1 0.003 0.004 0.002 0.005 -0.085 0.079 
∆RWt-2 0.000 0.004 -0.014** 0.005 0.076 0.077 
∆RWt-3 -0.002 0.004 -0.001 0.005 0.127 0.082 
∆RWt-4 -0.002 0.004 -0.000 0.005 0.018 0.082 
Constant 11.12** 2.79 2.26** 3.38 64.75 55.66 
ECTt-1 -0.089* 0.051 -0.471** 0.062 1.507 1.024 
* and ** indicates significance at a 90% and 95% level of confidence respectively 
  




(Break in 1993) 













∆Ct-1 0.236** 0.072 0.765** 0.093 3.766** 1.506 
∆Ct-2 0.224** 0.077 0.654** 0.099 — — 
∆Ct-3 0.353** 0.085 0.235** 0.106 — — 
∆Ct-4 — — 0.269** 0.109 — — 
∆RDPIt-1 -0.079 0.053 -0.468** 0.066 -1.009 0.940 
∆RDPIt-2 -0.131** 0.057 -0.120 0.073 -1.205 0.954 
∆RDPIt-3 -0.080* 0.048 -0.160** 0.073 — — 
∆RDPIt-4 -0.064 0.046 -0.061 0.059 — — 
∆RWt-1 — — 0.002 0.004 -0.085 0.072 
∆RWt-2 — — -0.014** 0.005 0.087 0.073 
∆RWt-3 — — — — 0.158** 0.074 
Constant 11.34** 2.72 2.33 3.31 64.52 48.35 
ECTt-1 -0.084* 0.046 -0.468** 0.060 1.883** 0.894 
Joint Significance of Restrictions (p-value): 0.996 
* and ** indicates significance at a 90% and 95% level of confidence respectively 
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(Break in 1993) 
∆NDC Equation ∆RDPI Equation ∆RW Equation ∆RSC Equation ∆RDC Equation Variable 
Par. Est. Stan. Err.     Par. Est. Stan. Err. Par. Est. Stan. Err. Par. Est. Stan. Err. Par. Est. Stan. Err.
∆NDCt-1           -0.06 0.08   0.72** 0.36 -3.67 5.42 -0.09 0.10 -0.09 0.10
∆NDCt-2           -0.07 0.08 0.16 0.36 1.58 5.45 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.10
∆NDCt-3 0.02          0.08 0.51 0.36 -0.53 5.52 0.05 0.10 0.05 0.10
∆NDCt-4           -0.14* 0.08 0.40 0.33 -3.17 5.02 -0.08 0.09 -0.08 0.09
∆RDPIt-1           0.01 0.02 -0.43** 0.08 -0.76 1.14 -0.00 0.02 -0.00 0.02
∆RDPIt-2           -0.00 0.02 -0.10 0.08 -1.53 1.27 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02
∆RDPIt-3           0.00 0.02 -0.22** 0.09 0.03 1.31 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 0.02
∆RDPIt-4           -0.01 0.02 -0.17** 0.08 -0.02 1.20 -0.02 0.02 -0.02 0.02
∆RWt-1   0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.08 0.00* 0.00 0.00* 0.00 
∆RWt-2           -0.00 0.00 -0.02** 0.01 0.11 0.08 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
∆RWt-3 -0.00          0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.14* 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
∆RWt-4           0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.06 0.09 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
∆RSCt-1               0.23** 0.07 1.16** 0.29 5.30 4.43 0.08 0.08 0.08 0.08
∆RSCt-2           0.10 0.07 0.78** 0.30 -1.57 4.59 -0.02 0.08 -0.02 0.08
∆RSCt-3           0.04 0.07 0.34 0.30 2.19 4.55 0.19** 0.08 0.19** 0.08
∆RSCt-4           0.06 0.07 0.82** 0.30 -3.96 4.60 -0.07 0.08 -0.07 0.08
∆RDCt-1     0.18** 0.05 0.61** 0.21 3.68 3.16 0.15** 0.06 0.15** 0.06 
∆RDCt-2             0.13* 0.05 0.76** 0.22 1.66 3.35 0.11* 0.06 0.11* 0.06
∆RDCt-3             0.15* 0.06 0.20 0.24 3.41 3.67 0.20** 0.07 0.20** 0.07
∆RDCt-4           0.04 0.06 -0.16 0.24 3.90 3.66 -0.01 0.06 -0.01 0.06
Const. 0.04          0.03 -0.64** 0.11 4.37** 1.65 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.03
ECTt-1 -1.9          1.37 -6.54 5.93 75.36 89.75 8.85** 1.58 8.85** 1.58
* and ** indicates significance at a 90% and 95% level of confidence respectively. 
NDC, SC, and DC denote Non-Durable Consumption, Services Consumption, and Durable Consumption. 
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(Break in 1993) 
∆NDC Equation ∆RDPI Equation ∆RW Equation ∆RSC Equation ∆RDC Equation Variable 
Par. Est. Stan. Err.     Par. Est. Stan. Err. Par. Est. Stan. Err. Par. Est. Stan. Err. Par. Est. Stan. Err.
∆NDCt-1           -0.03 0.07 0.75** 0.34 — — — — 0.09 0.13
∆NDCt-2           -0.05 0.07 0.23 0.33 — — — — 0.10 0.13
∆NDCt-3 0.07          0.06 0.46 0.33 — — — — — —
∆NDCt-4           -0.10 0.06 0.40 0.31 — — — — — —
∆RDPIt-1           — — -0.43** 0.07 — — — — -0.04 0.03
∆RDPIt-2           — — -0.09 0.07 — — — — -0.07** 0.03
∆RDPIt-3           — — -0.23** 0.08 — — — — — —
∆RDPIt-4           — — -0.16** 0.07 — — — — — —
∆RWt-1           0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.02 0.08 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00
∆RWt-2           — — -0.02** 0.01 0.10 0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
∆RWt-3 —          — — — 0.15** 0.07 — — -0.01** 0.00
∆RWt-4           0.24** 0.06 1.10** 0.28 5.20 4.07 0.05 0.07 0.22** 0.11
∆RSCt-1           0.10 0.06 0.75** 0.29 — — -0.07 0.07 0.08 0.11
∆RSCt-2           — — 0.17 0.26 — — 0.15** 0.07 0.22** 0.11
∆RSCt-3           — — 0.68** 0.26 — — — — 0.14 0.10
∆RSCt-4           0.18** 0.05 0.63** 0.20 2.81 2.94 0.15** 0.05 -0.12 0.08
∆RDCt-1           0.12** 0.05 0.72** 0.21 — — 0.09* 0.05 0.10 0.08
∆RDCt-2           0.11** 0.05 — — — — 0.18** 0.05 0.12 0.08
∆RDCt-3 0.04**          0.02 -0.61** 0.10 4.73** 1.35 — — -0.07* 0.04
∆RDCt-4           -1.32 1.03 -3.37 5.32 9.88 56.31 8.26** 1.34 -2.66 2.06
Const.           -0.03 0.07 0.75** 0.34 — — — — 0.09 0.13
ECTt-1 -0.05          0.07 0.23 0.33 — — — — 0.10 0.13
Joint Significance of Restrictions (p-value):  0.990 
* and ** indicates significance at a 90% and 95% level of confidence respectively. 
NDC, SC, and DC denote Non-Durable Consumption, Services Consumption, and Durable Consumption. 
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Appendix B 
As noted in the text, this section includes the VECM results for aggregate 
consumption and disaggregated consumption.  Specifically, Table B 1.1 presents the 
VECM results for aggregate consumption incorporating a break in the cointegration 
relationship after 1990:3.  Specifically, the break after 1990:3 occurs in all parameters.  
Table B 1.2 presents the VECM results for non-durable consumption, where the 
cointegration relationship contains a break in the constant only after 1983:4. 
In Table B 1.1, the aggregate consumption results in the ∆C equation are 
relatively robust to those found in the main body of this study.  All three variables adjust 
with respect to changes in the long run equilibrium between the three.  The overall 
pattern of parameter significance is similar to VECM A and B, including both long run 
adjustment and Granger-Causality.  However, it is important to note, that the ECT of 
VECM B contains a long run wealth parameter that is statistically zero after 1990:3, and 
a disposable income parameter that is 1.375.  Therefore, although consumption does 
respond to changes in the long run relationship between the three variables, this response 
is from changes in disposable income and consumption only after the break.  In addition, 
wealth responds to changes in the relationship between the three variables.  This provides 
some interesting insight in this specification.  After 1990, consumption decisions are 
driven by past consumption and disposable income changes – it appears that wealth plays 
a passive role only.  The only difference between the two is that in VECM B, wealth does 
not Granger-Cause itself in the short run, which reinforces the passive nature of wealth 
evolution.  
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In addition, the finding of long run endogeneity, or long run adjustment of durable 
consumption and non-durable consumption remains when a structural break after 1983 is 
included in the long run relationship, and results are contained in Table B 1.2.  Further, as 
found in VECM C, the adjustment of durable consumption is larger, in absolute value, 
than the adjustment of non-durable consumption, suggesting that the response in durables 
to changes in the long run relationship is larger than that of non-durable consumption.  
Therefore, although durable consumption doesn’t appear cointegrated with these 
variables, the result here suggests that there is some kind of relationship between them.  
Further, there are no major changes in the pattern of Granger-Causality between the 
variables.  Therefore, the long run break in the cointegration relationship plays an 
important role in the pattern of endogenous response.  Finally, the long run exogeneity of 
service consumption remains when the structural break after 1983 is included. 
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Table B 1.1 
VECM D  
Aggregate Consumption 
(Break in 1990) 

















i=1 to j (0.000) 3 (0.000) 4 (0.008) 1 
Σ∆RDPIt-i 
i=1 to j (0.055) 4 (0.000) 4 (0.299) 1 
Σ∆RWt-i 
i=1 to j (0.209) 1 (0.011) 4 (0.246) 3 








   -0.524** 
(0.000) — 
    2.300** 
(0.008) — 
Joint Significance of Restrictions (p-value): 0.992 
* and ** indicates significance at a 90% and 95% level of confidence respectively 
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Table B 1.2 
VECM E 
Non-Durable Consumption 
(Break after 1983) 
∆NDC Equation ∆RDPI Equation ∆RW Equation ∆RSC Equation ∆RDC Equation 
Variable Joint Sig. 
(p-value) # of Lags 
Joint Sig. 
(p-value) # of Lags 
Joint Sig. 
(p-value) # of Lags 
Joint Sig. 
(p-value) # of Lags 
Joint Sig. 
(p-value) # of Lags 
Σ∆NDCt-I 
I=1 to j (0.20)          4 (0.06) 1 — — — — (0.23) 2
Σ∆RDPIt-I  
I=1 to j —          — (0.00) 3 (0.20) 2 — — (0.03) 2
Σ∆RWt-I 
I=1 to j (0.01)          1 (0.00) 2 (0.02) 4 (0.07) 2 (0.05) 3
Σ∆SCt-I 
I=1 to j (0.00)          2 (0.00) 4 (0.22) 1 (0.11) 3 (0.01) 4
Σ∆DCt-I 
I=1 to j (0.00)          3 (0.00) 2 (0.27) 1 (0.00) 3 (0.07) 3










   0.05** 
(0.02) — 
  -0.37** 
(0.00) — 
  5.54** 
(0.00) —   — —
  -0.069** 
(0.04) — 
Joint Significance of Restrictions (p-value):  0.991 
* and ** indicates significance at a 90% and 95% level of confidence respectively. 









(Break in 1990)  
∆C Equation ∆RDPI Equation ∆RW Equation Variable 
Par. Est. Std. Err. Par. Est. Std. Err. Par. Est. Std. Err. 
∆Ct-1 0.198** 0.075 0.684** 0.086 3.695** 1.506 
∆Ct-2 0.195** 0.082 0.563** 0.094 0.193 1.639 
∆Ct-3 0.393** 0.092 0.258** 0.105 1.526 1.839 
∆Ct-4 0.066 0.094 0.320** 0.107 1.361 1.871 
∆RDPIt-1 -0.072 0.054 -0.433** 0.062 -1.352 1.085 
∆RDPIt-2 -0.158** 0.063 -0.207** 0.072 -1.565 1.264 
∆RDPIt-3 -0.097 0.061 -0.185** 0.069 -0.739 1.212 
∆RDPIt-4 -0.080 0.051 -0.085 0.058 -0.604 1.009 
∆RWt-1 0.005 0.004 0.011** 0.004 -0.114 0.075 
∆RWt-2 0.003 0.004 0.000 0.004 0.028 0.079 
∆RWt-3 -0.001 0.004 0.007 0.005 0.100 0.081 
∆RWt-4 -0.001 0.004 0.007 0.005 -0.005 0.081 
Constant 11.54** 2.76 4.50 3.15 57.68 55.06 
ECTt-1 -0.103** 0.049 -0.523** 0.055 1.720* 0.969 
* and ** indicates significance at a 90% and 95% level of confidence respectively 
 




(Break in 1990) 
∆C Equation ∆RDPI Equation ∆RW Equation Variable 
Par. Est. Std. Err. Par. Est. Std. Err. Par. Est. Std. Err. 
∆Ct-1 0.211** 0.073 0.683** 0.085 3.837** 1.441 
∆Ct-2 0.199** 0.078 0.562** 0.093 — — 
∆Ct-3 0.364** 0.086 0.258** 0.104 — — 
∆Ct-4 — — 0.322** 0.106 — — 
∆RDPIt-1 -0.060 0.052 -0.433** 0.061 -0.969 0.931 
∆RDPIt-2 -0.126** 0.058 -0.207** 0.071 — — 
∆RDPIt-3 -0.077 0.048 -0.186** 0.069 — — 
∆RDPIt-4 -0.068 0.046 -0.085 0.057 — — 
∆RWt-1 0.005 0.004 0.011** 0.004 -0.107 0.072 
∆RWt-2 — — 0.000 0.004 0.007 0.075 
∆RWt-3 — — 0.007 0.005 0.104 0.075 
∆RWt-4 — — 0.007 0.005 — — 
Constant 11.46** 2.71 4.49 3.11 43.72 45.52 
ECTt-1 -0.082* 0.044 -0.524** 0.055 2.300** 0.856 
Joint Significance of Restrictions (p-value): 0.992 
* and ** indicates significance at a 90% and 95% level of confidence respectively 
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(Break after 1983) 
∆NDC Equation ∆RDPI Equation ∆RW Equation ∆RSC Equation ∆RDC Equation Variable 
Par. Est. Stan. Err.     Par. Est. Stan. Err. Par. Est. Stan. Err. Par. Est. Stan. Err. Par. Est. Stan. Err.
∆NDCt-1           -0.06 0.08 0.69* 0.38 -4.22 5.29 -0.09 0.10 0.07 0.13
∆NDCt-2           -0.08 0.08 0.04 0.38 0.24 5.33 0.05 0.10 0.24* 0.13
∆NDCt-3 0.02          0.08 0.34 0.38 -1.75 5.37 0.03 0.10 -0.03 0.14
∆NDCt-4           -0.14* 0.08 0.30 0.35 -4.18 4.90 -0.09 0.09 -0.11 0.12
∆RDPIt-1           0.01 0.02 -0.38** 0.08 -0.73 1.10 0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.03
∆RDPIt-2           -0.00 0.02 -0.03 0.09 -1.47 1.21 -0.01 0.02 -0.08** 0.03
∆RDPIt-3           -0.00 0.02 -0.14 0.09 0.10 1.26 -0.01 0.02 -0.03 0.03
∆RDPIt-4           -0.01 0.02 -0.11 0.08 -0.04 1.15 -0.01 0.02 0.00 0.03
∆RWt-1           0.00** 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.08 0.00** 0.00 0.00 0.00
∆RWt-2           -0.00 0.00 -0.02** 0.01 0.15* 0.08 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
∆RWt-3 -0.00          0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.19** 0.09 0.00 0.00 -0.01** 0.00
∆RWt-4           0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.11 0.09 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
∆RSCt-1           0.23** 0.07 1.08** 0.31 5.12 4.31 0.07 0.08 0.25** 0.11
∆RSCt-2           0.10 0.07 0.69** 0.32 -1.96 4.47 -0.03 0.08 0.11 0.11
∆RSCt-3           0.04 0.07 0.23 0.31 2.06 4.42 0.18** 0.08 0.25** 0.11
∆RSCt-4           0.05 0.07 0.82** 0.32 -4.46 4.49 -0.07 0.08 0.21* 0.11
∆RDCt-1           0.18** 0.05 0.51** 0.22 3.33 3.06 0.15** 0.06 -0.13* 0.08
∆RDCt-2           0.13** 0.05 0.72** 0.23 1.15 3.28 0.11* 0.06 0.11 0.08
∆RDCt-3           0.14** 0.06 0.16 0.25 2.72 3.59 0.19** 0.07 0.13 0.09
∆RDCt-4           0.04 0.06 -0.23 0.25 3.27 3.57 -0.02 0.06 -0.05 0.09
Const. 0.04*          0.02 -0.42** 0.11 5.90** 1.48 0.02 0.03 -0.06* 0.04
ECTt-1 -1.90          1.36 -5.92 6.21 75.65 87.60 8.88** 1.58 -3.12 2.21
* and ** indicates significance at a 90% and 95% level of confidence respectively. 
NDC, SC, and DC denote Non-Durable Consumption, Services Consumption, and Durable Consumption. 
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(Break after 1983) 
∆NDC Equation ∆RDPI Equation ∆RW Equation ∆RSC Equation ∆RDC Equation Variable 
Par. Est. Stan. Err.     Par. Est. Stan. Err. Par. Est. Stan. Err. Par. Est. Stan. Err. Par. Est. Stan. Err.
∆NDCt-1           -0.04 0.07 0.69* 0.36 — — — — 0.10 0.13
∆NDCt-2           -0.06 0.06 — — — — — — 0.20 0.13
∆NDCt-3 0.06          0.06 — — — — — — — —
∆NDCt-4           -0.11** 0.06 — — — — — — — —
∆RDPIt-1           — — -0.38** 0.07 -1.11 0.90 — — -0.04 0.03
∆RDPIt-2           — — -0.00 0.07 -1.24 0.91 — — -0.07** 0.03
∆RDPIt-3           — — -0.11 0.07 — — — — — —
∆RDPIt-4           0.00** 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.01 0.07 0.00* 0.00 0.00 0.00
∆RWt-1           — — -0.01** 0.01 0.14* 0.07 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.00
∆RWt-2           — — — — 0.19** 0.07 — — -0.01** 0.00
∆RWt-3 —          — — — 0.09 0.07 — — — —
∆RWt-4           0.24** 0.06 1.04** 0.29 4.89 4.01 0.05 0.07 0.22** 0.10
∆RSCt-1           0.11 0.06 0.65** 0.30 — — -0.07 0.07 0.08 0.11
∆RSCt-2           — — 0.06 0.27 — — 0.15** 0.07 0.21** 0.11
∆RSCt-3           — — 0.73** 0.27 — — — — 0.15 0.10
∆RSCt-4           0.18** 0.05 0.52** 0.21 3.21 2.88 0.15** 0.05 -0.12 0.07
∆RDCt-1           0.12** 0.05 0.71** 0.22 — — 0.09* 0.05 0.10 0.08
∆RDCt-2           0.11** 0.05 — — — — 0.18** 0.05 0.12 0.08
∆RDCt-3 0.05**          0.02 -0.37** 0.09 5.54** 1.24 — — -0.07** 0.03
∆RDCt-4           -1.41 1.03 -4.48 5.47 24.20 57.62 8.28** 1.34 -2.59 2.05
Const.           -0.04 0.07 0.69* 0.36 — — — — 0.10 0.13
ECTt-1 -0.06          0.06 — — — — — — 0.20 0.13
Joint Significance of Restrictions (p-value):  0.991 
* and ** indicates significance at a 90% and 95% level of confidence respectively. 








 The previous essay establishes the importance of wealth (equal to assets minus 
liabilities) on total household consumption in the long run.  Fluctuations in aggregate 
wealth impact consumption in the short run and long run.  Through this wealth effect, 
changes in wealth have implications for aggregate output, since aggregate consumption 
constitutes two-thirds of total output.  Therefore, changes in wealth can have meaningful 
effects on aggregate real output.   
However, using wealth in the empirical analysis may impose unrealistic 
econometric restrictions.  Wealth, in the accounting identity, is simply assets minus 
liabilities.  Using an aggregate wealth measure in the analysis imposes the restriction that 
assets and liabilities have the same effect, in absolute value, on consumption. However, 
aggregate consumption may be more sensitive to asset changes than to liability changes, 
or vice-versa.  This essay investigates these issues by disaggregating wealth into assets 
and liabilities.   This study evaluates their respective effects in the long relationship with 
consumption and income.  In addition, since wealth affects different components of 
consumption differently, the effects from changes in assets and liabilities on these 
components may be different. 
Falling asset prices in the year 2000 may partly explain the current slowdown in 
aggregate output.  Equal changes in assets and liabilities in absolute value lead to 
equivalent reductions in aggregate wealth, ceteris paribus.  This decline in wealth may 
have been transmitted through the wealth effect, causing diminished or smaller growth in 
consumption.  At the same time, decreases in wealth can be attributed to rising consumer 
credit, also reducing consumption through the wealth effect.  Some research demonstrates 
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the importance of financial assets in household consumption, but excludes other assets.  
Still others, such as Modigliani, claim that real estate prices are more important, through 
the use of homeowner equity loans to finance consumption (Boston Globe, 2002).  Given 
evidence that wealth and consumption are positively related, do changes in assets have an 
equal effect in absolute value on household consumption as changes in liabilities?  Are 
the consequences of falling values of financial assets upon aggregate consumption the 
same as rising debt levels?  These questions cannot be answered by using disposable 
income and wealth only as determinants of consumption.  A clearer understanding of the 
effects of assets or liabilities on consumption can only be derived by estimating the 
separate effects of assets and liabilities, while controlling for personal income.  This 
essay investigates the relationship between disposable income, total assets, total 
liabilities, and the respective components of consumption.  The goal is to determine 
whether assets and liabilities affect each component of consumption differently. 
 
Literature Review 
 Many “wealth” studies actually focus on assets (or categories of assets), rather 
than net wealth (assets less liabilities).  Among studies that focused on assets, several 
have shown different impacts from different asset types.  Several empirical studies have 
shown that changes in different measures of assets influence consumption. Carruth and 
Henley (1990), using a very specific definition of wealth (defined as net financial assets 
plus housing stock), find important effects on consumption.  An analysis of Japanese 
households by Ogawa, Kitasaka, Yamaoka, and Iwata (1996) shows that the impacts of 
liquid versus illiquid wealth on consumption differ.  However, these studies use only 
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subsets of wealth or assets, not total aggregate assets or liabilities, possibly excluding 
important information.  Therefore, these papers may omit relevant information, and not 
fully capture the “true” effect of asset changes on consumption. 
Bosworth (1975) finds differing effects on consumption from stock price changes 
versus those from non-equity wealth.24  Further, he finds that the effects on consumption 
from stock price changes and non-equity wealth are limited to consumption of non-
durables plus services.  For equity wealth, Bosworth’s parameter estimates range from 
0.046 for aggregate consumption and 0.059 for non-durable plus services consumption.  
For non-equity wealth, every dollar increase creates 6.9 cents of new consumption.  More 
recently, Poterba and Samwick (1995) find evidence that changes in lagged stock market 
prices induce short run changes in aggregate consumption, durable consumption, non-
durable consumption, and services consumption.  A one dollar increase in stock prices 
leads to 6.4 cents of new consumption, 13.9 cents of new durable consumption, 5.4 cents 
of new non-durable consumption, and 2.5 cents in new services consumption.  Poterba 
and Samwick use equity prices, which constitute only a subset of aggregate assets in the 
household balance sheet.  In addition, the conflicting evidence concerning the effect of 
assets on durable consumption warrants further study. 
 The liquidity hypothesis analyzed by Mishkin (1976, 1977, and 1978) supports 
the view that households respond differently to changes in household assets than to 
changes in liabilities.  Mishkin theoretically develops the Liquidity Model to investigate 
the behavior of consumer durables. Using data spanning from the early fifties through the 
early seventies, Mishkin empirically finds the response of durable consumption is larger 
                                                 
24 Non-equity wealth is defined as aggregate wealth less assets held in stocks.   
 88
for liability changes than for asset changes.  Looking at demand by households for long-
lived assets, Mishkin attributes some historical movements in aggregate demand to 
changes in the aggregate balance sheet.  Mishkin’s research is among the first to identify 
the different effects of assets and liabilities on consumption, but it investigates the 
behavior of durable consumption only.  Important substitution effects between 
components of consumption (non-durable, durable, and services consumption), which 
were found in the previous essay, are omitted from Mishkin’s analysis. 
 Evidence supporting Mishkin’s liquidity hypothesis is mixed, however. McCarthy 
(1993) finds no long run effects from changes in assets and liabilities on durables 
consumption.  In fact, the causality appears to run bi-directional; the household balance 
sheet affects durable purchases, but durable purchases also determine the aggregate 
balance sheet.  Also, McCarthy (1997) suggests that household debt has little influence 
over consumer spending in the short run.  In other words, total liabilities may exert no 
transitory influence on consumption, contrary to Mishkin’s results.  However, the 
existence of any cointegration relationship between consumption and liabilities is not 
investigated, and, if any exists, is omitted from McCarthy’s 1997 paper. 
 To conclude, some of the past literature looks at the response of consumption to 
individual balance sheet components only.  These papers risk creating omitted variable 
bias by excluding some components of assets and liabilities.  Others, like Mishkin and 
McCarthy, use total assets and liabilities, but investigate their influence on consumer 
durables only.  The use of durable consumption only ignores important substitution 
effects between consumption categories.  Further, the conflicting evidence between 
Mishkin’s and McCarthy’s results requires further investigation.   
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Contribution 
 This essay contributes to the current field of knowledge in several ways.  First, the 
separate effects of assets and liabilities on long run consumption are investigated.  
Previous research investigates the effects of certain categories of assets on consumption, 
omitting possibly relevant effects.  Aggregate wealth is disaggregated here, so the 
relationship between consumption and all components of assets and liabilities is 
examined.  Research such as Bosworth’s, which disaggregates stock market assets from 
wealth, still imposes the restriction that non-stock assets and liabilities affect 
consumption equally. 
In addition, total consumption is replaced by its disaggregated components; 
cointegration is tested for accordingly.  Further, these long run relationships are tested for 
the existence of any structural breaks.  The disaggregated analysis of Mishkin and 
McCarthy ignores important substitution effects identified in Essay One.  Here, the 
effects of assets and liabilities on all disaggregated components of consumption are 
examined, allowing for substitution effects between components of consumption. 
 Finally, the short run dynamics of consumption, income, assets, and liabilities are 
investigated.  The previous literature ignores the possible long run endogeneity of 
disposable income or balance sheet categories.   Vector Error-Correction Model (VECM) 
methodology is used to investigate the long run endogeneity (endogenous response) of all 
variables in the long run relationship.  
 This essay provides evidence on the behavior of consumption, allowing separate 
influence from assets and liabilities.  First, the long run influences of assets and liabilities 
on consumption concurrently are investigated.  Also, any relevant substitution effects are 
 90
considered when consumption is disaggregated.  Finally, investigations into the 
permanent and transitory effects of assets and liabilities on aggregate consumption are 
considered.  The findings suggest that liabilities play no significant role in determining 
aggregate consumption, if there is no change in technology.  In addition, excluding 
liabilities from the cointegration relationship induces almost no omitted variable bias.  
Assets appear to play a key role in determining future consumption, and appear to drive 
the wealth effect identified in Essay One. 
 
Empirical Methods 
Properties of Assets and Liabilities 
 The empirical investigation in this essay utilizes the variables from the same 
sources as Essay One.  As previously mentioned, the Balance Sheet of the United States 
details aggregate wealth, assets, and liabilities.  Assets are broken into tangible assets and 
financial assets.  Tangible assets include housing, such as owner-occupied, unoccupied 
secondary homes, homes for sale, and vacant property.  Housing assets are included at 
market value.  Other tangible assets, such as equipment and durable goods, are valued at 
replacement cost.  Financial assets include equities, mutual funds, demand deposits and 
currency, bonds, and other securities; and these are also listed at current market value.  
Also under wealth, liabilities include mortgages and home equity loans, consumer credit, 
bank loans, and other miscellaneous entries.25  Aggregate consumption and its 
disaggregated components, disposable income, GDP deflator, and population are 
gathered from the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis’s FRED. 
                                                 
25 See Table A 1.3 of Essay One for all balance sheet categories. 
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This essay disaggregates wealth into its two major subcategories, assets and 
liabilities.  Assets and liabilities are deflated using the GDP deflator. In addition, assets 
and liabilities in any quarter are measured as beginning-of-period values.  Therefore, as 
in the previous essay, the sample range runs from 1952:2 to 2002:2.  All variables are in 
real terms and are adjusted for population changes. 
Descriptive statistics are given in the Appendix.26  The correlation matrix in Table 
2.1 reveals interesting patterns.  The pattern of correlation for assets closely resembles 
that between wealth and all other variables in Essay One.  The correlation of real 
liabilities with all other variables, especially the consumption variables, is negligible.  
Therefore, the pattern of correlation in the disaggregated wealth series foretells some 
possible interesting results.  Might aggregate assets be the prime driver of consumption 
and consumption categories? 
Further, if we examine the relationship between liabilities and assets with 
aggregate wealth in Table 2.1, we see a strong correlation between assets and wealth.  In 
fact, assets and wealth are highly correlated, having an estimated correlation of 0.997.  
Liabilities, on the other hand are not highly correlated with either assets or wealth.  This 
pattern of correlation can also be seen in Figure 2.1.  The high degree of correlation 
between assets and wealth can be seen in the identical movements of wealth and assets 
over time, which is not apparent between liabilities and wealth.  Further, liabilities are 
approximately one-sixth the size of assets, so assets should dictate most of the 
movements in wealth. 
                                                 
26 Real liabilities appears to contain two unit roots.  The descriptive statistics are meaningful for stationary 
series only, since the means are non-reverting and the variances depend upon time.  Given this, the 
descriptive statistics of the second difference of liabilities and first difference of all other variables are 




Correlation of Variables 
Panel A: Correlation between consumption, consumption components, income, assets, and liabilities 
 ∆RC ∆RNDC ∆RSC ∆RDC ∆RDPI ∆RA ∆2RL 
∆RC 1 0.759 0.632 0.809 0.423 0.282 0.074 
∆RNDC 0.759 1 0.446 0.378 0.483 0.286 0.033 
∆RSC 0.632 0.446 1 0.234 0.374 0.285 -0.037 
∆RDC 0.809 0.378 0.234 1 0.136 0.090 0.124 
∆RDPI 0.423 0.483 0.374 0.136 1 0.338 0.089 
∆RA 0.282 0.286 0.285 0.090 0.338 1 0.141 
∆2RL 0.074 0.033 -0.037 0.124 0.089 0.141 1 
Panel B: Correlation between Assets, Liabilities, and Wealth 
 ∆2RL ∆RA ∆RW 
∆2RL 1 0.141 0.099 
∆RA 0.141 1 0.997 





































Empirical Strategy  
 This essay seeks to examine the robustness of the results found in the previous 
essay.  In the previous essay, wealth was found to share a long run relationship with 
income and consumption.  Assessments of net wealth presume that changes in assets and 
liabilities have equal impacts (in absolute value) on consumption in the long run.  In other 
words, a given increase in assets and an equal increase in liabilities leaves wealth 
unchanged, and therefore has no influence on consumption.  However, this presumption 
may be inaccurate. 
 This essay examines the long run relationship between consumption, disposable 
income, assets, and liabilities.  In addition, this essay also estimates the long run 
relationship between disaggregated components of consumption with income, assets, and 
liabilities.  The robustness of these long run relationships is examined through a series of 
robustness tests that examine the sensitivity of the parameter estimates to the exclusion of 
liabilities.  The empirical methodology and procedures match those of Essay One in the 
Empirical Results section.  These include the use of cointegration tests, structural break 
tests, and VECMs. 
Unit Root Tests  
 Before estimating any long run relationships, the order of integration for all 
variables must be examined.  Essay One contains the unit root tests for all consumption 
measures and disposable income.  The results from the unit root tests in Essay One 
indicated that all measures of consumption and disposable income contained one unit 
root.  The order of integration of assets and liabilities are left to estimate. 
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 As in Essay One, three principle unit root tests are used: the Augmented Dickey-
Fuller (ADF) test (Dickey and Fuller, 1981), the Phillips-Perron (PP) test (Phillips and 
Perron, 1988), and the KPSS test (Kwiatkowski, et. al., 1992).  The null hypothesis under 
the first two tests is that a unit root exists in the data generating process, while the null 
hypothesis in the KPSS test is stationarity. 
 The results of unit root tests for assets and liabilities in levels are given in Table 
2.2a.  As expected, assets and liabilities contain at least one unit root.  All tests indicate 
that assets and liabilities in levels are non-stationary.  The next set of unit root tests 
estimates the properties of the variables in first differences.  Table 2.2b gives the results 
of the ADF, PP, and KPSS tests for the first difference of assets and liabilities.  Taking 
the first difference of assets results in a stationary process (in all tests).  This is not true of 
liabilities.  The ADF and KPSS tests indicate that the first difference of real liabilities is 
not stationary, while the PP test indicates stationarity.27  This is an interesting and 
surprising result.  Estimation of the unit root tests on the second difference of liabilities 
(∆2
                                                
 Liabilities) yields a stationary process.  This result indicates that shocks to liabilities 
have a persistent impact on the change in liabilities.  The evolution of liabilities differs 
substantially from assets. 
 Figures 2.2a, 2.2b, and 2.2c provide graphical evidence confirming the non-
stationary result for the first difference in liabilities.  Figure 2.2a is the graph of liabilities 
in levels.  The graph uses a logarithmic scaling, so the slope of the line represents growth 
rates.  One can see that the period from around 1965 to1985 is characterized by a 
 
27 The KPSS test has greater power than the ADF or PP test.  Given the results of the KPSS and ADF tests, 
the first difference of liabilities is treated as a non-stationary series.  The results from the Johansen test 




Unit Root Tests 
Variables in Levels 
(8 Lags in the ADF and KPSS Tests) 
Variable Constant Only Constant and Time Trend 
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(5% CV = 
-3.43) (5% CV = 0.15) 





Liabilities 2.01 3.68 2.15 0.58 1.62 0.47 
ADF and PP tests the null of a unit root, while KPSS tests the null of a stationary series. 
 
Table 2.2b 
Unit Root Tests 
Variables in Differences 
(8 Lags in the ADF and KPSS Tests) 
Variable Constant Only Constant and Time Trend 
 ADF Test 
Statistic 






















(5% CV = 
0.15) 
∆ Assets -3.58 -14.36 0.38 -3.85 -14.49 0.08 
∆ Liabilities -1.85 -11.57 0.84 -2.73 -12.46 0.216 
∆2 Liabilities -4.96 -39.15 0.03 -5.01 -39.15 0.02 
ADF and PP tests the null of a unit root, while KPSS tests the null of a stationary series. 
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different growth rate in liabilities than the remaining periods.  The differences in growth 
rates between decades can be clearly seen in Figure 2.2b, which is a graph of the first 
differences of real liabilities.  In fact, there appears to be a trend in the rate of change in 
liabilities beginning in the early 1990’s, and the variability seems to increase through the 
sample.  Finally, in Figure 2.2c, taking the second difference in liabilities appears to 
result in a stationary process.  Given these results, the empirical methods will be slightly 
modified from Essay One.  All cointegration tests include the first difference of 
liabilities, since the first difference of liabilities contains a unit root, or ~I(1).  All other 
variables are included in levels in the cointegration tests. 
Cointegration Tests 
 In Essay One, cointegration initially was tested using the Johansen procedure 
(Johansen, 1991).  This procedure is used in this essay (see Cointegration Tests in Essay 
One for fuller discussion).  The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) (Akaike, 1974) and 
the Schwarz Criterion (SC) (Schwarz, 1978) are used to find the number of lags to start 
with for the Johansen test.28 Table 2.3 gives the results of AIC and SC, which indicates 
the appropriate number of lags. 
 The AIC and SC results diverge significantly, unlike those contained in essay 
one.29  The SC results are similar to Essay One.  The AIC results suggest a large number 
of lags.  It is important to note that the SC and AIC provide a starting point only.  The 
number of lags indicated might still be insufficient to remove residual serial correlation, 
which invalidates the results of the Johansen test.  This essay begins with the number of  
                                                 
28 Generally the AIC and SC give different results.  In particular, due to the nature of the criteria, the AIC 
usually suggests a larger number of lags than the SC. 
29 Robustness tests indicate that using the level of liabilities does not alter the results of Table 2.3.   
Therefore, using the first difference of liabilities has no impact on the suggested lag length. 
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Table 2.3 
Akaike Information and Schwarz Criterion 
Number of lags indicated by: VAR AIC SC 
Total Consumption At least 38 1 
Disaggregated Consumption At least 24 1 
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lags suggested by the SC, and then adds lags until the results are no longer substantially 
altered by the addition of these lags. 
The cointegration results for aggregate consumption are given in Panel A of Table 
2.4, and the test VAR employs twelve lags.  As found in the previous essay, the results 
suggest one cointegration or long run relationship between the four variables.  
Normalizing on consumption, the parameter estimate for disposable income is relatively 
robust compared to Essay One (-0.689 compared with –0.723 in Essay One).  In addition, 
the parameter on assets (-0.036) closely resembles that found on wealth (-0.039).  
Aggregate liabilities, on the other hand, have no significant influence on the long run 
relationship, with the estimated parameter being zero statistically.  Therefore, as seen in 
the simple correlation matrix, the role of liabilities appears limited in determining the 
value of consumption, at least in the long run given the results so far. 
Since the long run parameter on real liabilities is statistically zero, the 
cointegration space can be restricted, namely restricting the coefficient on liabilities to 
zero.  The feasibility of the restriction can then be tested.  Testing the null hypothesis of a 
parameter value of zero for liabilities in the long run relationship results in a failure to 
reject, with an associated p-value of 0.711. 
Table 2.4, Panel B gives the results of the Johansen test, where liabilities are 
restricted to zero.  However, liabilities are not fully excluded from the test VAR; they are 
still included as an exogenous variable.  Results prove to be highly robust to the results in 
Panel A.  The parameter estimates on the remaining variables in the cointegration 
relationship are almost identical to those in Panel A of Table 2.4, and one long run 





Johansen Cointegration Test Results 
Panel A: Johansen Test Including Liabilities from the Cointegration Space 
Number of Cointegration 









r = 0   35.51* 27.07   53.03* 47.21 
r ≤ 1 9.84 20.97 17.52 29.68 
r ≤ 2 7.33 14.07 7.69 15.41 
r ≤ 3 0.36 3.76 0.36 3.76 
Cointegration Relationship: 







Panel B: Johansen Test Excluding Liabilities from the Cointegration Space 
Number of Cointegration 









r = 0   43.35* 20.97   43.36* 29.68 
r ≤ 1 6.78 14.07 6.89 15.41 
r ≤ 2 0.11 3.76 0.11 3.76 
Cointegration Relationship: 





* indicates rejection of the null at a 95% level of confidence. 
Standard error in parenthesis. 
Critical values provided by Osterwald-Lenum (1992), Table 1. 
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consumption, previous studies that use assets only to investigate wealth effects may 
suffer from little omitted variable bias, if any. 
The Johansen test appears to confirm the results of the unit root tests, specifically 
the finding of two unit roots in aggregate liabilities.  Taking the first difference of 
liabilities does not create a stationary series.  As noted in Harris (1995), the inclusion of a 
variable that is ~I(0) (or stationary) results in identification of an additional cointegrating 
vector, since that variable by itself creates a stationary variable.  Note that results in both 
panels of Table 2.4 suggest one cointegrating vector.  If the first difference of real 
liabilities were indeed stationary, then the number of cointegrating vectors between the 
two tests should differ, since liabilities is included in one test and excluded from the 
other.30 
 Given the evidence from the correlation matrix and the Johansen test for 
aggregate consumption, an alteration is made to the cointegration estimation.  In this 
alteration, the Johansen test is estimated excluding liabilities from the long run 
relationship.  However, the results are still conditioned on liabilities by leaving it in the 
specification as an exogenous variable.  Results of the Johansen test, excluding liabilities 
from the long run relationship, become stable after the use of fourteen lags in the test 
VAR.  This is consistent with the lag length used for the aggregate consumption test.  The 
results are given in Table 2.5. 
                                                 
30 To see this, assume that the first difference of liabilities is stationary, then results in Panel A of Table 2.4 
should indicate at least one cointegrating vector.   When liabilities are excluded from the cointegrating 
vector in Panel B, then the indicated number of vectors should be one less than that in Panel A, since it 
would exclude a stationary variable.  This is not the case here – both tests indicate one cointegration 






Johansen Cointegration Test Results 
Number of Cointegration 









r = 0   37.48* 33.46   75.72* 68.52 
r ≤ 1 23.73 27.07 38.24 47.21 
r ≤ 2 8.70 20.97 14.51 29.68 
r ≤ 3 5.74 14.07 5.81 15.41 


















* indicates rejection of the null at a 95% level of confidence. 
Standard error in parenthesis. 
Critical values provided by Osterwald-Lenum (1992), Table 1. 
 106
 
 Disaggregating wealth into assets and liabilities also has a substantial impact on 
the long run parameter estimates in the disaggregated consumption cointegration 
relationships.  The parameter on disposable income (0.738) is larger than the range of 
estimates in Essay One (0.365 to 0.508), and it is close to that found in the Endogenous 
Wealth literature (≈0.718).31  The parameter on assets closely matches that found on 
wealth in Essay One – a range of 0.022 to 0.028 for wealth compared with 0.029 above.    
Thus far, disaggregating wealth into assets and liabilities has led to some interesting 
contributions and results.  First, examining the properties of the variables reveals that 
assets, like wealth, contain one unit root, but liabilities, which are nearly one-sixth the 
size of assets, has two unit roots.  Further, in the long run relationships estimated, 
liabilities appear to play no major role in determining the evolution of assets, 
consumption, or disposable income.  In addition, disaggregating wealth into assets and 
liabilities results in finding cointegration between disaggregated consumption 
components, assets, and disposable income.  This differs from results in Essay One, but 
only when liabilities are excluded from the cointegration relationship.  Recall that when 
assets are replaced with wealth, as in Essay One, the Johansen test fails to indicate a 
single cointegration relationship.    
Finally, there appears to be little bias from excluding liabilities from the 
cointegration relationships.  This should not be surprising considering the small 
                                                 
31 Recall that the Endogenous Wealth literature finds an endogenous response in wealth only.  Consumption 
does not respond to changes in wealth or disposable income in the long run.  Changes in wealth have on 
temporary impacts on consumption. 
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correlation between liabilities and all forms of consumption.  So, the results here indicate 
that the use of assets instead of wealth does not materially alter the results. 
Structural Break Tests 
 Significant structural breaks were found in the cointegration relationships in 
Essay One (see Structural Break Tests section in Essay One).  However, the structural 
breaks had no substantial impact on the general results.  It is possible that disaggregating 
wealth into assets and liabilities will alter the results of the tests.  Therefore, the Gregory-
Hansen tests for cointegration in the presence of structural breaks are re-estimated for the 
cointegration relationships in Tables 2.4, Panel B and 2.5.  
 Table 2.6 provides the results of the Gregory-Hansen test for the cointegration 
relationship containing aggregate consumption, disposable income, and assets.  
Substituting assets for wealth slightly alters the results of the test, but the general 
conclusions still hold.  Tests indicate a potential break in the constant around the end of 
1993 or a break in all parameters at the end of 1990.  Therefore, using assets instead of 
wealth seems to generate robust results.   
The similarity of break test results for aggregate consumption carries over to 
disaggregated consumption in Table 2.7.  Again, using assets instead of wealth does not 
substantially alter the break test results.  As was found in Essay One, breaks appear in the 
constant only after 1983 and after 1992 in the long run relationship between 
disaggregated consumption, income, and assets. 
Therefore, the results here are robust to those in Essay One, even with the 




Gregory and Hansen Tests of Consumption 
Break in: ADF* Statistic Zα Statistic 
Constant -4.57 (1994:2) 
   -75.12** 
(1994:1) 
All Parameters -4.73 (1982:4) 
   -88.67** 
(1990:4) 
** signifies significance at the 95% level. 
The 95% (90%) level of confidence critical values are –4.92 (-4.69) for the ADF* test and –46.98 (-42.49) 
for the Zα test for breaks in the constant.  The 95% (90%) level of confidence critical values are –5.50 (-
5.23) for the ADF* test and –58.33 (-52.85) for the Zα test when testing for a break in disposable income, 
and wealth. Critical values are provided by Gregory and Hansen (1996) Table 1, pg. 109. 
 
Table 2.7 
Gregory and Hansen Tests of Non-Durable Consumption 
Break in: ADF* Statistic Zα Statistic 
Constant    -6.73** (1984:1) 
   -78.01** 
(1992:4) 
All Parameters -4.48 (1987:2) 
-18.64 
(1985:2) 
** signifies significance at the 95% level. 
The 95% (90%) level of confidence critical values are –5.56 (-5.31) for the ADF* test and –59.40 (-54.38) 
for the Zα test for breaks in the constant.  The 95% (90%) level of confidence critical values are –6.41 (-
6.17) for the ADF* test and -78.52 (-72.56) for the Zα test when testing for a break in disposable income, 
wealth, and other consumption measures. Critical values are provided by Gregory and Hansen (1996) 
Table 1, pg. 109. 
 
 109
results should be surprising, given the cointegration evidence.  The next step is to 
determine the parameter estimates in the presence of the structural breaks. 
Cointegration Results in the Presence of Structural Breaks 
 It should not be surprising that the cointegration results incorporating structural 
breaks are almost identical to those in Essay One, given the results in this essay up to this 
point.  The results for aggregate consumption, incorporating the break after 1993 
identified by the Gregory-Hansen test, are provided in Table 2.8.  Indeed, they are 
relatively robust to the cointegration results in Essay One.  The income parameter is 
0.764.  Further, the estimated assets parameter is 0.021.  In fact, the parameter results on 
income and assets are almost equivalent to those in Table 1.8.   
 The results for cointegration of the disaggregated relationships, incorporating 
structural breaks, are given in Tables 2.9 and 2.10.  The range of income parameters 
estimates is slightly offset from those in Essay One, ranging from 0.396 to 0.532 
(compared to 0.365 to 0.508 in Essay One).  Also, the range of asset parameters is 
smaller than the wealth parameters in Essay One: from 0.019 to 0.024, compared with 
0.022 to 0.028. 
 As in Essay One, there appear to be important substitution effects between the 
consumption categories.  In fact, the exclusion of liabilities from the cointegration 
relationship has some substantial effects on the range of possible substitution effects.  
The range of parameters in Tables 2.5, 2.9, and 2.10 on durable goods consumption is  
–0.476 to –0.823 and –0.477 to –1.053 for services consumption.  
The cointegration results and subsequent long run parameters differ substantially 





(Break after 1993) 
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Real Disposable Personal Income 0.764** 0.023 
Real Assets 0.021** 0.004 
Constant 62.42** 19.88 
ϕt * Constant (1994:1) 103.30** 24.78 





(Break after 1983) 
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Real Disposable Personal Income 0.396** 0.052 
Real Assets 0.024** 0.002 
Services Consumption -0.477** 0.092 
Durable Consumption -0.476** 0.118 
Constant 262.14** 41.11 
ϕ1t * Constant (1984:1) -44.67** 7.90 





(Break in 1992) 
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Real Disposable Personal Income 0.532** 0.055 
Real Assets 0.019** 0.004 
Services Consumption -0.687** 0.101 
Durable Consumption -0.503** 0.160 
Constant 242.08** 56.57 
ϕ1t * Constant (1992:4) 43.54** 19.24 
** indicates significance at a 95% level of confidence 
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parameters in the cointegration relationship for aggregate consumption to be between 
0.046 and 0.064, compared to 0.021 to 0.038 here.  Also, cointegration is found between 
disaggregated components of consumption, which includes durable consumption.  The 
range of wealth/assets parameters for disaggregated consumption is 0.025 to 0.139, 
compared to 0.019 here. 
The finding of cointegration for disaggregated consumption, including durable 
consumption, runs counter to McCarthy’s examination.  McCarthy finds weak evidence 
of cointegration.  In addition, Mishkin finds that aggregate liabilities play an important 
role in determining durable consumption, but aggregate liabilities have no influence on 
the long run behavior of durable consumption in this essay.   
The empirical evidence thus far provides some interesting insights.  It appears that 
liabilities play only a passive role in the evolution of consumption, income, and assets 
over the long run.  Cointegration estimates here are relatively robust to those in Essay 
One, even when aggregate liabilities are excluded from these long run relationships.  So, 
liabilities seem to play no role at all in the determination of consumption in the long run.  
However, liabilities may still prove to be a viable determinant of consumption in the 
short run.  The next section models the short run dynamics and long run adjustment of 
aggregate consumption, disposable income, assets, and liabilities through the VECM 
methodology.  
Long Run Adjustment and Short Run Dynamics 
 This section examines the dynamic behavior of aggregate consumption.  In total, 
two VECMs are estimated.  The first VECM incorporates the long run relationship 
estimated in Panel B of Table 2.4, where the long run relationship between consumption, 
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income, and assets excludes any structural breaks.  The second VECM uses the error-
correction term (ECT) derived from the long run relationships that incorporate a 
structural break after 1993 from Table 2.8. 
 As in Essay One, the VECM methodology begins with four lags of all variables in 
the long run relationship.  Further, liabilities are added to the VECM specification, but 
still excluded from the ECT.  Therefore, liabilities are allowed to respond in the long run 
to changes in the relationship between assets, income, and consumption. 
 The two VECMs are then reduced to a parsimonious model, as in Essay One.  The 
results in Tables 2.11 and 2.12 give the joint significance of the restrictions imposed 
through this model reduction in the next to last row of each table.  Further, the joint 
significance of the included parameters is presented, which gives the short-run Granger 
Causality of the included lags. 
 Table 2.11 contains the results for the VECM that excludes structural breaks in 
the ECT.  As found in Essay One, consumption and disposable income are endogenous in 
the long run to changes in the equilibrium relationship.  This result indicates that a 
change in aggregate assets has a permanent impact on the long run evolution of income 
and consumption.  In addition, disaggregating wealth once again reveals the importance 
of assets.  Here, assets, like wealth, adjust to changes in all variables in the long run.  
Aggregate liabilities are exogenous on the other hand.  Further, disaggregating wealth 
into assets and liabilities has no effect on the endogeneity of aggregate consumption.   
The short-run Granger Causality results support the weak role of liabilities in determining 
consumption.  Not only do liabilities play no apparent role in the long run evolution of 



























i=1 to j (0.000) 3 (0.000) 2 (0.012) 1 (0.000) 4 
Σ∆RDPIt-i 
i=1 to j (0.031) 4 (0.000) 1 — — (0.002) 3 
Σ∆RAt-I 
i=1 to j — — (0.012) 2 (0.031) 3 (0.000) 4 
Σ∆2RLt-I 
i=1 to j — — (0.415) 4 — — (0.000) 4 







(0.001) — — — 
Joint Significance of Restrictions (p-value): 0.872 
* and ** indicates significance at a 90% and 95% level of confidence respectively 
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The results in VECM F support the impotence of liabilities in determining consumption, 
assets, and income.  In addition, if one thinks of assets as the prime driver of wealth in 
the short run and long run, the pattern of Granger-Causality exactly matches that in 
VECM A (see Table 1.10) from Essay One.   
VECM G, in Table 2.12, incorporates a break in the constant in the ECT after 
1993:4.  The pattern of long run endogeneity is preserved, with consumption, income, 
and assets responding to changes in the long run relationship.  Also, liabilities remain 
exogenous, as found in VECM F.  Finally, the Granger-Causality results are similar to the 
previous VECMs, except for assets.  As in VECM F, assets Granger-Cause assets, but so 
do liabilities.  Therefore, the evidence suggests that liabilities may play some role in 
determining assets in the short run.  Therefore, the effect of liabilities in VECM F or 
VECM G is transitory, at best. 
The implications for past and future research are interesting.  Studies that have 
examined the effects of assets only on consumption do not appear to suffer from any 
major omitted variable bias by excluding liabilities.  Further, future researchers wishing 
to examine the long run relationship between different forms of assets, consumption, and 
income may do so without the fear of possibly introducing sizeable bias.  Therefore, the 
results here set the stage for investigation into the separate effects of housing assets and 
financial assets, if any, on consumption.  
 Another important result is the robustness of endogeneity results for consumption.  
In fact, disaggregating wealth into assets and liabilities does not alter consumption 
endogeneity.  The results from Essay One carry through this essay: consumption 
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i=1 to j (0.000) 3 (0.000) 4 (0.005) 1 (0.000) 4 
Σ∆RDPIt-i 
i=1 to j (0.013) 4 (0.000) 3 (0.171) 2 (0.002) 3 
Σ∆RAt-I 
i=1 to j — — (0.008) 2 (0.025) 3 (0.000) 4 
Σ∆2RLt-I 
i=1 to j — — — — (0.011) 2 (0.000) 4 







(0.032) — — — 
Joint Significance of Restrictions (p-value): 0.999 
* and ** indicates significance at a 90% and 95% level of confidence respectively 
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influencing consumption must be a concern for policymakers, especially in the current 
environment of volatile equity and housing prices. 
 
Conclusion 
 These results here pave the way for future research through several means.  First, 
the long run relationship between consumption, income, and disaggregated assets can be 
examined without the fear of omitted variable bias through the exclusion of liabilities.  
The long run parameters in the cointegration relationships are relatively robust to those 
found in the first essay.  Second, the endogeneity of assets and income has been shown 
repeatedly, demonstrating the improper restrictions imposed by employing an Error-
Correction Model.  Also, the presence of structural breaks in the long run relationships is 
found, but does not alter the major findings.  Finally, another important finding is the 
endogeneity of consumption.  This result is robust throughout both essays, despite the 
different econometric specifications and tests. 
 In conclusion, the empirical estimates lend credence to the idea that policymakers 
must consider the role of household wealth and/or assets when conducting policy.  This 
essay does not answer the question of how long it takes for permanent changes in 
consumption to be realized from changes in assets.  Nor does it address the relative 
importance of stock market assets versus housing assets in consumption decisions.  It 
does, however, demonstrate that household assets play a role in determining consumption 
in the long run.  In the short run, Granger-Causality is unidirectional, from consumption 
to wealth. Therefore, the increase in the value of financial assets that existed in the late 
nineties (followed by the large stock market downturn and large increases in housing 
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values) can have substantial impacts on aggregate consumption in the long run.  Since 
consumption constitutes two-thirds of total output, these changes in asset values can 
create substantial changes in total output. 
 118
References 
“Q&A Franco Modigliani, Nobel Laureate, on Wealth and Value.” Boston Globe, Sept. 8, 
2002, G2.   
Bosworth, B. “The Stock Market and the Economy.” Brookings Papers on Economic 
Activity, 2, 1975, 257-290. 
Carruth, A. and A. Henley. “Can Existing Consumption Functions Forecast Consumer 
Spending in the Late 1980’s?” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 52, 
1990, 211-222. 
Dickey, D. and W. Fuller. “Distribution of the Estimators for Autoregressive Time Series 
with a Unit Root.” Journal of the American Statistical Association, 74, 1979, 427-
431. 
Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.  http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred/. 
Granger, C. “Investigating Causal Relations by Econometric Models and Cross-Spectral 
Methods.” Econometrica, 37, 1969, 424-438. 
Gregory, A. and B. Hansen. “Residual-Based Tests for Cointegration in Models with 
Regime Shifts.”  Journal of Econometrics, 70, 1996. 
Gregory, A. and B. Hansen. “Tests for Cointegration in Models with Regime and Trend 
Shifts.” Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics, 58(3), 1996. 
Harris, R..  Using Cointegration Analysis in Econometric Modeling.   London: Prentice 
Hall, 1995. 
Johansen, S. “Estimation and Hypothesis Testing of Cointegration Vectors in Gaussian 
Vector Autoregressive Models.” Econometrica, 59, 1991, 1551-1580. 
 119
Kwiatkowski, D., P.C.B. Phillips, P. Scmidt, and Y. Shin. “Testing the Null Hypothesis 
of Stationarity Against the Alternative of a Unit Root.” Journal of Econometrics, 
54, 1992, 159-178. 
McCarthy, J. “Does the Households Balance Sheet Affect Durable Goods Expenditures?” 
Federal Reserve Bank of New York Working Paper No. 9329, 1993. 
McCarthy, J. “Debt, Delinquencies, and Consumer Spending.” Current Issues in 
Economics and Finance, February, 1997. 
Mishkin, F. “Illiquidity, Consumer Durable Expenditure, and Monetary Policy.” 
American Economic Review, 66, 1976, 642-654. 
Mishkin, F. “What Depressed the Consumer? The Household Balance Sheet and the 
1973-75 Recession.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 1, 1977, 123-164. 
Mishkin, F. “The Household Balance Sheet and the Great Depression.” Journal of 
Economic History, 38, 1978, 918-937. 
Newey, W. K. and K. D. West.  “A Simple, Positive Semi-Definite, Heteroskedasticity 
and Autocorrelation Consistent Covariance Matrix.”  Econometrica, 55, 1987. 
Ogawa, K., S. Kitasaka, H. Yamaoka, and Y. Iwata. “An Empirical Re-Evaluation of 
Wealth Effect in Japanese Household Behavior.” Japan and the World Economy, 
8, 1996, 423-442. 
Osterwald-Lenum, M.  "A Note on the Asymptotic Distribution of the Maximum 
Likelihood Cointegration Rank Test Statistics." Oxford Bulletin of Economics and 
Statistics, 54, 1992. 
Phillips, P. and P. Perron. “Testing for a Unit Root in Time Series Regression.” 
Biometrika, 75, 335-346. 
 120
Poterba, J. and A. Samwick. “Stock Ownership Patterns, Stock Market Fluctuations, and 
Consumption.” Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 2, 1995, 295-357. 
Stock, J. and M. Watson. “A Simple Estimator of Cointegrating Vectors in Higher Order 




Table A 2.1 
Descriptive Statistics 
Variable Mean Standard Deviation 
∆Assets 148.49 516.72 
∆2Liabilities 0.11 45.53 
 
 




∆C Equation ∆RDPI Equation ∆RA Equation ∆2RL Equation Variable 
Par. Est. Std. Err. Par. Est. Std. Err. Par. Est. Std. Err. Par. Est. Std. Err. 
∆Ct-1 0.22** 0.08 0.69** 0.10 3.98** 1.50 0.48** 0.07 
∆Ct-2 0.20** 0.09 0.49** 0.12 0.40 1.82 0.07 0.08 
∆Ct-3 0.40** 0.10 0.11 0.12 0.32 1.88 0.07 0.09 
∆Ct-4 0.05 0.10 0.18 0.12 1.46 1.88 0.17** 0.09 
∆RDPIt-1 -0.08 0.06 -0.40** 0.07 -1.44 1.08 -0.08 0.05 
∆RDPIt-2 -0.14** 0.06 -0.06 0.08 -1.37 1.21 0.01 0.06 
∆RDPIt-3 -0.08 0.06 -0.13 0.08 -0.04 1.20 -0.15** 0.05 
∆RDPIt-4 -0.09* 0.05 -0.06 0.07 -0.52 1.02 -0.03 0.05 
∆RAt-1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.03 0.08 -0.00 0.00 
∆RAt-2 -0.00 0.00 -0.02** 0.01 0.10 0.08 -0.00 0.00 
∆RAt-3 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.20** 0.08 0.00 0.00 
∆RAt-4 -0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.03 0.08 -0.02** 0.00 
∆2RLt-1 -0.04 0.08 0.15 0.10 -1.04 1.56 -0.74** 0.07 
∆2RLt-2 0.02 0.09 0.16 0.11 1.37 1.74 -0.64** 0.08 
∆2RLt-3 -0.05 0.09 0.14 0.12 -1.39 1.81 -0.61** 0.08 
∆2 0.11 RLt-4 -0.01 0.08 0.18* -1.71 1.61 0.24** 0.07 
Constant 11.63** 2.89 7.20* 3.75 49.23 56.81 -6.47** 2.56 
ECTt-1 -0.09** 0.04 -0.32** 0.06 2.41** 0.85 0.04 0.04 








∆C Equation ∆RDPI Equation ∆RA Equation ∆2RL Equation Variable 
Par. Est. Std. Err. Par. Est. Std. Err. Par. Est. Std. Err. Par. Est. Std. Err. 
∆Ct-1 0.22** 0.07 0.71** 0.10 3.68** 1.44 0.49** 0.07 
∆Ct-2 0.20** 0.08 0.47** 0.11 — — 0.07 0.08 
∆Ct-3 0.36** 0.08 — — — — 0.08 0.08 
∆Ct-4 — — — — — — 0.16** 0.08 
∆RDPIt-1 -0.07 0.05 -0.39** 0.07 — — -0.07 0.05 
∆RDPIt-2 -0.13** 0.06 — — — — 0.01 0.05 
∆RDPIt-3 -0.09* 0.05 — — — — -0.16** 0.05 
∆RDPIt-4 -0.08 0.05 — — — — — — 
∆RAt-1 — — 0.00 0.01 -0.05 0.07 -0.01 0.00 
∆RAt-2 — — -0.01** 0.01 0.10 0.07 -0.00 0.00 
∆RAt-3 — — — — 0.17** 0.07 0.00 0.00 
∆RAt-4 — — — — — — -0.02** 0.00 
∆2RLt-1 — — 0.16 0.10 — — -0.72** 0.07 
∆2RLt-2 — — 0.18* 0.11 — — -0.64** 0.07 
∆2RLt-3 — — 0.18 0.11 — — -0.58** 0.08 
∆2RLt-4 — — 0.19* 0.10 — — 0.27** 0.07 
Constant 11.86** 2.69 6.50** 3.27 42.41 44.74 -6.76** 2.45 
ECTt-1 -0.08** 0.04 -0.28** 0.05 2.51** 0.76 — — 








(Break after 1993) 
∆C Equation ∆RDPI Equation ∆RA Equation ∆2RL Equation Variable 
Par. Est. Std. Err. Par. Est. Std. Err. Par. Est. Std. Err. Par. Est. Std. Err. 
∆Ct-1 0.23** 0.08 0.80** 0.10 4.12** 1.56 0.50** 0.07 
∆Ct-2 0.24** 0.10 0.67** 0.12 0.19 1.92 0.09 0.09 
∆Ct-3 0.42** 0.10 0.27** 0.12 0.68 1.98 0.11 0.09 
∆Ct-4 0.07 0.10 0.34** 0.12 1.75 1.98 0.20** 0.09 
∆RDPIt-1 -0.09 0.06 -0.48** 0.07 -1.53 1.12 -0.09* 0.05 
∆RDPIt-2 -0.15** 0.06 -0.15** 0.08 -1.67 1.27 -0.01 0.06 
∆RDPIt-3 -0.09 0.06 -0.21** 0.08 -0.24 1.25 -0.17** 0.06 
∆RDPIt-4 -0.09* 0.05 -0.07 0.06 -0.68 1.03 -0.04 0.05 
∆RAt-1 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.06 0.08 -0.01 0.00 
∆RAt-2 -0.00 0.00 -0.01** 0.01 0.08 0.08 -0.00 0.00 
∆RAt-3 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.17** 0.08 0.00 0.00 
∆RAt-4 -0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 -0.01 0.08 -0.02** 0.00 
∆2RLt-1 -0.07 0.08 0.01 0.10 -0.40 1.58 -0.74** 0.07 
∆2 -0.64** RLt-2 -0.02 0.09 -0.01 0.11 2.10 1.77 0.08 
∆2RLt-3 -0.10 0.09 -0.05 0.11 -0.63 1.86 -0.61** 0.08 
∆2RLt-4 -0.05 0.08 0.01 0.10 -1.00 1.65 0.24** 0.07 
Constant 10.34** 2.95 1.14 3.56 69.45 58.87 -6.66** 2.61 
ECTt-1 -0.11* 0.05 -0.52** 0.07 1.51 1.08 -0.02 0.05 








(Break after 1993) 
∆C Equation ∆RDPI Equation ∆RA Equation ∆2RL Equation Variable 
Par. Est. Std. Err. Par. Est. Std. Err. Par. Est. Std. Err. Par. Est. Std. Err. 
∆Ct-1 0.24** 0.07 0.80** 0.09 4.31** 1.51 0.50** 0.07 
∆Ct-2 0.23** 0.08 0.69** 0.10 — — 0.07 0.08 
∆Ct-3 0.39** 0.09 0.26** 0.11 — — 0.08 0.08 
∆Ct-4 — — 0.30** 0.11 — — 0.16** 0.08 
∆RDPIt-1 -0.09 0.05 -0.48** 0.07 -1.36 0.95 -0.08* 0.05 
∆RDPIt-2 -0.15** 0.06 -0.16** 0.07 -1.24 0.96 0.00 0.05 
∆RDPIt-3 -0.09* 0.05 -0.19** 0.07 — — -0.16** 0.05 
∆RDPIt-4 -0.06 0.05 — — — — — — 
∆RAt-1 — — 0.00 0.01 -0.07 0.07 -0.01 0.00 
∆RAt-2 — — -0.01** 0.01 0.08 0.07 -0.00 0.00 
∆RAt-3 — — — — 0.19** 0.07 0.00 0.00 
∆RAt-4 — — — — — — -0.02** 0.00 
∆2 -0.72** RLt-1 — — — — 0.25 0.90 0.07 
∆2RLt-2 — — — — 2.43** 0.90 -0.62** 0.07 
∆2RLt-3 — — — — — — -0.59** 0.08 
∆2RLt-4 — — — — — — 0.26** 0.07 
Constant 11.31** 2.74 0.41 3.19 80.86* 48.13 -6.59** 2.46 
ECTt-1 -0.10** 0.05 -0.52** 0.06 1.93** 0.90 — — 




The long run relationship in Table B 2.1 gives the estimated long run parameters 
in the presence of a structural break in all parameters after 1990:3.  The results are almost 
identical to those in Table 1.7 in Essay One.   
As noted in the text, this section includes the VECM results for aggregate 
consumption including a break in the cointegration relationship in all parameters.  
Specifically, Table B 2.2 presents the VECM results for aggregate consumption 
incorporating a break in the cointegration relationship after 1990:3.   
The addition of a break in all parameters after 1990:3 does not noticeably alter 
results for aggregate consumption, as seen in VECM H.  Consumption still responds in 
the long run to changes in income and assets.  Recall that the parameter on assets after the 
break is statistically zero, therefore, consumption, income, and assets respond to changes 
in consumption and income only after the break.  The addition of the break does not alter 
the long run endogeneity results of income, assets, or liabilities.  The long run 
endogeneity of assets and income is preserved.  The inclusion of the break does alter 
Granger-Causality results for assets.  Assets no long Granger-Cause themselves, but are 
Granger-Caused by liabilities. 
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Table B 2.1 
Cointegration Results 
Aggregate Consumption 
(Break in 1990) 
Variable Parameter Estimate Standard Error 
Real Disposable Personal Income 0.763** 0.031 
Real Assets 0.021** 0.006 
Constant 63.72** 23.82 
ϕt * Real Disp. Personal Income (1990:4) 0.576** 0.154 
ϕt * Assets (1990:4) -0.032** 0.010 
ϕt * Constant (1990:4) -2102.20** 565.80 
** indicates significance at a 95% level of confidence 
Joint Parameter Values and Significance 
Aggregate Consumption 
(Break in 1990) 
Variable Marginal Effect p-value 
Real Disposable Personal Income 1.339 0.000 
Real Assets -0.011 0.292 
Constant -2038.48 0.000 




Table B 2.2  
VECM H 
Aggregate Consumption 
(Break in 1990) 






















i=1 to j (0.000) 3 (0.000) 4 (0.004) 1 (0.000) 4 
Σ∆RDPIt-i 
i=1 to j (0.035) 4 (0.000) 4 (0.159) 1 (0.002) 2 
Σ∆RAt-i 
i=1 to j — — (0.018) 4 (0.133) 3 (0.000) 4 
Σ∆2RLt-i 
i=1 to j — — — — (0.007) 2 (0.000) 4 




   -0.547** 
(0.000) — 
    2.553** 
(0.003) — — — 
Joint Significance of Restrictions (p-value): 0.999 
* and ** indicates significance at a 90% and 95% level of confidence respectively 
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(Break in 1990) 
∆C Equation ∆RDPI Equation ∆RA Equation ∆2RL Equation Variable 
Par. Est. Std. Err. Par. Est. Std. Err. Par. Est. Std. Err. Par. Est. Std. Err. 
∆Ct-1 0.22** 0.08 0.71** 0.09 4.26** 1.51 0.50** 0.07 
∆Ct-2 0.22** 0.09 0.59** 0.11 0.29 1.86 0.09 0.08 
∆Ct-3 0.41** 0.10 0.29** 0.11 0.36 1.96 0.12 0.09 
∆Ct-4 0.07 0.10 0.36** 0.11 1.46 1.95 0.21** 0.09 
∆RDPIt-1 -0.08 0.06 -0.44** 0.06 -1.56 1.09 -0.09* 0.05 
∆RDPIt-2 -0.16** 0.07 -0.22** 0.07 -1.28 1.29 -0.02 0.06 
∆RDPIt-3 -0.09 0.06 -0.21** 0.07 -0.10 1.23 -0.17** 0.06 
∆RDPIt-4 -0.09* 0.05 -0.10 0.06 -0.54 1.03 -0.04 0.05 
∆RAt-1 0.01 0.00 0.01** 0.00 -0.09 0.08 -0.01 0.00 
∆RAt-2 0.00 0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.04 0.08 -0.00 0.00 
∆RAt-3 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.15* 0.08 0.00 0.00 
∆RAt-4 -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.02 0.08 -0.02** 0.00 
∆2RLt-1 -0.08 0.08 -0.04 0.09 -0.17 1.58 -0.74** 0.07 
∆2RLt-2 -0.03 0.09 -0.07 0.10 2.41 1.78 -0.65** 0.08 
∆2RLt-3 -0.10 0.09 -0.07 0.11 -0.44 1.85 -0.62** 0.08 
∆2RLt-4 -0.05 0.08 -0.01 0.09 -0.82 1.64 0.23** 0.07 
Constant 10.84** 2.90 3.31 3.33 65.59 57.74 -6.64** 2.57 
ECTt-1 -0.10** 0.05 -0.55** 0.06 1.99** 1.00 -0.04 0.04 








(Break in 1990) 
∆C Equation ∆RDPI Equation ∆RA Equation ∆2RL Equation Variable 
Par. Est. Std. Err. Par. Est. Std. Err. Par. Est. Std. Err. Par. Est. Std. Err. 
∆Ct-1 0.21** 0.07 0.71** 0.09 4.24** 1.44 0.50** 0.07 
∆Ct-2 0.20** 0.08 0.59** 0.09 — — 0.07 0.08 
∆Ct-3 0.40** 0.09 0.26** 0.11 — — 0.09 0.08 
∆Ct-4 — — 0.34** 0.11 — — 0.16** 0.08 
∆RDPIt-1 -0.07 0.05 -0.44** 0.06 -1.32 0.94 -0.08* 0.05 
∆RDPIt-2 -0.13** 0.06 -0.22** 0.07 — — 0.01 0.05 
∆RDPIt-3 -0.08* 0.05 -0.20** 0.07 — — -0.16** 0.05 
∆RDPIt-4 -0.07 0.05 -0.09 0.06 — — — — 
∆RAt-1 0.00 0.00 0.01** 0.00 -0.09 0.07 -0.01 0.00 
∆RAt-2 — — -0.00 0.00 0.01 0.07 -0.00 0.00 
∆RAt-3 — — 0.01 0.01 0.14** 0.71 0.00 0.00 
∆RAt-4 — — 0.01 0.00 — — -0.02** 0.00 
∆2 — RLt-1 — — — 0.49** 0.89 -0.72** 0.07 
∆2 — RLt-2 — — — 2.59** 0.90 -0.63** 0.07 
∆2 — RLt-3 — — — — — -0.60** 0.08 
∆2 — RLt-4 — — — — — 0.26** 0.07 
Constant 11.56** 2.71 3.93 3.10 59.60 45.51 -6.88** 2.46 
ECTt-1 -0.08* 0.05 -0.55** 0.06 2.55** 0.84 — — 




What Determines Liabilities? 
The results here indicate that aggregate liabilities play no role in the long run 
evolution of consumption, disposable income, or assets.  In addition, consumption, assets, 
and disposable income have no influence on aggregate liabilities in the long run.  
Liabilities respond to changes in liabilities, assets, consumption, and income in the short 
run only.  How do aggregate liabilities evolve over time, and which variables play an 
important role in determining aggregate liabilities?  This section estimates the influence 
of lagged changes in consumption, assets, income, and liabilities on the current changes 
in liabilities, and provides greater insight into the behavior of households. 
 Empirically, Equation (C2.1) is estimated.  In Equation (C2.1), ∆ signifies the 
difference operator, RCt is real aggregate consumption, RDPIt is real disposable personal 
income, RAt is real assets, and RLt is real liabilities.  Since liabilities appear to be 
exogenous in VECM F, these lagged changes can be modeled, without a sizeable fear of 
introducing endogeneity into the OLS estimation.  Four lags of the first-difference of 
each variable in VECM F are introduced as shown in Equation (C2.1).  Further, the 
Newey-West (1987) procedure is used to provide a robust variance estimate. 



















iititit RLARRDPIRCRL ελµβθα  (C2.1)
Equation (C2.1) describes the short run impacts of lagged changes in assets, 
consumption, disposable income, and changes in the change in the first difference of 
liabilities on aggregate liabilities.  The results from estimating Equation (C2.1) are given 
in Table C 2.1.  The table presents the joint value and significance of the four lags of each 
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variable.  The joint significance is derived from the Wald test.  Recall that liabilities are 
~I(2).  Therefore, the joint parameter values in Table C 2.1 give the effect that a change 
in the right hand side variable has on the rate of change of liabilities.  For example a one-
dollar increase in aggregate consumption creates a 0.87 increase in the change in 
liabilities.  In other words, if liabilities were changing at a rate of one, then a one-dollar 
increase in consumption causes liabilities to change by 1.87.  Examining Table C 2.1 
gives some insight into the behavior of liabilities.  The largest impact on liabilities comes 
from its own lagged values.  Aggregate consumption is the only component that has a 
positive effect on the change in liabilities.  Increases in income and assets tend to reduce 
the change in liabilities.  In fact, one can recognize the inherent stability of liabilities 
through the joint action of all parameters.  A one-dollar increase in all variables has a 
negative effect on the change in liabilities, reducing the rate of change by 1.123.  Further, 
a one-dollar increase in the past rate of change in liabilities causes the current rate of 
change in liabilities to decrease by more than one.  So, if consumption increases by one 
dollar, the change in liabilities increases by 0.87 dollars, which then reduces the change 
in liabilities by 1.45 over the next four quarters. 
 Therefore, the results show that all variables have significant effects on the 
change in liabilities.  In fact, this set of four variables explains seventy-seven percent of 
the variation in the change in liabilities.  Overall, changes in assets, disposable income, 
and liabilities have a negative impact on liabilities.  Consumption is the only variable that 
exhibits a positive relationship with liabilities.  Consequently, in periods where 
consumption growth is high, aggregate liabilities should increase. As consumption 
growth begins to slow, however, the negative influences of disposable income, assets, 
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and liabilities outweigh the change in consumption, causing liabilities to decrease.  




Table C 2.1 
Results from Equation (C2.1) 
Variable Joint Parameter Value Joint Parameter Significance (p-value) 
Σ∆RCt-i, i=1 to 4 0.871 0.000 
Σ∆RDPIt-i, i=1 to 4 -0.303 0.002 
Σ∆RAt-i, i=1 to 4 -0.024 0.000 
Σ∆2RLt-i, i=1 to 4 -1.667 0.000 
Adjusted R2 0.77 
Joint parameter value gives the summation of all four lags.  The joint parameter significance gives the 
results from the Wald test. 
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Essay Three 
Marginal Tax Rates and Income Reporting Among the Ultra-Rich: 




 In the last twenty years, there have been five major changes in federal marginal 
income tax rates.  Most of these statutory changes altered the marginal rate for the 
wealthiest households.  Tax debates center on taxation of the rich, and particularly how 
changes in tax rates influence their behavior.  Since this group reports such a large share 
of total income and pays a large share of income taxes, it is important to understand how 
this small subset of households reacts to tax code changes.  Feenberg and Poterba (2000) 
estimate that the top 0.5 percent of all income tax filers paid nearly one-fourth of all 
income taxes in 1995.  Moreover, it is estimated that the top one percent of households 
paid 33.6 percent of all income taxes in 2000 and nearly 36 percent in 2001 (Joint 
Committee on Taxation, 2000 and 2001).  Further, the wealthy report a large share of 
Adjusted Gross Income (AGI).32  For example, the share of income reported by the top 
0.5 percent of income tax filers was 13.5 percent of all income in 1999.    In this literature 
(and this essay), the ultra-rich are defined as those households that lie in the top 0.5 
percent of the distribution of Adjusted Gross Income (AGI share).  This group includes 
roughly 700,000 households that reported AGI in excess of an estimated $430,000 in 
1999.33  Understanding the reporting behavior of the wealthy is important for policy 
makers when designing tax code changes, since they report such a large share of AGI and 
pay a large percentage of income taxes. 
                                                 
32 Income in this essay refers to Adjusted Gross Income.  AGI is the Internal Revenue Service’s definition 
of income. 
33 Estimate using Feenberg and Poterba’s (1993) methodology.  Calculations are available upon request 
from the author. 
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 The importance of the wealthy in the U.S. tax system cannot be denied.  What is 
questioned is how this group responds to changes in tax rates.  Particularly, recent 
research questions how reported AGI responds to changes in tax rates.  Some have 
argued that tax rate changes have no effect on the wealthiest households’ reporting of 
income.  Others suggest that any induced changes are solely temporary in nature, 
inducing no long-term effects.  Still others suggest permanent behavioral responses from 
tax rate changes.  These changes can be due to altered tax avoidance behavior, tax 
evasion behavior, or change in work effort.  Previous research findings also differ in the 
magnitude of these effects.  Therefore, changes in the wealthiest households’ reporting of 
income may be small or large, with estimated elasticities of income with respect to tax 
rate changes of zero, less than one, or greater than one; these changes may be temporary 
or permanent in nature. 
 More recent research provides evidence that permanent and transitory effects on 
the AGI share from changing tax rates exist (Bruce, Tuttle, and Garrison, 2003).  These 
transitory effects include shifting the realization of income into adjacent periods to take 
advantage of changing tax laws.  As Feenberg and Poterba (1993) note, the wealthiest 
households have greater opportunities to engage in such behavior.34   However, changing 
tax rates can also create permanent changes in behavior.  One possibility is the effect that 
changing tax rates may have on labor supplied by wealthy households.  Also, changing 
tax rates can induce permanent changes in tax avoidance behavior.  Ambiguity in the 
                                                 
34 Examples include shifting of income payments from self-employment, delaying capital gains 
realizations, and engaging in legal tax avoidance. 
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current literature centers around this issue of temporary versus permanent changes in 
behavior from changes in the top marginal income tax and capital gains tax rates.  
The contributions of this essay are three-fold.  The use of time-series econometric 
techniques allows the measurement of such permanent and transitory effects.  First, the 
long run effects are estimated for impacts of tax rate changes on the share of AGI 
reported by the top 0.5 percent of households.  If a long run relationship exists, then this 
provides evidence that permanent behavior or reporting impacts exist.  In addition to the 
long run effects, the transitory effects of tax changes on the share of income reported by 
the top 0.5 percent of filers are estimated.  Empirically, the short run lead, lag, and 
current period effects of tax rate changes, or transitory effects are measured through an 
error correction model (ECM), while controlling for any permanent effects. Finally, this 
essay presents the idea that household wealth plays an equally important role in 
determining the top AGI share.  Changes in wealth can alter the income and earnings 
decisions of the Ultra-Rich.  Given the importance of wealth for this group, the omission 
of wealth can potentially bias the tax rate elasticities.  An estimate of the relationships 
between the AGI share and tax rates provides a baseline assessment.  Measures of wealth 
are then added, to check for robustness in the tax rates, and to demonstrate the 
importance of wealth in these particular households’ decisions.  Also, the endogeneity of 
all variables is examined, and formal tests of structural breaks are estimated.  Finally, 
other measures are added to check the robustness of the net wealth elasticities.  Dynamic 
simulations are provided to show the response of the AGI share to changes in taxes and 
wealth. 
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The results show that, in the long run, the top capital gains rate is the most 
important tax rate in determining the share of income reported by the top 0.5 percent of 
households, with an estimated elasticity between –0.42 and –0.55.  Therefore a 
permanent ten percent increase in the top capital gains tax rate will permanently reduce 
the share of AGI reported by the top 0.5 percent of households by 4.2 to 5.5 percent.  The 
top federal marginal income tax rate is less important in influencing long run behavior.  
The estimated long run elasticity of the AGI share with respect to changes in the top 
federal marginal income tax rate is between 0.0 and –0.15.  Finally, real wealth proves to 
be equally important as tax rate changes, given a long run elasticity of 0.57 to 0.62.  
Therefore, the positive effects of increases in wealth on the AGI share can overcome the 
negative effect of an equal and simultaneous percentage increase in both tax rates.  The 
estimated long run tax rate elasticities are relatively consistent with previous research.  
The next section presents the current debate and recent findings of tax rate effects on the 
distribution of AGI. 
 
Literature Review 
 Feenberg and Poterba (1993 and 2000) calculate the share of AGI reported by the 
top 0.5 percent of households.  Their estimates are calculated using the Internal Revenue 
Service’s Treasury Tax Model database and Statistics of Income (SOI).  They suggest 
that portions of the movement in their share measure are due to permanent changes in 
reporting behavior.  Sustained increases in AGI share exist following the large tax rate 
reductions in the 1980s.  They agree that short-run shifting of income does occur, but 
there are also permanent effects from tax rate changes.  Further, the wealthy earn a large 
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share of income from capital gains.  Yet, when they adjust their measure to exclude 
capital gains realizations, their conclusions are unaltered – changes in taxes appear to 
permanently affect the distribution of AGI less capital gains. 
 Slemrod (1996) and Goolsbee (1999, 2000a, and 2000b) suggest that increases in 
the share of income reported occur from income shifting, not permanent behavioral 
changes.  Slemrod adjusts Feenberg and Poterba’s share measure to account for changes 
in the treatment of capital gains, and estimates a set of time series equations to measure 
the effect of tax rates.  Since the exclusion of macroeconomic factors may bias results, 
Slemrod add a measures of wage inequality, real stock prices, and the corporate AAA 
rate.  He includes the top marginal income tax rate and capital gains rate to estimate their 
influence on the AGI share.  To control for timing effects, he adds leads and lags of the 
changes in both tax rates.  From his estimates, the capital gains rate plays a significant 
role in determining the AGI share, while the effects of income tax rate changes are 
questionable.  Goolsbee (1999) looks at several tax rate changes and concludes the 
historical responsiveness of the rich is small, and that results from the 1980s are 
“atypical”.  Goolsbee (2000a, 2000b) estimates the absolute value of the elasticity of 
taxable income to the income tax rate to be between 0.0 and -0.4.  He concludes, like 
Slemrod, the majority of the effects from tax rate changes occur from changes in the 
timing of the reporting of income (from labor or capital gains), not from permanent 
changes in behavior. 
 Bruce, Tuttle, and Garrison (2003) estimate AGI share elasticities from income 
and capital gains tax changes.  They control for various economic factors, such as real 
GDP growth, productivity, globalization, and schooling.  Like Slemrod, the authors also 
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allow for timing effects by adding lead and lag changes of both tax rates.  They estimate 
an AGI share elasticity with respect to changes in the top capital gains tax rate between –
0.41 and –0.51.  Marginal income tax rates have a smaller effect upon the share of 
income reported, with an estimated elasticity between –0.27 and –0.31.  These findings 
represent permanent changes and they are robust when controlling for various economic 
factors.  Using dynamic time series analysis, they conclude that the major determinants of 
AGI share are changes in the capital gains rate and macroeconomic factors.  In fact, they 
find a long-run, permanent relationship between the AGI share, the top federal marginal 
income tax rate, the top capital gains tax rate, and macroeconomic factors.  The 
respective tax rates have a negative effect on AGI share, while output has a large positive 
effect and interest rates induce a negative response.  Their research goes a long way in 
showing that tax rates and macroeconomic factors induce permanent changes in the top 
AGI share. 
 The possibility exists that a long run model containing only tax rates omits 
relevant factors that determine the AGI share, namely household wealth.   If changes in 
tax rates truly change labor decisions among the wealthy, then omitting wealth may bias 
the income tax rate and capital gains rate elasticities.  An increase in the top marginal 
income tax rate or capital gains rate can create a substitution effect between labor 
decisions and the realization of capital gains or savings.  Increases in the top income tax 
rate can result in an increase in the consumption of real wealth.  Increases in the top 
capital gains rate may reduce capital gains realizations, causing an increase in net wealth, 
or it could change current savings behavior.  Therefore, omitting wealth measures can 
bias either of the tax rate elasticities, attributing a larger or smaller effect between income 
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tax rate or capital gains rate changes and the AGI share.  Therefore, measures of real 
wealth will be added to address this issue.  However, if wealth has only transitory effects, 
then we should find no significant long run relationship between the wealth measures and 
the AGI share.  The tax rate elasticities should be robust.  In such a case, wealth should 
be modeled into a short run model only. 
As Feenberg and Poterba (1993) and Slemrod (1996) note, approximately 50 
percent of all capital gains are reported by the top 0.5 percent of all households.  Poterba 
(2000) notes those in the top 0.5 percent of the wealth distribution held 25.6 percent of all 
net wealth in 1998, and the top 5 percent held almost 60 percent.  Also, Starr-McCluer 
(2002) shows that approximately 80 percent of households that earned over $250,000 of 
income in 1995 owned equities.  Therefore, unlike most households, wealth plays an 
important role in the Ultra-Riches’ earning decisions, and unfortunately, this information 
is not contained in tax return data.   
Despite the large fluctuations in wealth over the sample period, the share owned 
by the top 0.5% of households remained relatively stable over the sample period, as 
shown in Table 3.1 (Poterba and Samwick, 1995 and Poterba, 2000).  In addition, these 
same households held only six to ten percent of all housing equity between 1962 and 
1998 (Poterba 2000), so housing wealth is a small share in these households’ balance 
sheets.  Therefore, to include the effect that changing wealth may have on the AGI share, 
two measures will be used: aggregate real wealth and aggregate real wealth less housing 
wealth. 
A potential problem in this essay is that aggregate net wealth variables are used, 
not net wealth of the top 0.5 percent of households.  Therefore, real net wealth is included 
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Table 3.1 
Wealth Ownership of the Top 0.5 Percent of Households 
Percent of Aggregate Housing 
Wealth Year 
1962 Definitions 1992 Definitions 1962 Definitions 1992 Definitions 
1962 23.5% — 6.05% — 
1983 22.4% 23.7% — 8.74% 
1992 — 21.7% — 10.48% 
— 25.6% — 10.20% 
Source: Poterba and Samwick (1995) and Poterba (2000) 
Percent of Aggregate Wealth 
1998 
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as a proxy.  The use of a proxy that is not highly correlated with the true variable can 
cause biased and inefficient parameters.  However, these deficiencies get smaller the 
greater the correlation between the two measures.  Although aggregate wealth is not 
perfectly positively correlated with real wealth of the household sector in question, they 
should be highly correlated, since rich households hold a large share of aggregate wealth.  
 
Empirical Methods and Data 
As mentioned in the last section, recent research has presented various estimates 
of the response of the ultra-rich to changes in tax rates.  The contribution of this essay is 
to provide further insight into the behavior of these households.   Not only are long-run 
tax rate elasticities measured, but also short-run elasticities and the duration of these 
responses are estimated. To accomplish these goals, time series econometric techniques 
are employed.  The marginal income tax and capital gains tax rates are included to 
determine whether they share a long-run relationship with AGI share, or, in other words, 
if they are cointegrated.  These long-run effects arise from permanent changes in labor 
effort, reporting changes, or shifting of income by the wealthy due changes in tax rates. 
 The method employed here is Dynamic OLS (DOLS), as suggested by Stock and 
Watson (1993), which is a single-equation cointegration technique.  The cointegrating 
equation is a single equation, and takes the following form: 
ttttt XLnZLnITLnCGLnAGI ωαββββ +++++= '3210  (3.1) 
where AGIt is the share of income reported by the top 0.5 percent of tax filers, CGt is the 
top federal capital gains rate, ITt is the top federal marginal income tax rate, and Zt 
represents the wealth series added to Equation (3.1).  All variables are included in natural 
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logs.  The X denotes a matrix of the lead, lag, and current values of the first differences of 
the natural log of each independent variable in the cointegrating equation.  Although an 
included variable may be non-stationary, the problem of spurious results does not exist if 
the variables in Equation (3.1) share a long-run relationship.  Further, since all variables 
are in natural logs, the parameters yield measures of elasticity.  
 Variables that are cointegrated produce consistent parameter estimates, and, in 
fact, the parameters are ‘super consistent’, converging at a faster rate than normal.  The 
problem with previous methods, however, is the possibility of biased and inefficient 
estimates due to non-normal residuals and endogenous regressors.  DOLS attempts to 
control for these deficiencies by adding the first differences of leads, lags, and current 
values of the right-hand side variables.  Estimations contained in this essay add a lead, 
lag, and current value of the first difference of all independent variables (the X matrix in 
Equation 3.1).  These additions are intended to remove bias caused by endogeneity and to 
correct for serial correlation (Patterson, 2000).  Leads and lags are also added to ensure 
normally distributed residuals.  Further, a robust covariance matrix is estimated using the 
Newey-West (1987) method to improve efficiency of the estimates. 
It is reasonable to assume that these same tax rates have immediate impacts upon 
behavior, but these short-run influences are not necessarily identical to any long-term 
impacts from tax changes.  Therefore, a two-step estimation process is called for, where 
the second stage is a model of the short-run responses.  Therefore, once the long-run 
relationship is estimated, a short-run dynamic model, in the form of an error correction 
model (ECM) shown in Equation (3.2), is employed.  All variables in Equation (3.2) are 
the first differences of natural logs, except for the error correction term (ECT). 
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The ECM is estimated to uncover short run responses of the AGI share and speed 
of adjustment to the new long run equilibrium.  This new long run equilibrium arises 
from changes in the right-hand side variables in the cointegrating relationship [Equation 
(3.1)] at time t-1.  The disequilibrium that exists at time t from a change in the long run 
relationship at time t-1 is given by the lagged value of the error correction term (ECT).  
To capture the full effects of any short-run adjustments, leads, lags, and the current 
changes in each tax rate are added.  Therefore, from employing this two-step method, the 
long run and short run dynamics of the percent of AGI reported by the top 0.5 percent of 
filers are captured.  Finally, when wealth is modeled in the cointegrating equation, the ∆Ζ 
matrix is added to Equation (3.2) to include any short run wealth effects.35 
The ultimate purpose is to differentiate between permanent changes in reporting 
behavior and transitory effects.  If any permanent responses exist, then empirical results 
should confirm the existence of a cointegrating relationship.  Specifically, the estimate of 
α7 should lie in the interval (-1,0) and be statistically significant for cointegration to exist.  
The short-run elasticities from the ECM give some insight into the short-run, transitory 
effects. 
The primary source for the AGI series is Feenberg and Poterba (2000), and is 
available for the years 1960 through 1996.36  This series is supplemented through 1999 
using the methodology described in Feenberg and Poterba (1993).  The Internal Revenue 
Service Statistics of Income Bulletin (Internal Revenue Service, 2000-2001) provides the 
                                                 
35 Specifically, changes in current period and last period wealth are added. 
36 The data series is available at http://www.nber.org/~taxsim. 
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data needed to supplement the AGI series, and interpolation is used to fill in the two 
missing observations in the 1960s. 
Figures 3.1a and 3.1b are graphs of the individual tax rate and AGI series.  These 
graphs provide some interesting insights.  Figure 3.1a displays the AGI share and top 
marginal income tax rate.  There have been five major changes in the top marginal 
income tax rate since 1960.  The first three changes in 1964, 1982, and 1987 are marginal 
rate decreases, while those of 1992 and 1993 are rate increases.  In fact, the historical 
movement in this rate has been generally downward through 1991, and rising after this 
date until the recent tax code changes.  From the figure, it appears that rate decreases in 
the early 1960s and 1980s are associated with increases in the AGI share.  Rate increases 
in the 1990s, however, do not seem to be followed by decreases in the AGI share. 
The evidence concerning the relationship between the top AGI share and capital 
gains rate is less ambiguous.  Large increases in the capital gains rate around 1970 and in 
1986 are followed by large downward swings in the AGI share, as shown in Figure 3.1b.  
The top AGI share trends upward in the 1980s and late 1990s, following the decline in 
capital gains tax rates in 1979 and 1997.  On the other hand, tax increases in the 1970s 
coincide with decreases in the AGI share.  Therefore, the circumstantial evidence 
suggests the importance of the capital gains rate over the marginal income tax rate, but 
closer evaluation is warranted. 
Two series were collected to control for the financial position of the wealthiest 
individuals.  Aggregate wealth data are provided in the Federal Reserve’s Balance Sheet 
of the United States (Federal Reserve, 2001).  Net worth is adjusted by the GDP deflator 
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growth, to better match the indexing of the AGI series.  To address the evidence provided 
by Starr-McCluer (2002), Poterba (2000), and Poterba and Samwick (1995), another 
measure of real wealth is included.  This second measure is real wealth less housing 
wealth (RWH), and is measured as net wealth minus the aggregate value of housing 
assets plus the value of mortgages.  This variable better measures the concentration of 
wealth among the richest households, since housing is a small portion of their wealth.  
Finally, the net wealth variables are lagged one period, so household decisions are based 
on the beginning-of-period wealth levels.   
 Figures 3.1c and 3.1d show AGI share with each measure of wealth.  Although 
both measures of wealth trend upwards through the entire sample period, the majority of 
the growth takes place after 1986.  In fact, the largest periods of growth correspond with 
the largest increases in the AGI share.  There appears to be some positive relationship 
between the two measures of aggregate wealth and the share of income reported by the 
wealthiest households.  Omission of the wealth term may have biased earlier results. 
By now, the potential perils of using time series data are well established.  Non-
stationary data can produce spurious results, intimating statistical relationships that 
simply do not exist. Fortunately, methods exist to test for non-stationarity and control for 
the difficulties presented, such as employing DOLS and an ECM.  To test the stochastic 
properties of the variables, Augmented Dickey-Fuller Tests (ADF) are estimated (Dickey 
and Fuller, 1979).  Further, a second unit root test, the KPSS test, is employed, which 
tests the null of stationarity (Kwiakowski, et. al., 1992).  Also, the possibility exists that 
the two-stage estimation may not be appropriate.  If all variables are stationary in levels, 
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 A constant and time trend are included in the ADF and KPSS tests for each 
variable.  The results of the ADF tests in levels are presented in Table 3.2a.  Since the 
data frequency is annual, a lag length of one is used for testing; this is sufficient to 
remove residual autocorrelation.  From Table 3.2a, all variables appear non-stationary, 
and they are at least integrated of order one, or I(1).  Thus, estimating a model using 
levels of the variables will provide spurious results if they do not share a long run 
relationship (i.e. they are not cointegrated). 
A second round of ADF and KPSS tests are estimated for the first differences of 
all variables, using one lag in the specification.  The purpose is to identify if all variables 
are I(1) or I(2).  These results are contained in Table 3.2b.  Indeed, all variables appear to 
be I(1), so all of the variables are stationary in first-differences.  Therefore, if the 
variables are not cointegrated, using OLS can result in spurious estimation.  On the other 
hand, if these variables are cointegrated, as was the case in Bruce, Tuttle, and Garrison 
(2003), then spurious estimates are no longer a problem. 
Empirical Results  
 To estimate the permanent effect of tax rate changes on the AGI share, Equation 
(3.1) is estimated.  Three estimations provide baseline results and are displayed in Table 
3.3.  The first specification, Specification A, restricts β rameter) to zero.  
In Specification A, the only determinants of AGI share in the long run are the two 
included tax rates.  Next, Specifications B and C add measures of wealth to estimate the 
influence on the AGI share, and to check the robustness of the tax rate elasticities. 
3 (the wealth pa
 Specification A provides some interesting results.  The elasticity of AGI share 




Unit Root Tests 
Variables in Levels 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test KPSS Test 
Series Test Statistic 
5% MacKinnon 
C.V. Test Statistic 5% C.V. 
AGI -1.64 -3.53 0.38 0.146 
CG -1.75 -3.53 0.16 0.146 
IT -2.32 -3.53 0.16 0.146 
RW -1.05 -3.53 0.146 0.35 




Unit Root Tests 
Variables in First Differences 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller Test KPSS Test 
Series Test Statistic 
5% MacKinnon 
C.V. Test Statistic 5% C.V. 
-5.97  0.07 0.146 
∆CG           -3.16* -3.53 0.08 0.146 
∆IT -4.08  -3.53 0.08 0.146 
∆RW -4.07  -3.53 0.06 0.146 
∆RWH -4.14 -3.53 0.11 0.146 
*Null hypothesis rejected at a 90% level of confidence 
∆AGI -3.53 
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statistically significant.  The top marginal income tax rate elasticity is slightly higher than 
that of the capital gains rate.  Although the results are slightly higher than those in 
previous research, these results suggest some permanent response to changes in the two 
tax rates among the wealthy.  From Specification A, a ten percent increase in either tax 
rate will decrease the top AGI share by five to five-and-a-half percent. 
As noted, certain omitted variables may be biasing the tax rate elasticities.  The 
amount of wealth held by the wealthiest households can serve as a source of capital gain 
income.  If income tax rates are high enough, the households considered here can 
substitute capital gains realizations for labor earnings, thus creating a substitution effect.  
Further, they can reallocate earnings from forms taxable as income to those forms taxed 
at the capital gains rate.  Thus if income rates are high enough, these households can 
draw upon their net wealth to take advantage of lower capital gains tax rates.  Therefore, 
the top marginal income tax rate and wealth should be negatively correlated.  Indeed, the 
measures are negatively correlated, with respective measures of ρ= -0.83 and ρ= -0.85.   
The relationship between wealth and the income tax rate indicates exclusion of wealth 
will bias the top marginal income tax elasticity of the AGI share elasticity downward.  
This will result in a larger income tax rate elasticity, in absolute value, if wealth is 
omitted.  On the other hand, the capital gains rate and wealth measures are also 
negatively correlated, but the correlation values are much smaller (-0.13 to –0.24) than 
the correlation between the wealth measures and the top marginal income tax rate.  
Therefore, the effect of wealth on the capital gains rate elasticity is likely to be smaller. 
 As results in Table 3.3 show, when aggregate real wealth is added 































Real Wealth — 0.624 (0.188) — 
Real Wealth minus 
Housing — — 
0.574 
(0.109) 
Schwarz Criteria -1.141 -1.608 -1.899 
Adjusted R2 0.835 0.918 0.939 
Jarque-Bera (p-value)* 0.849 0.829 0.904 
Bold indicates significance at the 95% level of confidence 
*Test of residual normality, where the null hypothesis is approximately normally distributed residuals. 
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–0.113.  In addition, the statistical significance of the top marginal income tax rate 
deteriorates dramatically, and in fact it is now statistically insignificant.  The exclusion of 
wealth appears to severely bias the long run income tax rate elasticity.  The capital gains 
elasticity, however, appears robust.  In fact, this estimated elasticity is closer to results 
found in previous work (Bruce, Tuttle, and Garrison 2003).  The capital gains rate has a 
substantial impact on share of AGI reported, while the income tax rate plays no statistical 
role in the long run.   
Real wealth does play an economically and statistically significant role in 
determining AGI share in the long run.  The effect is larger than the combined effects of 
equal changes in the tax rates.  The results in Specification B suggest that the effect of a 
given equal increase in both the top capital gains tax rate and top marginal income tax 
rate on the AGI share is nullified by an equal percentage increase in real wealth.  Thus, as 
suspected, wealth appears to be an important determinant, and its exclusion results in 
substantial bias in the income tax rate elasticity. 
Next, Specification C adjusts the real net wealth variable by removing from the 
wealth measure effects of changes in housing equity.  As with the previous specification, 
the long run capital gains rate elasticity is relatively robust.  However, it is immediately 
apparent that removing housing wealth has substantial impacts on the parameter estimate 
for the marginal income tax rate and its significance.  The income tax rate in this 
specification is statistically significant.  It still plays an economically limited role in 
determining AGI share in the long run when wealth is included.  Additionally, this 
measure of long run wealth has a significant role in determining AGI share, but the 
parameter is slightly smaller.  In this specification, the wealth parameter is equal, in 
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absolute value, to the sum of the top marginal income tax and capital gains tax rate 
parameters.  Therefore, a percentage change in real wealth that exactly equals a given 
percentage change in both tax rates will have equal offsetting impacts on the AGI share 
in the long run.  Using the Schwarz Criteria as a model selection parameter, this 
specification is the optimum and preferred of the three. 
The pattern of short run, transitory responses is very different.  ECM 
Specification A is the short run model pertaining to long run Specification A, where only 
taxes enter the long run relationship (the benchmark specification).  Thus, the parameters 
in θ’ in Equation (3.2) are restricted to zero.  From Specification A in Table 3.4, current 
period short-run responses exist for the capital gains rate only (-0.386).  Transitory, 
income-shifting effects (lagged and lead impacts) are non-existent for changes in either 
tax rate.  Therefore, Specification A indicates there is not any apparent income shifting to 
take advantage of changing tax rates.  A long-run relationship appears to exist between 
tax rates and the AGI share, as seen in the statistical significance and value of the 
adjustment parameter.  Given the value of the adjustment parameter of –0.434, 90 percent 
of the disequilibrium created by changes in any of the tax rates is eliminated after 4 
years.37  Thus, Specification A indicates there are immediate responses in the top AGI 
share from capital gains rate adjustments, but adjustments to changes in the top federal 
marginal income tax rate are fully realized over a longer period.  Whether these 
adjustments are due to changes in labor supply decisions or reporting cannot be inferred, 
but Specification A indicates some sort of permanent effect exists empirically. 
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∆Wealth This Year — 1.030 (0.346) — 
— 0.900 (0.405) — 
∆Wealth Less Housing 
This Year — — 
0.930 
(0.273) 
∆Wealth Less Housing 
Last Year — — 
1.019 
(0.324) 





Adjusted R2 0.313 0.587 0.663 
Bold indicates significance at the 95% level of confidence 
∆Wealth Last Year 
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 ECM Specification B includes the first difference of real wealth, and is the short 
run model for long run Specification B.  In ECM Specification B, there is a significant 
and negative effect from a changing capital gains rate in the current period.  This is 
nearly offset by the lag effect of a capital gains rate change.  Thus, when wealth is 
included in the analysis, results indicate that an increase in the capital gains rate induces 
income-shifting behavior in the form of delayed realization of capital gains in the short 
run.  Also, the marginal income tax rate has a lead effect that is close to the lag effect 
from capital gains rate changes.  Thus, the income tax rate has a short run impact on the 
AGI share only in this specification, through the shifting of income to take advantage of 
changing rates only. 
Real wealth is added in ECM Specification B with a current change and lagged 
change component only.  Recall that all net wealth measures are lagged one period, so 
that beginning of period values are measured.  Both current period and lagged changes in 
real wealth have substantial impacts upon the share of income reported.  The short run 
wealth elasticities are larger than any measure of tax rate elasticities and the long run 
wealth elasticity.  These results suggest an overshooting, in the short run, of the AGI 
share above or below the new long run equilibrium after changes in wealth.  In other 
words, a given percentage increase in wealth will create a larger temporary increase in 
the AGI share than the long run increase.   
Finally, the adjustment parameter is statistically significant and larger in ECM 
Specification B than that in the previous ECM Specification A.  Therefore, a long run 
relationship between the variables exists, so changes in real wealth and tax rates induce 
permanent responses in the AGI share.  In fact, the speed of adjustment is relatively 
 159
quick, with almost 95 percent of the disequilibrium being removed after two years.  Thus 
the permanent changes in the AGI share occur rapidly.  If the top capital gains tax rate 
increases ten percent, then 94.5 percent of the approximate 4.6 percent permanent 
decrease in the AGI share (or a decrease of 4.35 percent), occurs within two years of the 
capital gains tax change.  At the same time, the substantial transitory change in the top 
capital gains tax rate also occurs.  This rapid permanent adjustment that is concurrent 
with the transitory effects may provide some evidence as to why it is so difficult to 
untangle the transitory and permanent effects from tax rate changes, since long run 
changes occur over the same period as short-term adjustments. 
                                                
The results from the ECM Specification C appear robust, except for the income 
tax results.  The significant lead effect of changes in the top marginal income tax rate 
found in the previous equation is absent.  Also, the speed of adjustment is almost 
immediate, with 97.3 percent of the disequilibrium being eliminated in the first period 
and over 99.9 percent eliminated in just two years after a change in tax rates or non-
housing wealth.38  This result further supports the previous proposal of why debate exists 
over the timing of responses, since permanent and transitory reactions to changing rates 
occur over a relatively short period, creating ambiguous effects. 
Are Wealth and Taxes Exogenous? 
 The possibility remains that, over long periods of time, changes in the AGI share 
may create changes in the top marginal income tax or capital gains tax rates.  Further, tax 
rates and wealth may respond in the short run to changes in the AGI share too.  For 
 
38 Statistically, the adjustment parameters in both ECM B and C are not statistically different from –1, with 
p-values on the null hypothesis of 0.13 and 0.86, respectively.  Therefore, the results suggest that complete 
permanent adjustment in the AGI share occurs in the year immediately following any tax changes. 
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example, as the AGI share grows over the long run, taxes may rise or fall as policymakers 
respond to public pressures. Therefore, there remains the possibility that the top income 
tax rate, top capital gains rate, wealth, and/or the AGI share respond to changes in any of 
the other remaining variables (in the long run only, or both the long run and short run).  If 
tax rates fail to adjust to changes in the AGI share in the long run, they are said to be 
weakly exogenous.  If they fail to adjust to changes in the AGI share in the short run and 
long run, they are strictly exogenous.39 
 Specifically, a VECM(1) containing AGI share, the top marginal income tax rate, 



























































































































































where the matrix of γs represents the short run relationship between the variables, the 
matrix of αs contains the long run adjustment of each variable to changes in any variable, 
and the β matrix contains the estimates from long run Specification B or C, depending on 
the specification.  Weak exogeneity of the top capital gains rate, top marginal income tax 
rate, and real wealth exists when α21= α31= α41=0.  A weakly exogenous variable does 
not respond to changes in other variables in the long run.  If weak exogeneity exists in all 
but one of the variables, it is feasible then to estimate a reduced form model.  In fact, if 
we fail to reject the null hypothesis of α21= α31= α41=0, it is appropriate to estimate a 
                                                 
39 For further discussion, see Harris (1995). 
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single equation, in this case an error correction model, where the dependent variable is 
∆AGIt.  Table 3.5 gives the results of joint tests for weak exogeneity for the VECM 
specification in Equation (3.3), where the Zt variable represents real wealth or real wealth 
less housing, respectively.  The null hypothesis of weak exogeneity of the top marginal 
income tax rate, top capital gains rate, and measure of real wealth is supported by the 
results in Table 3.5. 
 Tests for strong exogeneity of a variable involves testing the restriction that the 
particular variable is unaffected by changes in the remaining variables in both the long 
run and short run.  For example, the test of strong exogeneity of the top capital gains tax 
rate tests the null hypothesis of γ21= γ23= γ24= α21=0.  Table 3.5 includes the joint test of 
strong exogeneity of the top marginal income tax rate, top capital gains tax rate, and 
respective wealth measures.  Indeed, we fail to reject the null of strong exogeneity of 
these three variables.  So, changes in the top marginal capital gains tax rate, top marginal 
income tax rate, and wealth appear unaffected by changes in the AGI share in the long 
run and short run.  In other words, the AGI share solely responds to changes in other 
variables.40 
Structural Breaks 
 The tax code changes of the 1980s marked a dramatic change in policy.  Between 
1980 and 1988, the top marginal income tax rate fell by sixty percent, when the top 
marginal income tax rate was reduced from 70 percent to 28 percent. Over this same 
period, the top capital gains rate fluctuated: it fell forty percent (from a 28 percent rate to  
                                                 
40 When tested separately, the top marginal income tax rate, top capital gains tax rate, and wealth measures 




Joint Tests of Weak and Strong Exogeneity of Capital Gains Rate, Income Tax 
Rate, and Wealth 




Weak Exogeneity 0.254 0.146 
Strong Exogeneity 0.162 0.180 
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a 20 percent rate in 1981); it then rose in 1987 back to 28 percent.  Further, beyond the 
rate changes, other drastic tax code changes took place as well.  These changes 
constituted the most extraordinary transformation in income taxation since its inception, 
and raise the possibility that some sort of break in the long run relationship, short run 
relationship, or both occurred. 
 To address this issue, Hao and Inder’s (1996) OLS-based CUSUM test of long 
run Specifications A, B, and C is estimated.  This test involves using fully-modified (FM) 
OLS residuals or asymptotically equivalent estimators, such as DOLS.  The adjusted 
cumulative sums of the DOLS residuals are then compared to the critical values provided 
by Hao and Inder.41  With this test, the entire sample period can be examined for the 
existence of any structural breaks.  The structural break test results appear in Table 3.6. 
 Looking at long run Specification A (which contains no wealth measure), a 
structural break occurs at a 90 percent level of confidence.  This proposed break occurs 
over the 1992-1994 period, or during the 1993 tax increase.  In contrast, when measures 
of real wealth are included in the cointegrating relationship, the test fails to reject the null 
of no structural breaks.  The maximum value of the test statistic occurs in 1968 (the year 
of President Johnson’s tax surcharge) for both long run Specification B and long run 
Specification C, but is not large enough to warrant the treatment for a structural break in 
the long run relationship. 
 Next, the possibility of a short run structural break is addressed.  CUMSUM tests 
of the error correction models are estimated.  The results are contained in Figures 3.2a,  
                                                 
41 The residuals are adjusted by the estimate of the long run variance and the square root of the sample size.  




Test for Structural Breaks in the Long Run Relationships 
Test Statistic* 5% Critical Value 
Specification A 1.011** 1.0413 
Specification B 0.795 0.934 
Specification C 0.541 0.934 
*The test statistic is the largest absolute value of the adjusted cumulative sum of the DOLS 
residuals. 
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3.2b, and 3.2c for ECM Specification A, B, and C respectively.  These tests provide no 
evidence of structural breaks in any of the error-correction models, or short run 
relationships. 
Robustness Checks 
The possibility remains that the parameters on wealth are capturing the effect of 
other macroeconomic changes.  To investigate the robustness of the wealth results, two 
long run models are estimated, where further macroeconomic variables are added.  
Specifically, real GDP and labor productivity are separately added to Specification C.  
The results are shown in Table 3.7.  Adding either real GDP or labor productivity has 
little effect on the elasticity of the top AGI share with respect to real wealth or the top 
capital gains rate.  However, the top federal marginal income tax rate elasticity does 
increase (in absolute value) when these two measures are added.  Thus results here show 
that estimates of income tax elasticities are sensitive to specification.  Potentially, 
influences not captured in earlier specifications may be biasing the income tax elasticity.  
Moreover, the income tax elasticity in Table 3.7 lies in the range found by Bruce, Tuttle, 
and Garrison (2003).  Thus, the economically and statistically significant effects of real 
wealth and the top capital gains rate found in the early estimations are robust across 
various specifications, but the income tax elasticity appears to be sensitive to 
specification.  Therefore, the role of wealth in determining the AGI share proves to be 
robust, and is important in determining the evolution of the share of income reported by 
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Alternate Long Run Equations 
 Alternate Equation 1 Alternate Equation 2** 
Variable Long-Run Elasticity Long-Run Elasticity 
Constant -1.221 0.499 
Capital Gains Rate -0.428 -0.453 
Income Tax Rate -0.191 -0.277 
Real Wealth minus 
Housing 0.749 0.531 
Real GDP -0.170 — 
Labor Productivity — -0.166 
Schwarz Criteria -1.752 -2.153 
Adjusted R2 0.942 0.968 
Jarque-Bera (p-value)* 0.369 0.915 
Bold indicates significance at the 95% level of confidence 
Italics indicate significance at the 90% level of confidence 
* Test of residual normality, where the null hypothesis is approximately normally distributed 
residuals. 
** 1 lead, current value, and 2 lags of first differences were added to ensure approximately 




One final issue is to examine the dynamic effects that changes in tax rates or 
wealth have on the AGI share.  Figures 3.3a, 3.3b, and 3.3c show the dynamic adjustment 
of the AGI share to a ten percent decrease in the top capital gains tax rate, top marginal 
income tax rate, and a ten percent increase in real non-housing wealth (given by ECM 
Specification C).  A ten percent decrease in the top capital gains tax rate creates a volatile 
short run effect in the first two years, but after three years there is almost complete 
permanent adjustment.  The concurrent transitory and long run permanent impacts from a 
capital gains rate change create this volatile movement in the AGI share.  Conversely, 
with a ten percent decrease in the top marginal income tax rate, most of the permanent 
change in the AGI share occurs after only two years.  Finally, Figure 3c is the dynamic 
adjustment of the AGI share from a ten percent increase in real non-housing wealth.  The 
overshooting mentioned earlier is evident in Figure 3c, as the growth of the AGI share 
matches that of wealth in the first two years. After this, it corrects in the third year to its 
new long run value (above its initial value).   
Importance of Wealth in Recent Tax Changes 
 During the late 1980s, there occurred a large upsurge in the share of AGI reported 
by the top 0.5 percent of income tax filers.  In 1987 however, the capital gains rate 
increased forty percent.  Based on Specification C, this capital gains rate shock should 
result in a long run decrease in the AGI share of approximately 16.5 percent.  The real 
AGI share, however, fell just over eleven percent from 1986 through 1990.  Given the 
long run elasticities, the share of AGI was buffered by the 12 percent growth in aggregate 
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which translates into an approximate 7 percent increase in AGI share.  Thus, as 
mentioned earlier, changes in real wealth partially offset impacts from the large increase 
in the capital gains rate.  Thus, impacts on the AGI share are consistent with estimates 
here. 
 Using evidence from the middle-to-late nineties, one can see the possible cause 
for large revenue flows into the Treasury.  Concurrent with the tax increase in 1993, the 
two measures of real wealth grew by 2.5 percent and 6 percent respectively from 1992 to 
1994.  These small increases in wealth could not offset the effects of the 24.5 percent 
increase in the top income tax rate and one percentage point increase in the capital gains 
rate.42  By 1995, the situation was completely reversed.  The first announced budget 
surplus occurred that year, coinciding with a 5.2 percent and 6.4 percent increase in the 
wealth measures, in that one year alone.  In the same year, the AGI share reported by the 
top 0.5 percent of all households grew 5.5 percent.  Therefore, it appears that changes in 
real wealth and the eight percentage point reduction in the capital gains rate in the late 
1990s may be responsible for the large increase in the AGI share. 
 What does this evidence imply for policy makers?  It appears that tax rates play 
an important role in determining the share of income reported by the ultra-rich, but real 
wealth fulfills an equally, if not more important, function.  If fiscal policy is totally 
ineffective in altering aggregate income, lowering tax rates in a period of falling wealth, 
such as in 2001, may result in a declining share of AGI reported by top earners.  
Conversely, the negative effect of raising tax rates on the AGI share can be totally offset 
                                                 
42 In 1993, the top federal marginal income tax rate increase 8.6 percentage points, from 31 percent to 36 
percent plus a 10 percent surcharge, making the effective top rate 39.6 percent. 
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by robust growth in net wealth of these households in the long run.  Therefore, from the 
evidence presented here, policy makers, who are concerned about income distribution, 
must pay attention to expected changes in real wealth when enacting tax rate changes.  
Over time, the positive permanent effect of wealth increases can easily negate the 
negative effects of tax rate increases on the AGI share. 
 
Conclusion 
 The empirical evidence presented strengthens the view that tax rates are an 
important determinant of the share of AGI reported by the wealthiest households in both 
the short run and long run.  The most influential tax rate appears to be the capital gains 
rate (estimated long run elasticity of -0.42 to -0.50).  The top marginal income tax rate 
plays a lesser role in the long run (estimated income tax elasticity is between 0.00 and -
0.15).  Additionally, the evidence presented here illustrates the importance of wealth in 
the income and tax considerations of the ultra-rich.   In fact, positive changes in wealth 
can dominate the negative effects of tax rate increases on the AGI share.  A given 
percentage increase in aggregate household wealth (or non-housing wealth) and an equal 
percentage increase in both tax rates can actually result in a 0.3 percent increase, on 
average, in the share of income reported by the wealthiest households in the long run. 
 The short run evidence from the error correction models also reveals the 
importance of the capital gains tax over the income tax.  Further, it appears that wealthy 
households adjust realizations of capital gains in the face of changing tax rates, but only 
current period and lag effects exist.  In contrast, there are both economically and 
statistically significant current period and lag effects when controlling for wealth.  These 
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changes in wealth induce the greatest AGI share changes in the short-run.  In fact, these 
adjustments imply an overshooting of the AGI share above or below the new long run 
equilibrium in the short run from wealth changes. 
 Therefore, it appears that tax rates permanently influence the AGI share in the 
long run.  Also, these permanent changes occur quickly, with 95 to 99.9 percent of these 
long run changes occurring within two years.  The transitory effects from tax rate 
changes are relatively modest, when compared to the long run elasticities.  Short run AGI 
share responses to changes in real wealth, however, are larger than the permanent effects.  
Evidence presented in this essay suggests that if policy makers are concerned about the 
distribution of income, they must pay particular attention to not only macroeconomic 
factors, but also to either actual or expected changes in real wealth when changing tax 
policies. 
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Appendix 
Table A 3.1 
Correlation of Variables 
 AGI CG IT RW RWH 
AGI  1.00 -0.52 -0.83  0.73  0.87 
CG -0.52  1.00  0.18 -0.13 -0.24 
IT -0.83  0.18  1.00 -0.83 -0.85 
RW  0.73 -0.13 -0.83  1.00  0.83 





 The essays contained in this dissertation demonstrate the importance of aggregate 
wealth for the macroeconomy of the U.S.  All empirical investigations find a permanent 
effect from aggregate wealth changes on consumption, disaggregated consumption, and 
the distribution of taxable income.  Given the size of aggregate wealth (4 times greater 
than annual output in 2001), small changes in wealth can have dramatic effects on the 
U.S. economy. 
 In the first essay, aggregate consumption permanently responds to wealth 
changes.  The size of this effect is consistent with previous results in the literature – a one 
dollar increase in wealth creates nearly four cents in new consumption in the long run.  
Therefore, changes in wealth can have substantial impacts on aggregate consumption.  
However, changes in aggregate consumption have ramifications on aggregate wealth too.  
Permanent changes in wealth are created from changes in aggregate consumption.  
Therefore, the relationship between the two is bi-directional in the long run. 
 The first essay presents results that are different from that of the Endogenous 
Wealth literature.  Wealth changes are shown to have permanent effects on non-durable 
and durable consumption in the first essay, once the disaggregated components of 
consumption are investigated.  However, like the finding of the Endogenous Wealth 
literature, results here indicate a permanent change in wealth is found. 
  The second essay investigates how the components of wealth - assets and 
liabilities - affect aggregate consumption.  Results indicate the permanent wealth effects 
on consumption found in the first essay are solely due to changes in assets.  Aggregate 
liabilities changes have no permanent impact on consumption.  Even with the exclusion 
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of aggregate liabilities from the long run relationship between consumption, income, and 
assets, the results in the second essay are relatively similar with those in the first essay.   
 The final essay examines the relationship between wealth and the distribution of 
Adjusted Gross Income.  Wealth is found to play an important role in permanently 
affecting the share of Adjusted Gross Income (AGI share) reported by the top 0.5% of 
households.  The top capital gains tax rate and top marginal income tax rate are also 
shown to create permanent changes in the AGI share.  The empirical evidence presented 
also points to the substantial bias created in the income tax elasticity from the omission of 
wealth from the long run relationship.  In addition, the permanent effects on AGI share 
due to increases in wealth can easily outweigh the effect from equivalent percentage 
increases in both tax rates.  Further, almost all of the permanent change in the AGI share 
occurs within two years of wealth or tax rate changes.  In the short run, the transitory 
response of the AGI share shows a distinct over-shooting from wealth changes.  This 
over-shooting is relative to the permanent change in the AGI share from wealth changes.  
Given the evidence in the third essay, wealth is an important determinant of the 
distribution of AGI between the rich and remaining households.  
 These three essays contribute to the current literature through their investigations 
into the role of wealth in the U.S. economy.  The evidence presented here demonstrates 
that wealth produces permanent effects on overall consumption movements.  This wealth 
effect can be substantial, adding significantly to aggregate purchases of goods and 
services by households.  Further, changes in wealth can also influence the distribution of 
purchases of goods and services by households, by creating more non-durable and 
durable consumption in the long run.  Finally, the last essay indicates the important role 
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that changing wealth has on the share of AGI reported by the top 0.5% of households, 
relative to total taxable income.  Given the evidence in this research, aggregate wealth 
can have substantial impacts on the macroeconomy.  Further, these changes in wealth 
have temporary effects on consumption and taxable income, but the most important 
influence is in the long run.  Wealth changes can permanently alter the macroeconomic 
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